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Abstract (English) 
What effect do evaluation systems have on the use of evaluation? This is the 
research question guiding this PhD thesis. By answering this research question as 
well as three sub-questions, the thesis addresses three important gaps in the 
evaluation literature: the first gap is that evaluation theory does a poor job 
explaining non-use and justificatory uses of evaluation. The second gap is that 
evaluation theory does not account for the systemic context of evaluation in its 
more general explanations of evaluation use. Finally, the literature does not 
account empirically for the micro-level of evaluation use in evaluation systems. 
The thesis draws inspiration from organisational theory and in particular 
organisational institutionalism. Organisational institutionalism explains 
organisational action and change to be driven by legitimacy-seeking organisational 
behaviour. Organisations seek to legitimise themselves in order to survive in their 
environment. This theory is applied to the concept ‘evaluation system’. Hence, the 
assumption underlying this thesis is that organisations within an evaluation system 
are using evaluations to appear accountable rather than improve policies.  
The thesis investigates the European Union’s evaluation system with a particular 
focus on the European Commission. This is done in four articles. The first article 
is a theoretical article introducing organisational institutionalism to the evaluation 
literature in order to explain non-use and justificatory uses of evaluations. The 
second article is a historical analysis of the development of the European 
Commissions evaluation practices. The third article is a case-based analysis of 
evaluation use in the European Commission. The fourth article is also an empirical 
article on policy learning from evaluations in three different Directorate-Generals 
in the European Commission. The methodology used in the empirical articles is 
qualitative content analysis and the data were more than a hundred Commission 
documents and 58 interviews with Commission staff.  
The thesis concludes that formal structures are introduced in the Commission to 
increase oversight of the Commission by other organisations in the system and 
that evaluation is used to increase accountability in the Commission. Article 2 
finds that evaluation is, in fact, primarily institutionalised in the Commission for 
accountability purposes. The evaluation system is thus set up with a main aim of 
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securing the legitimacy through accountability for the Commission. Nevertheless, 
articles 2, 3 and 4 all show that, despite this aim of the evaluation system, there is 
still room for evaluation use within the framework of the evaluation system’s rules 
and standards. The three main effects of the evaluation system on evaluation use 
can be summarised as: 1) the ‘sacrifice’ of process use for findings use and 
accountability in decision points; 2) a very narrow scope for evaluation use, due to 
the formal institutionalisation of evaluation; 3) a de-politicisation of evaluation.  
First, the possibility of evaluation use in the evaluation process is decreased 
because of the tightly managed and standardised evaluation process and the stress 
on evaluator independence that ultimately secures the legitimacy of the evaluation 
output and the Commission. Process use is sacrificed as a logical consequence of 
the fact that programme changes are usually attainable only in the design phase of 
a new programme (and not during its implementation), at which time the 
Commission needs credible, trustworthy and independent evaluations to increase 
its own legitimacy as well as that of the new proposal. Second, evaluation 
recommendations tend to suggest small procedural programme changes rather than 
large-scale programme changes that only the EP and Council could decide upon. 
Third, the two previous findings imply a de facto de-politicisation of programme 
evaluations in the EU evaluation system, where evaluation information conforms 
to the administrative context of programme management in the Commission 
instead of the political context of policy-makers.  
A number of other findings from the four articles are indirectly linked to the 
research question. First, the articles all together show the importance of analysing 
phenomena such as evaluation and evaluation use in their systemic organisational 
context. When trying to explain evaluation use, the evaluation literature has 
focused on the evaluation much more than on the context of the evaluation. The 
main contribution of this thesis is to introduce to the evaluation literature 
empirically tested assumptions of organisational institutionalism, thereby 
illustrating that a theory of organisation is better at explaining evaluation uses than 
evaluation theory. The purpose of the evaluation system is to secure the 
Commission’s accountability. Justificatory use is therefore the most important 
type of use for the Commission and this raison d’être can explain why process 
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uses are not made possible in the evaluation system and why findings uses are 
significantly limited to mainly small-scale programme changes.  
An important finding of this thesis is that the concept ‘evaluation system’ needs 
more theoretical depth. If an ‘evaluation system’ is defined only in terms of its 
boundedness, units and institutionalisation then we fail to understand how 
accountability and organisational effectiveness affects evaluation practices and 
evaluation use. This thesis shows very clearly how organisational accountability in 
the system plays an important role in determining how evaluations are used.  
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Resume (Dansk) 
Hvilken effekt har evalueringssystemer på anvendelsen af evalueringer? Det er 
forskningsspørgsmålet, som besvares i denne ph.d.-afhandling. Ved at besvare 
dette forskningsspørgsmål samt tre delspørgsmål, adresserer afhandlingen tre 
vigtige mangler i evalueringslitteraturen: For det første kan evalueringteori ikke på 
tilfredsstillende vis forklare, hvorfor evalueringer nogle gange ikke anvendes eller, 
hvorfor evalueringer bruges til at legitimere organisationer. For det andet tager 
evalueringsteori ikke højde for den systemiske kontekst, når 
evalueringsanvendelse forklares. Endelig er litteraturen ikke udviklet empirisk i 
forhold til at forklare anvendelse af evalueringer i evalueringssystemer på mikro-
niveauet. 
Teoretisk trækker afhandlingen på organisationsteori og især organisatorisk 
institutionalisme. Organisatorisk institutionalisme forklarer organisatorisk handlen 
og forandring ved organisationers behov for at legitimere dem selv vis-à-vis det 
organisatoriske miljø. Denne teori bringes i anvendelse i relation til begrebet 
’evalueringssystem’, og det er således antagelsen i denne afhandling, at 
organisationer inden for et evalueringssystem bruger evalueringer til at legitimere 
sig selv ved at vise ansvarlighed (accountability) frem for at forbedre politikker. 
Afhandlingen undersøger Den Europæiske Unions evalueringssystem med særlig 
fokus på Europa-Kommissionen. Dette sker i fire artikler. Den første artikel er en 
teoretisk artikel, som introducerer forklaringer på manglende anvendelse og 
legitimerende typer anvendelse ved hjælp af antagelser fra organisatorisk 
institutionalisme. Den anden artikel er en historisk analyse af udviklingen af 
Europa-Kommissionens evalueringspraksis. Den tredje artikel er en case-baseret 
analyse af evalueringsanvendelse i Europa-Kommissionen. Den fjerde artikel er 
også en empirisk artikel om politik læring fra evalueringer i tre forskellige 
generaldirektorater i Kommissionen. Den metode, der anvendes i de empiriske 
artikler, er kvalitativ indholdsanalyse og data udgør mere end hundrede 
Kommissionsdokumenter og 58 interviews med Kommissionsmedarbejdere. 
Afhandlingen konkluderer, at de formelle evalueringspraksisser, der er indført i 
Kommissionen til at øge tilsynet, anvendes primært til at øge Kommissionens 
ansvarlighed (accountability). Artikel 2 fastslår, at evaluering primært er 
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institutionaliseret i Kommissionen for at øge organisationens ansvarlighed udadtil. 
Evalueringssystemet er således oprettet med det formål at sikre legitimitet gennem 
ansvarlighed (accountability) for Kommissionen. Ikke desto mindre, viser artikel 
2, 3 og 4, at evalueringer stadig anvendes inden for rammerne af meget snævre 
rammer i evalueringssystemet. De tre vigtigste effekter af evalueringssystemet i 
forhold til evalueringsanvendelse kan opsummeres som: 1) en ’ofring’ af 
procesanvendelse for at forbedre anvendelse af evalueringsresultater og 
legitimerende anvendelsestyper; 2) evalueringer anvendes inden for et meget 
snævert anvendelsesområde på grund af den formelle institutionalisering af 
evaluering; 3) der sker en afpolitisering af evalueringer i evalueringssystemer. 
Vi kan uddybe disse tre overordnede konklusioner. For det første er muligheden 
for evalueringsanvendelse i evalueringsprocessen reduceret på grund af den stramt 
styrede og standardiserede evalueringsproces og fokus på evaluators 
uafhængighed, som i sidste ende sikrer evalueringens- og Kommissionens 
legitimitet. Procesanvendelse ofres som en logisk konsekvens af, at 
programændringer normalt kun er opnåelige i designfasen af et nyt program (og 
ikke under gennemførelsen). I designfasen har Kommissionen behov for 
troværdige, pålidelige og uafhængige evalueringer for at øge sin egen legitimitet 
såvel som legitimiteten af det nye forslag. For det andet har evalueringer i 
Kommissionen tendens til at anbefale små proceduremæssige programændringer 
snarere end store programændringer. For det tredje indebærer de to ovenstående 
resultater at der sker en de facto afpolitisering af programevalueringer i EU’s 
evalueringssystem, da informationer fra evalueringer tilpasses til den 
administrative kontekst i Kommissionen i stedet for den politiske kontekst i 
Europa-Parlamentet. 
En række andre resultater fra de fire artikler er indirekte knyttet til 
forskningsspørgsmålet. For det første viser artiklerne alle sammen, hvor vigtigt det 
er at analysere fænomener som evaluering og evalueringsanvendelse i deres 
systemiske og organisatorisk kontekst. Denne afhandlings væsentligste bidrag er 
at introducere empirisk testede antagelser fra organisatorisk teori til 
evalueringsliteraturen og dermed illustrere, at en teori om organisation er bedre til 
at forklare evalueringsanvendelse end standard evalueringsteori.  
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Et andet vigtigt resultat af denne afhandling er desuden at tilføre begrebet 
’evalueringssystem’ mere teoretisk dybde. Hvis et ’evalueringssystem’ kun 
defineres i form af sin afgrænsning, aktører og institutionalisering, så bidrage det 
stadig ikke meget til at forstå, hvordan ansvarlighed (accountability) og 
organisatoriske effektivitet påvirker evalueringspraksis og evalueringsanvendelse. 
Denne afhandling viser meget tydeligt, hvordan organisatorisk ansvarlighed 
(accountability) i systemet spiller en vigtig rolle i forhold til at forklare, hvordan 
og hvorfor evalueringer anvendes. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
I start by explaining the background to this PhD thesis and the reasons I spent 
three years studying evaluation and the European Commission ‒ two things that 
for most people would provoke boredom at best and aversion more likely. Then I 
clarify how a puzzle developed into a research question, how far the literature on 
evaluation has answered the research question and which parts of the story are still 
untold. Finally, this introduction summarises the findings of this thesis and their 
significance.  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 describe the theoretical and conceptual framework of the 
thesis. Chapter 4 describes the object of study and Chapter 5 expands on the 
research design and methodology. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by answering 
the research question and putting the findings into perspective.  
1.1 BACKGROUND 
About four years ago in Copenhagen, three consultants in the Danish consultancy 
COWI, were pondering the meaning of their work. They worked primarily with 
evaluations of European Union policies and spending programmes. But they did 
not know if the European Commission used the evaluations they produced. One 
day they decided to find out. And so this industrial PhD project came into being, 
as collaboration between COWI and Copenhagen Business School with support 
from the Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science. The project was 
undertaken to shed light on evaluation use in the Commission. 
As it turned out, the consultants’ puzzle over evaluation use was shared by the 
evaluation community in relation to all types of evaluating organisations. In fact, 
the phenomenon of evaluation use had been studied empirically since the 1970s 
with widely varying results. Some studies described how evaluations so rarely 
change policies that a general evaluation ‘utilization crisis’ was pronounced by 
Michael Q Patton (Patton, 1997; Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 2-3). Other studies 
revealed extensive use of evaluations (Leviton and Hughes, 1981; Shulha and 
Cousins, 1997; Johnson et al., 2009a). So what to believe? 
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Two aspects made this question difficult: 
First, the literature is mainly empirical and under-theorised. It comprises many 
case studies that are hard to generalise from. Attempts to build theory from the 
many observations also stay conceptual. Without a theory of evaluation use, we 
have to resort to the theory behind evaluation itself. The main theory assumes that 
evaluations are carried out so that public policy can be improved. According to 
this theory, evaluations are used because public organisations have implemented 
and institutionalised them (see for example Mark and Henry, 2004: 38; Cousins 
and Leithwood, 1986; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). But that does not explain why 
evaluations are not always used. 
Second, no evaluation theory adequately explains the non-use of evaluations. The 
literature is merely empirical, and highlights only that evaluation use sometimes 
does not take place. There are few attempts to build a theory of non-use of 
evaluation. In other words, we can understand non-use of evaluation only in terms 
of the general evaluation theory described above. Probably unaware, Patton 
perceives non-use of evaluation to be so unusual that he proclaims a ‘utilization 
crisis’. Maybe, if utilisation is in crisis when it does not materialise, we expect 
utilisation to happen too often. In other words, non-use of evaluation is considered 
an empirical curiosity or abnormality. Despite 40 years of research, no generalised 
assumptions can yet explain and predict the phenomenon properly. 
It constitutes a theoretical problem for evaluation theory that it cannot explain its 
non-use; it is also a problem that there is no credible theoretical framework that 
can. In practical terms, evaluation theory’s predictions of evaluations being used 
to improve public policies and interventions is paradoxical when, in fact, this is 
not always the case. It would be pertinent to ask: ‘Why evaluate with the objective 
of improving policy if the evaluation is not used afterwards?’ 
The focus of this thesis is the European Union’s evaluation system and, in 
particular, the European Commission, where most of the EU evaluation activity 
takes place. Over the last 30 years, the Commission institutionalised evaluation 
practices in response to internal and external pressures (see Article 2). Previously, 
very little attention was given to the Commission’s evaluation practices. This is 
unfortunate, since the Commission has had a significant impact on evaluation 
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practices and the setting up of evaluation systems in public administrations across 
Europe through EU programme conditionality (Toulemonde, 2000; Toulemonde et 
al., 2005; Olejniczak, 2013). Therefore, this thesis focuses on the European 
Commission evaluation system’s effects on evaluation use with a particular stress 
on the Commission’s role. 
1.2 TOWARDS A RESEARCH QUESTION 
Before introducing the research question, it is important to address the gaps in the 
literature as well as the underlying hypotheses that are the foundation for 
proposing the research question. In section 2, the theoretical assumptions and the 
research question are described in more detail. 
1.2.1 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
This thesis addresses three gaps in the literature on evaluation. The first gap is a 
theoretical gap, and concerns the problem that evaluation theory cannot explain 
non-use of evaluation and justificatory uses of evaluation.  
Theories of organisation have, for many years and with great success, explained 
why organisations do not act upon the knowledge they collect through means such 
as evaluations. Organisational institutionalism, in particular, has demonstrated 
how organisations have adopted evaluation to seek legitimacy in the 
organisational field. This thesis aims to fill this gap by proposing a theoretical 
framework that can explain why organisations do not use or learn from 
evaluations, and why organisations often use evaluations to justify themselves or 
the intervention in question. The thesis addresses the gap in the literature by 
applying organisational institutionalism to explain non-use of evaluation. 
Assumptions are drawn from this theory to formulate a key hypothesis and the 
overall research question (see Section 2.4). 
The second and related gap in the literature exists because the literature has not 
sufficiently incorporated ideas from organisational theory to explain evaluation 
use more generally in order to include the organisational context of evaluation. 
The evaluation literature has tried to focus on the organisational context by 
focusing on concepts such as ‘evaluation system’. However, this conceptualisation 
has never developed into a genuine theory of evaluation systems and the ways in 
which they relate to phenomena such as evaluation use.  
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The third gap relates to the lack of empirical evidence concerning evaluation use 
in evaluation systems ‒ in particular, the effect that the evaluation system has on 
evaluation use and learning at the micro-level and in relation to the users and uses 
of evaluation. This thesis uses the concept ‘evaluation system’ to explain the 
context of the evaluation (see Section 3.2 for an introduction to evaluation 
systems). A particular empirical focus that considers the special dynamics of an 
evaluation system is necessary to understand evaluation use in highly 
institutionalised contexts.  
To sum up, three gaps are addressed in this thesis.   
Box 1-1 Gaps addressed by the thesis 
First gap: Evaluation theory cannot explain non-use and justificatory uses of 
evaluation. 
Second gap: Evaluation theory does not account for the systemic context of 
evaluation in its more general explanations of evaluation use. 
Third gap: The literature does not account empirically for the micro-level of 
evaluation use in evaluation systems. 
 
Table 1-1 below contains an overview of the thesis’ four articles and how they 
address the three gaps. 
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Table 1-1 Overview of the way gaps are addressed in the articles 
Article 
number 
How gaps are addressed 
Article 1 Gaps 1 and 2 are addressed by proposing a theory of the organisation 
and its context that will account for various types of evaluation use. 
The proposed theory adapted from organisational institutionalism 
assumes that evaluation use is dependent on the organisation’s internal 
propensity to evaluate, and the external pressures on the organisation. 
Article 2 Gaps 2 and 3 are addressed as article 2 analyses the implementation of 
the EU evaluation system. The article breaks down accountability into 
four different types and illustrates how learning from evaluation and 
accountability are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Therefore, article 
2 explains evaluation outcomes with the organisational context 
(secondary gap) while also explaining under which circumstances non-
use of evaluation outcomes is likely.  
Article 3 Article 3 addresses all three gaps by demonstrating empirically how 
important the organisational context (in the form of the evaluation 
system) is in order to determine types of evaluation use.  
Article 4 Article 4 addresses gaps 1 and 3 by demonstrating empirically how 
important the organisational context (in the form of the evaluation 
system) is in order to determine different types of learning.  
 
1.2.2 ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS  
This thesis draws extensively on organisational theory and in particularly 
organisational institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). Organisational institutionalism proposes assumptions about organisational 
behaviour that are supported by empirical findings (see Section 2.3 for a more 
detailed explanation of assumptions). The general assumption is that organisations 
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seek to legitimise themselves in order to survive in the organisational field. They 
do so by adopting institutions or norms of behaviour. One such institution is 
evaluation including norms and values, which are adopted to support claims of 
accountability in the evaluation system.  
Therefore, and in accordance with organisational institutionalism, the general 
hypothesis is that public organisations implement evaluation to generate 
accountability.  
Below, I will explain the content of the hypothesis. First, evaluation is linked 
mostly with public organisations. This follows from the definition of evaluation 
used in this thesis (see Section 3.1). Therefore, this thesis analyses accountability 
in relation to public organisations (see Section 2). In this thesis I focus on 
accountability rather than legitimacy, because accountability is more specific in 
relation to evaluation’s function in public administration. Because this thesis 
focuses on the evaluation system and the distribution of power and control among 
organisations in the system, accountability is a more appropriate concept than 
legitimacy (see Section 3.2 for further elaboration).  
1.2.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
In this subsection, I present the research question of the thesis. Section 2.4 
explains the research question in greater detail and explains its importance. 
Following from the discussion of the gaps in the literature and the theoretical 
assumptions, the research question becomes: 
What effect do evaluation systems have on the use of evaluation? 
 
The research question contains three important elements (see Section 2.4 for 
further explanation): ‘evaluation system’, ‘evaluation use’ and ‘effect’.  
The ‘evaluation system’ concept is the study object of the thesis, together with 
evaluation use. It signifies the organisational context that organisational 
institutionalism assumes can explain organisational behaviour and, therefore, 
organisations’ use of evaluations. In this thesis, ‘evaluation system’ is used as a 
concept to capture the organisational interdependency in a system of 
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organisations, while relating this interdependency to evaluation practices and 
outcomes. This is captured in my definition of evaluation system: ‘Evaluation 
system’ is understood as permanent and systematic evaluation practices taking 
place and institutionalised in several interdependent organisational entities with 
the purpose of generating accountability and informing decision-making’ 
(Højlund, 2014a) (see Section 3.2). This definition builds on existing definitions 
and in particular on Leeuw and Furubo (2008). 
The concept ‘evaluation use’ is the object of study of the thesis together with 
evaluation systems. Evaluation use refers to the use of evaluations, including the 
learning that takes place during and subsequent to evaluation processes. In Section 
3.3, evaluation use is described in more detail, including the many types of 
evaluation use. The concept ‘evaluation use’ is to be understood broadly to include 
all types of uses. It is a key finding of this article that non-use as well as 
justificatory uses of evaluations are also to be included as important and central 
use types. 
The concept ‘effect’ refers to the relationship between evaluation system and 
evaluation use. I am interested in understanding this relationship; in particular, 
whether the evaluation system has an effect on evaluation use.  
To answer the research question, I propose three auxiliary sub-questions that 
address more specifically the gaps in the literature: 
1) How can non-use and justificatory uses of evaluation be explained? 
(addressed in articles 1, 3 and 4) 
2) How can evaluation use be explained in its systemic organisational context? 
(addressed in articles 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
3) How are evaluations used in evaluation systems? (addressed in articles 2, 3 
and 4) 
The next section contains a review of the evaluation literature in relation to the 
concepts of evaluation system and evaluation use. 
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1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this thesis, three gaps in the evaluation literature are addressed. All of them 
relate to evaluation theory and its potential for improvement. Therefore, this 
literature review starts by focusing on existing evaluation theory and its 
assumptions regarding evaluation use. Then it reviews the attempts the evaluation 
literature has made to integrate organisational theory and, in particular, 
organisational institutionalism in order to answer questions related to evaluation 
use. The review also looks at how the literature has developed in order to gauge 
the theoretical depth of this emerging line of thinking in the evaluation literature. 
The concept of ‘evaluation system’ represents another attempt to bring contextual 
factors into evaluation theory. But does the present literature on evaluation 
systems also speak about evaluation use? Finally, the review assesses the 
empirical contributions of the EU evaluation system. 
The concept ‘evaluation’ first appeared in the 1950s, linked with a common belief 
that society could be engineered through large public spending programmes and 
infrastructure projects (Vedung, 2010). Targeted interventions would improve life 
for everyone and evaluation would ensure that decision-makers learned from 
earlier mistakes or successes (Porter, 1995). Underlying this thinking were 
rationalist and economic assumptions about human behaviour containing the 
underlying positive and evolutionary assumption of progress and betterment 
(Henry, 2004; Dahler-Larsen, 2012). According to Henry and Mark, the ultimate 
objective of evaluation is social betterment, because evaluation helps policy-
makers make better policies, and in turn those policies improve people’s lives. In 
other words, part of this positivist paradigm was a belief in the ability of policy-
makers and administrators to learn lessons from previous interventions and thus to 
constantly improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending 
and interventions (Vedung, 1997). The inherent logic of mainstream evaluation 
theory is therefore realist and rational, and perfectly aligned with the economic 
theory and theories of rational choice from which it arose (Albæk, 1995; Van der 
Knaap, 1995; Schwandt, 1997; Sanderson, 2000).  
Theoretically, the rational approach to government intervention was reflected in 
David Easton’s system theory of policy-making (Easton, 1965). In Easton’s 
model, evaluation relates to the feedback that policy-makers receive as input 
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toward improved policies. But as this rational view on policy-making and public 
interventions proliferated, particularly in political science and economics, 
sociologists studying evaluative and scientific knowledge were more sceptical 
about whether this learning and evaluation use actually took place (Lazarsfeld et 
al., 1967). Though Easton’s policy model assumes feedback, little evidence 
supported this assumption. In fact, subsequent research into the use of scientific 
knowledge and evaluation often illustrated how existing knowledge was not used 
to improve policies. This phenomenon was referred to by some scholars as a 
‘utilization crisis’ (Patton, 1997).  
This concern over non-use of evaluation findings prompted the emergence of a 
large body of literature related to evaluation use. It was derived from literatures on 
the use of scientific results in policy making (Lazarsfeld et al., 1967; Porter, 1995; 
Vedung, 2010; Weiss, 1998; Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980). In fact, evaluation use 
is probably the most researched theme in the literature on evaluation (Christie, 
2007: 8; Henry and Mark, 2003: 294). At present, the substantial ‘evaluation use’ 
literature exists independently of the literature on the use of scientific results and 
knowledge, mainly because the field of evaluation is a relatively specific 
practitioner field.  
In the wake of the disenchantment over the scarce evidence of evaluation use, the 
literature sought reasons for it (Leviton and Hughes, 1981; Cousins and 
Leithwood, 1986; Johnson et al., 2009a). After the evaluation literature had more 
or less converged on a typology of four key uses (see Section 3.2), research was 
then dedicated to explanatory variables and to answering the question that interests 
all evaluators: What makes my evaluation useful? This resulted in a large number 
of case studies that inferred relationships between contextual variables or 
conditions and several different use types. This research, which undoubtedly 
comprises more than one thousand case studies, has been summarised in reviews: 
(Burry et al., 1985; Beyer and Trice, 1982; King and Thompson, 1983; Thompson 
and King, 1981; Shulha and Cousins, 1997; Leviton and Hughes, 1981; Cousins 
and Leithwood, 1986; Cousins et al., 2004; Johnson et al., 2009a). As the reviews 
make clear, the literature focused on factors related to the attributes of the 
evaluation (e.g., methodology, quality, relevance of findings, etc) or the 
immediate contextual factors pertaining to the organisation in which the 
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evaluation was implemented (e.g., political climate, timing of the evaluation 
relative to decision-making, etc). These categories were empirically informed 
from the late 1970s and onwards (see for example Leviton and Hughes, 1981).  
While research has clearly and comprehensively explained evaluation use, the 
explanations of non-use or justificatory use (sometimes called misuse) are not as 
satisfactory (Højlund, 2014b). There is a large body of empirical literature 
illustrating ‒ but not adequately explaining ‒ the phenomenon of non-use. This is 
mainly because the literature focuses on the evaluation and not very often on its 
context (Van der Knaap, 1995). This thesis addresses this gap by seeking an 
explanation of non-use and explanatory uses in organisational sociology.  
The majority of literature explaining evaluation use focuses on identifying uses as 
well as factors and conditions relevant to evaluation use. Though some examples 
exist, it is rare to find any work that attempts a systematic reflection on the 
organisational context and the implications for evaluation use. Van der Knaap 
(1995) and Sanderson (2000) are two important voices calling for a contextual 
analysis of evaluation research. Earlier, Levin (1987) found that contextual factors 
were highly important in explaining evaluation use, and Shulha and Cousins 
(1997) later produced an important review, concluding that contextual factors and 
organisational contexts were becoming more prominent in the literature. Thereby, 
the contextual characteristics of the evaluation, such as the decision-making or 
policy setting, became a focal point in the 1990s. However, the research 
community realised that it was not enough to describe different types of use and to 
catalogue their contributing factors (Shulha and Cousins, 1997: 197).  
Researchers started to theorise about the context of evaluation use more broadly. 
This resulted in many theory-building attempts. One of the most significant 
concepts is contained in the concept of the ‘evaluation system’ (Rist and Stame, 
2006; Leeuw and Furubo, 2008). The literature on evaluation has been 
increasingly interested in the question of evaluation systems and their effects on 
evaluation use. But only recently has it started investigating the effects of 
substantial formal and informal institutionalisation of evaluation practices on 
evaluation use. The discussion was initiated with publication of From Studies to 
Streams, edited by Ray C Rist and Nicoletta Stame (Rist and Stame, 2006) and 
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was continued in a small number of other studies (Williams and Imam, 2007; 
Leeuw and Furubo, 2008).  
However, the literature on evaluation systems both lacks a sound theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence related to evaluation systems’ effects on 
evaluation use. Evaluation systems are generally assumed to have a negative 
impact on the use of information and knowledge in policy-making (Power, 1997; 
Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Pollitt et al., 1999; Furubo, 2006). 
Previous studies suggest that evaluation use tends to be made relevant primarily 
for administrators and not for policy-makers, and that use in administrations will 
be linked to procedural assurance and legitimisation of the organisation rather than 
policy-making (see also Furubo, 2006; Langley, 1998). However, empirical 
research of evaluation systems at the micro-level is still needed to increase our 
understanding of their role with regard to the use of evaluations. 
Despite the focus on evaluative context, the evaluation literature has only to a 
limited extent looked to mainstream organisational theory (such as organisational 
institutionalism) for explanatory frameworks by which to explain evaluation use. 
Shulha and Cousins (1997) and Van der Knaap (1995) point to the emergence of 
‘context’ in relation to explaining evaluation use; however, no theoretical 
framework has since been developed. Peter Dahler-Larsen has written extensively 
on evaluation from an institutional and constructivist perspective (Dahler-Larsen 
and Krogstrup, 1998). He analyses oraganisations’ adoption and subsequent 
ritualisation of evaluation as an institution. However, Peter Dahler-Larsen does 
not explicitly address the use of evaluation results. When reviewing the evaluation 
literature, it is clear that since Cousins’ call for more contextual explanations for 
evaluation use, there has been very little written on this subject. A bibliographical 
search in the leading evaluation journals found only a few articles that analyse 
evaluation and its institutional role (Barnes et al., 2003; Hanberger and Schild, 
2004; Varone et al., 2005; Jacob, 2005). Only two articles focus on the influence 
of institutionalised evaluation practices on performance and evaluation use (Sager 
and Rissi, 2011; Eckerd and Moulton, 2011). Only the article by Eckerd and 
Moulton (2011) specifically explains evaluation use by institutional logics in the 
organisational context.  
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Thus, the literature falls short on three main issues. First, it fails to adequately 
explain why evaluations are sometimes not used at all, or why evaluations are 
often used to justify an organisation or its interventions. Second, the literature fails 
to explain how evaluation use can be explained by the systemic organisational 
context. Finally, there is very little empirical research on evaluation use in an 
evaluation system. 
Academic interest in evaluation systems has increased as evaluation systems in 
national and international public administrations have increased. As part of a 
general trend that began in the 1990s, the European Union has also developed an 
evaluation system, with the European Commission as the main organisation. 
Despite this evaluation system’s increasing influence on the evaluation practices 
of EU Member States and ‘third countries’, surprisingly little academic attention 
has been paid to the EU’s evaluation system. Only a few academic studies exist 
(Toulemonde, 2000; Furubo et al., 2002; Toulemonde et al., 2005; Hoerner and 
Stephenson, 2012; Mendez and Bachtler, 2011; Eser and Nussmueller, 2006), and 
the main empirical works are Commission-sponsored consultant reports (Williams 
et al., 2002; Laat, 2005). On EU evaluation more generally, a small body of 
literature exists, in particular on evaluation of the Structural Funds or other EU 
programmes (Eser and Nussmueller, 2006; Toulemonde et al., 2005; Eureval-C3E, 
2006; Stern, 2009; Summa and Toulemonde, 2002; Olejniczak, 2013; Ferry and 
Olejniczak, 2008). This thesis also addresses this shortage of research on the EU 
evaluation system. The section below explains the contributions of the thesis as 
well as the coherence of the four articles. 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS AND COHERENCE 
This section elaborates on the contributions of this thesis as well as on the 
coherence of the four articles that constitute the main work of the thesis (see the 
Appendix). 
1.4.1 COHERENCE OF ARTICLES 
This thesis consists of four articles, each of which makes a unique contribution to 
our knowledge about evaluation systems and evaluation use. Table 1-2 provides 
an overview of the articles and their findings. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the coherence between the four articles. It presents the causal 
relationship between evaluation system and evaluation uses (summative and 
formative). The dotted lines show which phenomena each article analyses.  
Figure 1 Coherence of the four thesis articles 
The four articles investigate different aspects of the relationship between the 
evaluation system and evaluation use. Thus, articles 1 and 2 investigate the 
context of the evaluation system theoretically (article 1) and empirically (article 
2), taking the Commission as its case. Articles 3 and 4 investigate evaluation use 
from evaluations in the context of the Commission’s evaluation system. The 
following expands on the content of each of the articles.  
The first article is a theoretical contribution that investigates the relationship 
between evaluation use and the evaluation’s organisational context. It lays down 
theoretical foundations for the other three articles, which are more directly focused 
on the concept of evaluation system. The article addresses gaps 1 and 2 by 
proposing a theoretical framework by which to understand non-use of evaluation, 
while also accounting for the evaluative context in which evaluation takes place. 
The article finds that the literature on evaluation use has been very good at 
describing the evaluation, its conditioning factors, while neglecting the 
organisational context in which the evaluating organisation operates, as well as the 
organisation’s ability to evaluate. This is done more specifically by introducing 
Evaluation Use 
Evaluation system 
Summative use 
Formative use 
Article 4 
Article 3 
Effect 
Article 1 
Article 2 
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institutional theoretical explanations to explain organisational behaviour and 
different types of evaluation use.  
The second article extends this by analysing the motives behind the 
implementation of evaluation practices and the creation of an evaluation system. 
In doing so, the article shows how the development of an evaluation system is a 
response to an organisational need to increase primarily accountability but also 
learning. Therefore, article 2 explains learning with the evaluation system while 
also explaining under which circumstances non-evaluative outcomes are likely. 
Thus, the article addresses gaps 2 and 3.  
The third article provides empirical evidence of evaluation use in the European 
Union’s evaluation system. It demonstrates empirically how important the 
organisational context (in the form of the evaluation system) is when determining 
types of evaluation use. The article addresses all three gaps. Both the third and 
fourth articles are empirical investigations of the effect that the evaluation system 
has on evaluation use in the context of the EU evaluation system.  
Finally, the fourth article investigates how evaluation systems affect policy 
learning when it is understood as a type of evaluation use. Similarly to article 3, 
article 4 also demonstrates empirically how important the evaluation system is in 
determining types of evaluative outcomes. The article addresses gaps 1 and 3.  
1.4.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The thesis fills three gaps in the literature and addresses a lack of empirical 
research on the EU’s evaluation system. The contributions are described in the 
subsections below. 
1.4.2.1 EXPLAINING NON-USE AND JUSTIFICATORY USES 
The contribution of this thesis is the introduction of organisational institutionalism 
to the evaluation literature in order to explain the phenomenon of non-use of 
evaluation. The thesis (mainly article 1) points out and illustrates the painful 
paradox of evaluation theory’s inability to explain why evaluations are not used, 
despite the fact that the purpose of conducting evaluations is to use them to 
improve policies (Højlund, 2014b). Empirically, non-use of evaluation is already 
supported by evidence, but the literature lacks a theory that can explain it. With 
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the contribution of this thesis, non-use of evaluation is theoretically explained by 
focusing on the evaluation in its systemic context and non-use of evaluation is 
assumed a priori. 
This contribution is made theoretically in article 1 (Højlund, 2014b) and supported 
by empirical research in articles 3 (Højlund, 2014a) and 4 (Borrás and Højlund, 
2014). The theoretical contribution is the explanation of non-use of evaluation 
with the explanatory framework and theoretical assumptions of organisational 
institutionalism. By assuming a need for organisations to legitimise themselves, 
evaluation is understood in its context of the evaluation system. In the evaluation 
system, organisations (the Commission) use evaluations to seek accountability in 
the system. Accountability-seeking behaviour does not exclude the organisation 
from using evaluations per se, but in the evaluation system an organisation can be 
obliged to evaluate in order to appear legitimate and survive in the long-term in 
that system.  
1.4.2.2 EXPLAINING EVALUATION USE WITH THE ‘EVALUATION SYSTEM’ 
The thesis also addresses a second gap in the evaluation literature: that the 
literature does not account for the context of evaluation when explaining 
evaluation use. More specifically, previous contributions on evaluation systems do 
not account for the effect these systems have on evaluation use.  
When explaining evaluation use, the literature has focused on the evaluation itself 
much more than its context. The contribution of this thesis is to introduce 
empirically tested assumptions of organisational institutionalism to the evaluation 
literature, thereby illustrating that a theory of organisation is better at explaining 
evaluation uses than evaluation theory. In particular, these assumptions are added 
to existing concepts of evaluation systems to increase their theoretical depth. The 
concepts were first formulated by Michael Scriven (Scriven, 1967) and have since 
been a common reference point in the literature. However, the summative and 
formative debate in the evaluation literature has long been under-theorised. This 
thesis is a credible attempt to add to this debate by emphasising evaluation’s 
summative role through the assumptions of organisational behaviour drawn from 
organisational institutionalism. 
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It is a major contribution of this thesis to expand the concept of ‘evaluation 
system’ so that it can explain evaluation use. This contribution is important, in that 
it translates the assumptions and concepts of organisational institutionalism into 
existing evaluation theory, thus theoretically invigorating the longstanding 
conceptual dichotomy in the evaluation literature between accountability and 
learning.  
The concept ‘evaluation system’ existed already in the evaluation literature, but it 
was merely conceptual and lacked theoretical depth (see section 3.2 for an 
introduction). By linking the assumptions of organisational institutionalism with 
the evaluation system, the concept gets the necessary ‘theoretical depth’ to explain 
phenomena such as evaluation use. This is done theoretically in article 1 (Højlund, 
2014b) and empirically in articles 2 (Højlund, Forthcoming), 3 (Højlund, 2014a) 
and 4 (Borrás and Højlund, 2014).  
1.4.2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF EVALUATION SYSTEMS’ EFFECT ON
EVALUATION USE
The third gap relates to lack of empirical evidence of the effects of evaluation 
systems on evaluation use. Articles 2 (Højlund, Forthcoming), 3 (Højlund, 2014a) 
and 4 (Borrás and Højlund, 2014) each describe in their own way the effect of the 
EU’s evaluation system on evaluation use including learning. Articles 3 and 4 
provide a rare insight into the micro-level of users of evaluations in the European 
Commission and beyond. Focusing on the users and the uses of evaluations 
illustrates the effects of the evaluation system’s formal and informal 
institutionalisation. Thus, article 4 finds that different types of actors learn 
differently from evaluations, depending on their position in the evaluation system. 
1.4.2.4 EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The thesis also makes several very important empirical contributions, described 
below.  
First, the literature on evaluation systems is primarily conceptual and not 
particularly empirical (Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Mendez and Bachtler, 2011). 
This thesis analyses the EU evaluation system as its case in order to remedy this 
empirical gap in the literature. Articles 2, 3 and 4 take the Commission – the most 
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important organisation in the system ‒ as their starting point in the EU evaluation 
system. For example, the third article improves our understanding of the 
implications of an evaluation system on evaluation use, and finds that formal and 
informal institutions both impede and enable the use of evaluation.  
Second, the EU evaluation system has not previously been scrutinised 
academically. The thesis focuses on the EU evaluation system and, in particular, 
the European Commission, where most of the system’s evaluation activity takes 
place. The case is interesting for its novelty. The Commission has had a significant 
impact on evaluation practices and the setting up of evaluation systems in public 
administrations across Europe through EU programme conditionality 
(Toulemonde, 2000; Furubo et al., 2002; Toulemonde et al., 2005; Hoerner and 
Stephenson, 2012; Mendez and Bachtler, 2011; Eser and Nussmueller, 2006). 
Therefore, it is important to study how and why the Commission evaluates. The 
project also accounts for the development and implementation of the 
Commission’s evaluation system (see article 2). 
Third, evaluation practices in the Commission have been addressed only by 
consultancy reports and not by systematic academic inquiry. This thesis analyses 
both the Commission’s adoption of evaluation as practice as well as the effects of 
the practices on evaluation use. This is done primarily in articles 2 and 3, but also 
in article 4.  
1.5 DATA 
The thesis is based on empirical analysis of 58 recorded interviews, two group 
interviews and one conference on evaluation in the EU, along with numerous 
informal talks with experts and Commission desk officers, as well as personal 
observations including evaluation steering committee meetings. Interviewees were 
sampled purposefully and according to availability, and included Commission 
employees working in evaluation units and policy units, as well as external 
evaluators, evaluation trainers and consultants working with the Commission in 
the setting up of the evaluation system. Several of the interviewees were senior 
staff who played key roles in the early implementation of the evaluation system 
and who thus had a good historical overview of evaluation in the Commission. 
Interview data were validated with document data comprising more than a 
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hundred public and non-public documents, such as internal evaluation policy 
papers, guidelines, minutes of meetings in the evaluation network and so on. 
1.6 INDUSTRIAL PHD THESIS 
This thesis is funded by the industrial PhD programme. In Denmark, an industrial 
PhD thesis must meet the same requirements as a conventional PhD thesis. 
However, the industrial PhD candidate is employed by a company, which is both 
an advantage and a challenge. In this case, it was an advantage because it 
facilitated access to the European Commission subsequent to a large ex post 
evaluation conducted for DG Environment by COWI, where I worked as a 
consultant before shifting position to become a PhD candidate in the same 
company. Without this contact the third article would never have been possible. 
Moreover, my previous experience in the field and with the Commission made it 
possible to write a better thesis. On the other hand, this contact raises conflict of 
interest issues, both in relation to science and the Commission.  
The issue of conflict of interest is standard to the industrial PhD programme as a 
whole. The only way to mitigate it in practice is through openness and 
management of this risk throughout the PhD process. Fortunately, it was never 
necessary to manage the risk of conflicts of interest during this project. It is 
obvious from the articles produced in this thesis that they favour neither COWI 
nor the Commission through gratuitous mentioning, branding or positive framing. 
Interviewees in the Commission and other stakeholders (such as COWI) did not 
have any interest in answering questions differently because of my affiliation, 
which was always made clear.  
The Commission is naturally keen to appear in a favourable light in the articles, 
but that is not relevant to my affiliation with COWI. COWI, on the other hand, 
would have an interest in protecting its brand before the Commission. However, 
association with a PhD candidate persistently asking questions is not necessarily 
the best way to do that. Likewise, the findings of this thesis are, on numerous 
occassions, quite critical towards the EU evaluation system and the Commission’s 
role in this system.  
For these reasons, I do not feel that there was a conflict of interest at any time or 
between me and any of the parties in this project or that it had an effect on the 
  
 
30 
thesis’ findings. I was aware of the potential for conflict from the beginning, but 
taking measures to mitigate against was fortunately never necessary.  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The assumptions and hypotheses in this thesis  are drawn from organisational 
theory. Organisational theory is, broadly speaking, the logical first choice of 
theory for this thesis, because both accountability and evaluation are linked to 
public administration and organisation. Practices of accountability, evaluation 
practices and evaluation use take place almost exclusively in organisational 
contexts. Typically, evaluations are procured by organisations, carried out by 
organisations (enterprises or teams of individuals) and read and acted upon by 
organisations.  
According to Dahler-Larsen (2012: 34), ‘evaluation is strongly dependent on its 
social and organizational context’. In parallel with Dahler-Larsen, Boswell (2008: 
473) argues that ‘Any account of how organizations use knowledge will inevitably 
be premised on a theory of organizations: a set of claims about the sources and 
nature of organizational interests, and how these translate into organizational 
action.’ Hence, to answer the research question (What effect do evaluation systems 
have on evaluation use?), we should rely on a theory of organisation with 
assumptions about accountability and organisational behaviour to explain 
evaluation use in evaluation systems. 
This section explains the theoretical framework of this thesis leading up to the 
formulation of the research question and the sub-questions. In the first subsection, 
I give an overview of the theoretical background and assumptions in the 
evaluation literature. Second, I introduce the theoretical framework of this thesis 
that is a precondition for formulating the underlying assumptions of the thesis 
described in subsection three. Subsection four describes the research question and 
three sub-questions that follow logically from the theoretical framework and the 
gaps in the literature.  
2.1 COMMON ASSUMPTIONS IN THE EVALUATION LITERATURE 
Evaluation has two main functions in democratic governance; namely, enhancing 
accountability and facilitating learning (van der Meer and Edelenbos, 2006; 
Scriven, 1991). The former type is commonly referred to in the evaluation 
literature as ‘summative evaluation’, while the latter is called ‘formative 
32 
evaluation’, a dichotomy invented by Michael Scriven (Scriven, 1967) that is often 
the starting point for discussion about evaluation use and learning.  
In the literature, it is commonly suggested that evaluations do not always generate 
learning, even though they are implemented to support the learning from past 
experience (Scriven, 1991; Albæk, 1995). Also, it is suggested that control 
systems such as evaluation and audit are implemented at a cost to general 
performance (Boven, 2005). For that reason, the dichotomous relationship is often 
seen as a contradictory relationship between learning and accountability 
understood as outcomes. This is also the case in several other areas of research, 
such as audit studies (Power, 2005; Boven, 2005; Dubnick, 2005) and studies on 
knowledge use (Boswell, 2008; Böhling, 2013; Mendez and Bachtler, 2011).  
Evaluation itself was born at a time when policy-makers and administrators 
believed in constructing a better society through rational interventions and social 
engineering based on the lessons of past successes and failures (Vedung, 2010). 
Therefore, from the outset the underlying assumptions of evaluation’s role in 
public administration were rationalist, causal and evolutionary in nature 
(Sanderson, 2000). In relation to public policy, evaluation was one of the feedback 
mechanisms described in the system theory framework (Easton, 1965) that 
informs policy-makers and civil servants of what works and what does not. Thus, 
most evaluation models and assumptions are derived from this primary rationale 
and function according to the logic of cause and effect (see, for example, Mark 
and Henry (2004: 38); Cousins and Leithwood (1986); and Pawson and Tilley 
(1997). When it was introduced in North America in the 1950s, evaluation was 
associated  primarily with policy learning.  
In the evaluation literature, a number of general assumptions underlie evaluation 
and its use: first, public organisations are assumed to rationally pursue 
improvements to public policy; second, public organisations are assumed to be 
able to objectively interpret feedback such as evaluations; and finally, it is 
assumed that evaluations are, in fact, used to improve public policies. 
Ontologically and epistemologically, these assumptions are linked to realist and 
positivist understandings commonly found in classical economic thinking and 
rational choice, where policy-makers are perceived to be rational and able to 
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objectively acknowledge and assess the social world around them in a way 
comparable to other people (Sanderson, 2000). In evaluation, this positive 
assumption also dominates through the general perception of ‘social betterment’ 
as the ultimate objective of evaluation (Henry, 2004). Thus, if one can talk about a 
‘general logic’ of evaluation, this logic is inherently realist and rational (Albæk, 
1995; Van der Knaap, 1995; Schwandt, 1997; Sanderson, 2000).  
Despite the fact that the initial purpose of evaluation was formative, evaluation 
was also institutionalised to support organisations’ accountability in relation to 
public spending programmes. This was particularly so as evaluation was 
introduced in many countries as part of New Public Management (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004). The institutionalisation of evaluation in public administrations 
trained a lens on evaluation systems, when criticism arose from practitioners in 
fields where evaluation had been introduced as an accountability tool rather than 
as a learning tool. Nevertheless, evaluation became an institutionalised and 
ritualistic practice that was closely identified with good governance and 
accountable government (Dahler-Larsen, 2012). The introduction of evaluation 
into public administration thus meant a shift from a formative to a summative 
purpose of evaluation that translated into a dichotomous relationship between the 
two in the evaluation literature. This also gave rise to the paradox that evaluation 
inherently was a learning tool, but that it in practice was rarely used as such.  
This non-use is exceptionally difficult for the existing evaluation theory to 
explain, with its underlying assumptions of rationality and belief in feedback to 
the political system. Instead, this thesis proposes to look to organisational theory 
and borrow another set of assumptions from organisational institutionalism to 
improve this explanation. Organisational institutionalism is introduced below, 
together with the assumptions that will lead the research question.  
2.2 ORGANISATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Fundamental to the theoretical contribution of organisational institutionalism is the 
distinction between organisational efficiency and organisational legitimacy. One 
famous contribution that spelled out this dichotomy was Meyer and Rowan’s 
(1977) distinction between output legitimacy and normative legitimacy. They 
wrote: ‘Some organizations use routine, clearly defined technologies to produce 
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outputs. When output can be easily evaluated… . …efficiency often determines 
success.’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 353-54). They continued: ‘Increasingly, such 
organizations as schools, R&D units, and governmental bureaucracies use 
variable, ambiguous technologies to produce outputs that are difficult to appraise’ 
(ibid). What Meyer and Rowan allude to in their ground-breaking article is that 
some organisations (such as public organisations) seek legitimacy rather than 
efficiency. Thus Meyer and Rowan laid the foundation for organisational 
institutionalism by adopting the view that allows us to understand organisations as 
legitimacy-maximising rather than efficiency- or output-maximising.  
While organisational theory for several decades has been dominated by 
organisational institutionalism (especially in Scandinavia), the field of evaluation 
has not taken serious note of these theoretical developments (Højlund, 2014b). A 
few evaluation studies use institutional theory and consider adoption of evaluation 
practices in organisations and countries (Hansen and Borum, 1999; Borum and 
Hansen, 2000; Radaelli, 2009; Sager and Rissi, 2011; Varone et al., 2005; 
Benjamin, 2012). Linked to the use of knowledge, Boswell (2008: 485-6) 
uncovers evidence that an organisation uses knowledge to legitimise itself in an 
unstable and uncertain environment, as predicted by institutional theory. Dahler-
Larsen argues that ‘institutional theory can contribute to describe the relatively 
mechanical diffusion of a phenomenon like evaluation, where the adopted 
standard in the respective organisation, however, remains a symbolic facade, 
which does not affect the organisation’s core activities significantly.’ (Dahler-
Larsen and Krogstrup, 2006: 297; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). However, the theory 
has not been linked explicitly with evaluation systems and their use of evaluation.  
By developing a broader theory of organisational behaviour, organisational 
institutionalism is probably the organisational theory that focuses most directly on 
accountability. Early on, Selznik (1949) discovered that organisations act contrary 
to the rational utility-maximising behaviour that was expected from organisations 
in classic organisational theory. He discovered that organisational behaviour often 
worked contrary to the objectives organisations set for themselves. Instead he 
found that organisations mostly act according to norms and values in their 
environment and with the aim of legitimising themselves (Zald and Denton, 1963; 
Scott and Meyer, 1994). An interesting conclusion from these early studies was 
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that organisations adapt to the practices that are legitimised by the organisational 
environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This is particularly the case if the 
organisation perceives itself to be operating in an unstable environment, where 
there is uncertainty about the distribution of resources between itself and rival 
organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 30-31). Meyer and Rowan (1991: 
190) argue that organisations are concerned with reducing uncertainty and 
stabilizing social relations (exemplified in Selznik (1984) and thus not primarily 
with maximising either power or outputs.  
At the heart of institutional theory is the definition of institution. First, institutions 
should not be confused with organisations. Rather, they are the frames for action 
of organisations, or, simply put, the taken-for-granted formal and informal rules of 
the game. Scott (1995: 49) writes: ‘…institutions are multifaceted, durable, social 
structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material 
resources’. From this definition, it is important to stress that institutions are 
resilient to change and that they consist of cultured-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative elements that provide meaning to social life (Scott (1995: 48). Thus, 
formal and informal rules shape social action, constraining actors and limiting 
their choice of action, and might be the subject of conflict between competing 
interests (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). An institution requires a clear typification 
(e.g., ‘evaluation’), social knowledge or sedimentation.  
The institution of evaluation is taken for granted in many organisations. A number 
of relatively stable interpretations of concepts, practices, principles, norms, ethics, 
values and artefacts are associated with evaluation. In other words, evaluation fits 
well with Scott’s previously mentioned definition of an institution. Dahler-Larsen 
and Krogstrup (2006) argue that evaluation has become a protected discourse and 
that ‘Evaluation has stepped into character as a mandatory political and 
administrative ritual, which priorities and decisions need to adhere to in order to 
be socially valid’ [my translation]. Schwandt (2009) refers to the ‘evaluation 
imaginary’. In other words, evaluation has become a de facto legitimising 
institution – in many cases a practice we accept without question.  
The notion of ‘organisational field’ is also important in institutional theory. Scott 
(1995: 207-208) defines it in the following way: ‘... the notion of field connotes 
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the existence of a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning 
system and whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one 
another than with actors outside of the field.’ The most important actors in the 
field of evaluation are arguably the World Bank, OECD, UN, the American 
Evaluation Association and the European Evaluation Society, as well as regional 
supranational political organisations such as the EU and some national donor 
agencies. (Furubo et al., 2002; Varone et al., 2005; Stern, 2006). They mutually 
reinforce and constantly negotiate the evaluation institution through their 
production of guidelines and practices, as well as through exchanges of opinions 
in public debates and at evaluation seminars, courses and conferences. The field is 
an important concept, because this is what an organisation adapts to. 
In this thesis, I argue that the notion of field is too broad to enrich the debate in the 
evaluation literature on evaluation use. However, it contains assumptions that are 
nonetheless useful. These assumptions will be developed further in the next 
section. Also, while organisational institutionalism is concerned with legitimacy in 
a large organisational field, evaluation systems are smaller clusters of 
interdependent public organisations where legitimacy is gained through 
accountability. Thus, the evaluation system is a community of organisations that 
reinforce shared evaluation practices put in place to secure accountability. The 
evaluation system is what the organisation adapts to, in order to seek legitimacy 
and accountability and survive in the long run.  
Thereby, the concept of evaluation system is not as extended as ‘organisational 
field’ and therefore more operational and with a more easily defined scope in 
empirical terms. The translation from ‘field’ to ‘evaluation system’ is also 
important because of the existing debate on evaluation systems in the evaluation 
literature. By proposing to apply the assumptions of organisational institutionalism 
to evaluation systems, this thesis adds more theoretical depth to the concept of 
evaluation system. This follows from the key assumptions that are made in 
organisational institutionalism below.  
2.3 KEY THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The theoretical vantage point of organisational institutionalism is organisational 
legitimacy. The concept of accountability is strongly related to the legitimacy and 
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theoretical assumptions made by organisational institutionalism in relation to 
legitimacy.  
Accountability is the hallmark of democratic governance and linked almost 
exclusively with public governance, administration and management. 
Accountability is broadly defined in this thesis ‘as a social relationship in which 
an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some 
significant other’ (Boven, 2005). This definition implies that accountability in a 
setting of public governance ultimately relies on the norms, values and cognitive 
frameworks of actors. Thereby accountability becomes almost synonymous with 
legitimacy, as the definition of accountability also stresses the link between the 
organisation and its environment and the assumption of justificatory objectives 
associated with the organisational behaviour in organisational institutionalism.  
Following from the above presentation of organisational institutionalism, the 
assumptions of this thesis are the following:  
1. Organisations survive by legitimising themselves in the organisational
field.
2. Therefore, organisations aim to legitimise themselves.
3. One way organisations legitimise themselves is by pursuing practices of
accountability.
According to organisational institutionalism, organisations survive in the 
organisational field by legitimising themselves in that field. As we saw earlier, the 
organisational field is a community of organisations sharing norms such as 
evaluation. In this thesis, field is replaced by evaluation system (see section 3.2).  
According to organisational institutionalism, the main aim of organisations is to 
seek legitimacy. One way of doing so is to establish practices of accountability (in 
the evaluation system). The fourth assumption of this article is that evaluation is a 
practice that establishes accountability: 
4. Evaluation is used in public administration to establish accountability.
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This assumption finds support in the evaluation literature. Evaluation is commonly 
understood to have two main functions in democratic governance; namely, 
enhancing accountability and securing policy learning (van der Meer and 
Edelenbos, 2006; Scriven, 1991). Whereas the former emphasises retrospective 
assessment in view of attaining political legitimacy relative to the evaluated object 
(summative evaluation), the latter emphasises improved policy-making (formative 
evaluation). In the evaluation literature, overwhelming empirical evidence 
supports the claim that evaluation is indeed an administrative tool used to secure 
organisational legitimacy through accountability.  
Seen through the lens of organisational institutionalism, organisations adopt 
evaluation practices in order to legitimise themselves in the organisational field. 
Legitimacy is preferred over the efficiency associated with learning from 
experience through evaluation. This is even more so when the organisation is 
public and operating under great uncertainty related to governmental budget 
allocations and public trust.  
Since organisational institutionalism posits legitimacy as the most important 
survival strategy for public organisations, we can assume that the use of 
evaluations to improve policies is a secondary objective for them. This assumption 
is largely shared by the evaluation literature, as explained above. Hence, the 
following assumption relevant to this thesis follows logically from organisational 
institutionalism: 
5. Evaluation is implemented and used mainly to establish organisational
accountability within the evaluation system.
Now we have associated a theory of organisation with evaluation use and the 
evaluation system. We have used organisational institutionalism to produce five 
assumptions of organisational behaviour and organisational use of evaluation in 
the evaluation system.  
2.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
From the above, we assume that especially public organisations are likely to 
maximise their legitimacy by appearing accountable in the evaluation system. One 
39 
way public organisations can increase their accountability is by evaluating so that 
other organisations and citizens can secure oversight of the organisation.  
However, if organisations are determined to pursue accountability through 
evaluation, where does that leave learning and evaluation use that results in 
improvements to public policies? To increase our understanding of both non-use 
as well as evaluation use in general under these assumptions, we need to ask and 
answer the following research question: 
What effect do evaluation systems have on evaluation use? 
The research question is directly linked to the original puzzle that my colleagues 
and I grappled with one day around the table in the Danish consultancy COWI. 
However, the question also links with some of the latest developments in the 
evaluation literature; namely, that of evaluation systems.  
As we see more and more evaluation systems come into being, it is relevant to ask 
what the effects of these systems are on evaluation use. Looking to the evaluation 
literature, evaluation systems are generally assumed to have a negative effect on 
the use of information and knowledge in policy-making (Power, 1997; Leeuw and 
Furubo, 2008; Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Pollitt et al., 1999; Furubo, 2006).  
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To answer the research question, three sub-questions have directed the research in 
the four articles that constitute the main empirical work of this thesis. The sub-
questions link up with the gaps identified in the literature.  
1) How can non-use and justificatory uses of evaluation be explained? 
(addressed in articles 1, 3 and 4) 
2) How can evaluation use be explained in its systemic organisational context? 
(addressed in articles 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
3) How are evaluations used in evaluation systems? (addressed in articles 2, 3 
and 4) 
The research question and the three sub-questions set the scene for an interesting 
investigation of the inner dynamics of inter-organisational dependencies and of the 
implementation of evaluation practices and the institutionalisation of evaluative 
norms and values. It is here that I think we as researchers of evaluation can make 
the greatest contribution today.  
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3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The overall theoretical inspiration is found in organisational institutionalism as 
described in the previous chapter. But the thesis also draws on conceptual 
frameworks from evaluation use theory. In the following subsections, I will 
elaborate on the conceptual background of evaluation and evaluation use theory. 
3.1 EVALUATION 
In this section, I cover the definition of evalution, the purpose of evaluation and 
the evaluation system.  
3.1.1 DEFINITION OF EVALUATION 
The usage of the term ‘evaluation’ in relation to assessments of government 
interventions started in the 1950s and gradually gained momentum in different 
sectors at different times. Hence, government interventions within development 
aid, health, education and research were scrutinised relatively early by practices 
and termed ‘evaluation’. Only in the 1990s did evaluation have its ‘linguistic 
breakthrough’, to the point where Evert Vedung called it ‘a linguistic magnet’ 
(Vedung, 1997). This was after evaluation from the 1980s and onwards had 
become part of the NPM-wave that permeated North American and European 
public administrations (Hood, 1991).  
There are numerous definitions of evaluation. As an example of a common 
definition of evaluation, Vedung (1997) offers the following:  
‘Evaluation is careful retrospective assessment of the merit, 
worth, and value of administration, output, and outcome of 
government interventions, which is intended to play a role in 
future, practical action situations.’ 
In this general definition it is worth noting that evaluation is ‘retrospective’. 
Evaluation therefore does not include prospective planning tools, such as impact 
assessment or ex ante appraisals (also called ex ante evaluations). Further, 
evaluation is related to ‘government interventions’, which links the term 
exclusively with public governance but excludes its use in relation to for-profit 
and NGOs. Finally, stating that evaluation is ‘intended to play a role in future 
practical action situations’ implies some use of evaluation findings, learning or 
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some other kind of information processing with a chronology or causality and with 
the objective of impacting decision-making. It is important here to note that 
evaluation according to Vedung is intended to play this role in decision-making. 
Hereby, Vedung implies that evaluations do not always do so, which is a relevant 
distinction for studies on evaluation use and learning from evaluation.  
The role of evaluation in relation to decision-making is particularly relevant to this 
thesis. To illustrate this importance, other scholarly definitions also refer to the 
subsequent use of evaluation. For example, Cousins et al. (2004) also define 
evaluation as a tool to improve future decision-making. They define evaluation as 
a  
‘systematic inquiry leading to judgements about program (or 
organisation) merit, worth, and significance, and support for 
program (or organisational) decision making’.  
Cousins et al.’s definition takes for granted that evaluations support decision-
making, which we will see later is often not the case. Both definitions have much 
in common with Scriven’s early, somewhat minimalist, definition: ‘Evaluation is 
the process of determining the merit, worth, and value of things’ (Scriven, 1991: 
1). However, Scriven does not define the purpose of evaluation (intended support 
for decision-making) and his definition is indeed very broad. 
In this thesis, Vedung’s definition is used due to its reservations regarding the 
usefulness of evaluation to decision-making. Another important element of this 
definition is its uncompromising stance on the retrospective nature of evaluation. 
Though it seems counter-intuitive that evaluation can be anything but 
retrospective, common planning tools such as impact assessment and ex ante 
appraisals are often labelled ‘evaluation’. The distinction was useful for this thesis 
in order to frame the cases to be mainly retrospective programme evaluation in the 
European Commission and not ex ante evaluation nor impact assessment, which 
are also important but very different tools in the Commission.1 Therefore, the 
1 The Commission defines evaluation as “a judgment of interventions according to their results, impacts and needs 
they aim to satisfy.” http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/evaluation/evaluation/index_en.htm (1st November, 
2014).  
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definition allows for more generalisability of the findings than would be the case if 
completely different tools such as impact assessment and ex ante appraisals were 
also contained in the definition. 
3.1.2 PURPOSE OF EVALUATION  
Evaluation has two main functions in democratic governance; namely, enhancing 
accountability and facilitating learning (van der Meer and Edelenbos, 2006; 
Scriven, 1991). Whereas the former emphasises retrospective assessment in order 
to secure accountability and oversight of the programme in question, the latter 
emphasises improved policy-making. The former type is commonly referred to in 
the evaluation literature as ‘summative evaluation’, while the latter is called 
‘formative evaluation’. This thesis starts from this distinction and dichotomy, as it 
focuses on the implications of evaluation systems for the formative role of 
evaluations.  
Scriven’s dichotomy is often taken as a starting point for discussion about 
evaluation use and learning. However, in this case it should be noted that the 
literature on use is far more developed and extensive than the evaluation literature 
on learning. For the same reason, this thesis uses the term ‘evaluation use’ to 
cover both evaluation use and learning.  
Scriven introduced the distinction between summative and formative evaluation 
(Scriven, 1967), but most evaluation literature takes it as a base for the elaboration 
of standpoints. Alkin and Christie (2004) have made several attempts to map the 
evaluation literature. The result is that one important part of the literature 
investigates the formative aspects of evaluation under the heading ‘evaluation use’ 
(Shulha and Cousins, 1997: 199) and essentially focuses on participatory 
evaluation and the delicate relationship and participation of stakeholder ‒ and 
particularly intended users ‒ in the evaluation process. This type of evaluation can 
also focus on personal and organisational learning, as well as ownership, 
engagement, self-determination and emancipation. Hence, organisation theory on 
learning and processes was also integrated in the theory building (Torres and 
Preskill, 2001; Preskill and Torres, 1999) as well as in cognitive theories on 
learning and knowledge sharing (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Owen and Lambert, 
1995). In collaborative modes of evaluation, the evaluands or stakeholders are 
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involved in the evaluation practices, and the evaluator assumes the role of teacher 
while the idea of the objective and independent evaluator is down-played. 
Collaboration has been promoted as a vehicle for capacity building and 
organisational learning (Cousins and Earl, 1995b; Cousins and Earl, 1995a) as 
well as stakeholder empowerment (Fetterman, 1994). 
The proponents of ‘evaluation use’ include Daniel Stufflebeam, Marvin Alkin, 
Michael Q. Patton, Hallie Preskill, Jean King, David Fetterman and Brad Cousins. 
Michael Q Patton is probably the most notorious and the reason ‘evaluation use’ 
or ‘utilization’ plays such an important role in evaluation literature. His key 
contribution, ‘Utilization-focused evaluation’ (Patton, 1997), is a well-written 
textbook that is mainstream in evaluation curricula, despite Patton’s extreme 
views that make him the most prominent representative for the formative branch 
of the evaluation literature. According to Patton, the evaluator should cast away 
any methodological considerations of reliability and validity if they stand in the 
way of evaluation use. In other words, the use by intended users of the evaluation 
takes priority over any other consideration. This view is also sometimes referred to 
as ‘pragmatic’ and is criticised for being too close to management consulting and 
too far from objective independent evaluation. 
In contrast to the views of Michael Q Patton, a number of authors emphasise the 
summative role of evaluation by focusing on methodology, objectivity and 
reliability. This branch in the evaluation literature is represented by Thomas Cook, 
Gary Henry and Melvin Mark, Huey Chen, Carol Weiss, Ray Pawson and Rick 
Tilley, who are sometimes referred to as the ‘positivists’. Here we also find the 
adherents to the so-called ‘realist’ type of evaluation. According to Alkin and 
Christie (2004), proponents of the positivist evaluation are also supporters of a 
value-free type of evaluation. They focus particularly on high reliability, and 
emphasise that evaluation should be as close as possible to objectivist social 
science and that truth about a social phenomenon can be value-free and studied out 
of its political context.  
Very dear to the ‘positivist’ views is the discussion of evaluation’s place in 
relation to science and research. Research and evaluation are both related to the 
systematic collection of data and production of knowledge. According to Owen 
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(2002), traditional academic social research, as well as policy analysis and 
program evaluation, is based on systematic social inquiry. They all use the same 
scientific methods and can analyse the same study objects. However, they have 
different objectives. Whereas science aims for universality and generalisability, 
evaluation aims to study a particular phenomenon and does not apply methods and 
research designs in order to generalise the findings to the population or to seek a 
universal truth. In other words, the purposes and uses of the knowledge produced 
are different (Alkin and Taut, 2003). In the case of research, the goal is 
generalisable knowledge that holds true across all settings, times, and for all 
individuals represented by the produced knowledge. Science aims to produce 
general theories through rigorous testing of hypotheses. The collection of 
systematic knowledge is based on information gathered by systematic social 
scientific procedures. The systematic creation of knowledge is based on linking 
empirical observations and conclusions in a coherent, shareable, and persuasive 
way with the aim of ensuring objectivity, reliability and validity of findings. 
It is important to focus on the distinctions between knowledge produced through 
research and knowledge produced through evaluation. In most cases, the focus of 
an evaluation is more specific. Evaluation can thus be compared to a case study: 
its purpose is context-specific and applicable only within a particular setting at a 
particular point in time, and it is intended for use by a particular group of people 
(Cronbach and Suppes, 1969). According to Scriven (1967) and the definition 
used earlier by Vedung, evaluation is different from research in terms of its unique 
purpose of judging the worth, merit, or quality of the evaluated object, as well as 
in terms of the context-specific uses of the knowledge produced to make these 
judgments.   
3.2 EVALUATION SYSTEMS 
In the evaluation literature, the attention on evaluation systems increased on 
publication of From Studies to Streams, edited by Ray C Rist and Nicoletta Stame 
(Rist and Stame, 2006) and Systems concepts in evaluation: an expert anthology, 
edited by Bob Williams and Iraj Imam (2007). In the evaluation literature, the 
concept of ‘evaluation system’ is used in two different ways. First, it is used 
mainly as a reference to a ‘system’ of organisations or organisational entities in 
which evaluation practice is institutionalised. This view on evaluation systems 
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developed to describe the rapid growth of systematic and institutionalised 
evaluation practice observed in public agencies in the 90’s and 00’s. Second, the 
concept is used to describe the ‘evaluation object’ (Imam et al., 2007). In this 
view, the emphasis is on a more contextual approach to evaluation studies and 
practice. The argument is that traditional evaluations focus on organisations, 
projects or programmes as the object of evaluation but that this is not adequate in 
order to understand (and evaluate) the complexity of the organisation, project or 
programme. Instead, the focus should be on the system-level to allow for more 
complex analyses of cause and effect.  
In this thesis, ‘evaluation system’ refers to the organisational entities forming a 
collective (the system) that shares a common understanding of evaluation 
practices in that collective, including the purpose of evaluation. Based on Leeuw 
and Furubo (2008), an evaluation system can be understood as ‘permanent and 
systematic evaluation practices taking place and institutionalised in several 
interdependent organisational entities with the purpose of informing decision-
making and securing oversight’ (Højlund, 2014a).  
This definition draws on Leeuw and Furubo (2008) as well as (Dahler-Larsen, 
2012; Dahler-Larsen, 2006). Following Leeuw and Furubo (2008), the four 
constitutive elements of an evaluation system are: 1) common practice; 2) 
organisational entity; 3) permanence; and 4) purpose of use.  
First, evaluation needs to be institutionalised to the extent that the actors involved 
in the evaluation activity share a common understanding about evaluation, 
including the way evaluation tasks are performed and the potential outcomes. 
Thus, for the participants in an evaluation within an evaluation system, there are 
common expectations, and conscious and unconscious normative values about 
evaluation and the evaluative practices associated with it. These might not be 
identical, but evaluation practices should be generally accepted throughout the 
system for the system to be institutionalised.  
Further, Leeuw and Furubo (2008: 159) argue that evaluation systems need to be 
constituted by several entities. There has to be not only an evaluator but also a 
commissioner of the evaluation. The evaluation system is thus institutionalised 
formally in at least one organisational structure which separates it from the 
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operational structure of this organisation. Hence, the system has at least one 
formal institutionalised organisational element (for example, ‘an evaluation unit’) 
that, typically, is in charge of planning, tendering, implementing, quality-checking 
and follow-up of evaluations. The term ‘evaluation machine’ refers to this 
particular entity, which is a constitutive element of the evaluation system but 
should not be confused with the entire evaluation system (Dahler-Larsen, 2006). 
An evaluation system can be constituted by, for example, an evaluation unit, 
policy units, external evaluators, politicians and maybe some beneficiaries, NGOs 
and industry. 
As a third characteristic, Leeuw and Furubo (2008) emphasise that an evaluation 
system is permanent and not ad hoc. Evaluation activities are thus constantly 
ongoing and reproductive and there is a history of systematic evaluation in the 
organisation. It is important to stress that permanence does not necessarily imply 
stasis. The system is likely to change but usually according to dynamics defined in 
the system or changes in the environment of the system.  
Finally, Leeuw and Furubo (2008) claim that evaluation systems need to include 
some sort of practice with which evaluations are used. Thus, evaluation practices 
need to be related to decision-making practices as well. Evaluation cannot stand 
alone as practice, and needs to be related to the practice of decision-making or 
oversight as these are practices of public organisations. Thus in the evaluation 
system, evaluations are organised and planned so that they relate to the activity 
cycle of the organisation or the evaluand (e.g., budget or policy cycle). 
To summarise, an evaluation system has a purpose (learning and/or accountability) 
and a boundary that is defined by the institutionalisation of evaluation practice. 
This is very much related to the purpose of the system. So, the evaluation system 
extends to actors who take evaluation practices for granted, either as consumers or 
producers of evaluations. Consumers are typically political masters such as the 
European Parliament or European Council, who expect evaluations to be produced 
by the European Commission with the aim of learning and oversight 
(accountability). Outside the EU evaluation system (described in more detail in 
section 4.2), we find NGOs, industry, the press and citizens, who might consult 
single evaluation reports for information although they do not internalise 
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evaluation practices in a systematic way either as consumers or as producers. The 
difference is that the European Parliament expects to consume evaluations from 
the European Commission systematically and over time, while citizens would not 
do so.  
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the evaluation system is a good 
framework for understanding evaluation use. There are two reasons for this:  
1) The evaluation system provides an organisational framework in which
evaluation and evaluation use can be understood. An evaluation system is 
constituted by several organisations and therefore the concept also captures the 
relationship between these organisations instead of focusing solely on the 
evaluating organisation. This is important because evaluation use, and in particular 
non-use, cannot be understood if we do not understand the interdependent 
relationships between the evaluating organisation and those organisations that 
oversee and check the work of that organisation.  
2) This is because in democratic systems of governance public organisations
control each other through systems of checks and balances. According to 
organisational institutionalism, this control determines the legitimacy of the 
organisation and ultimately its survival. Evaluation is one tool among several that 
is used to establish control and oversight in determining the legitimacy of an 
organisation. However, the concept of evaluation system captures the 
organisational interdependence very well among those organisations that are part 
of the system; that is, those organisations that share a common understanding of 
the evaluation practices put in place to control one or more organisations.  
Following from these two points, it is important to stress that the notion of ‘field’ 
from organisational institutionalism and ‘evaluation system’ are related but should 
not be confused. The organisational field as described by organisational 
institutionalism is a very broad community of organisations that uphold and 
update the institution of evaluation (e.g., professional associations, international 
organisations and states). An evaluation system is much more specific and related 
to a defined set of organisations defined by a common understanding of evaluation 
practices within the system, and thereby also by a common understanding of the 
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control and oversight associated with evaluation as well as the potential for policy 
learning and improved decision-making.  
For this reason, it makes more sense to talk about ‘accountability’ rather than 
‘legitimacy’ in the context of the evaluation system, because accountability relates 
more specifically to the relation of power and control that is the key premise of the 
evaluation system. Evaluation is institutionalised in an evaluation system in order 
to secure this accountability. That is not the case in the organisational field that 
organisational institutionalism refers to. In the organisational field, organisations 
that share the institution (for example, evaluation) might be totally independent of 
each other in terms of power, control and accountability. 
Therefore, I argue in this thesis that the notion of ‘field’ is too broad to enrich the 
debate in the evaluation literature on evaluation use. However, it contains some 
important and useful attributes. While organisational institutionalism is concerned 
with legitimacy in large organisational fields consisting of many organisations, 
evaluations systems are smaller clusters of interdependent public organisations, 
where control and power is distributed and accountability is important for the 
organisation’s survival. Thus, the evaluation system is a community of 
organisations that reinforce shared evaluation practices that have been put into 
place in order to secure accountability. Borrowing the logic from institutional 
theory that organisations adapt to the external environment (the field), this is also 
the case for the organisations in the evaluation system. In the evaluation system, 
the evaluated organisation also adapts in order to seek accountability and survival. 
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Table 3-1 Difference between evaluation system and organisational field 
 
Evaluation System Organisational field 
Scope 
Defined cluster of public 
organisations sharing 
norms of evaluation 
practice in relation to 
distributed power and 
control  
Shared norms and values 
among a large and often 
undefined number of 
organisations 
Survival factor 
Accountability through 
formal evaluation 
practices and evaluation 
output 
Legitimacy through 
adopting institutions 
(norms, values, practices of 
evaluation) 
Example 
The EU evaluation system 
comprises the 
Commission, the EP, the 
Council, MSs and 
consultants who share 
common evaluation 
practices and norms of 
control of the 
Commission’s 
expenditures.  
In the evaluation ‘field’ the 
institution of evaluation is 
shared among hundreds of 
organisations around the 
world, with the most 
important being states and 
international organisations. 
 
Thus, the concept of evaluation system is not as extended as ‘organisational field’ 
and its scope is therefore more operational and easier to define in empirical terms. 
In the literature on evaluation systems (Olejniczak, 2013), other concepts are 
applied to describe the ‘flows’ of things, resources and information (‘stacks’) and 
feedback loops within multi-layered systems. This level of ontological complexity 
was not sought in this thesis as the objective of study primarily was evaluation use 
within the organisational boundries of the EU evaluation system.  
The translation from field to evaluation system is also important because of the 
existing debate on evaluation systems in the evaluation literature. However, this 
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debate is not founded in any particular theory that allows for hypotheses to be 
formulated in relation to evaluation use. By proposing to apply the assumptions of 
organisational institutionalism to evaluation systems, this thesis adds theoretical 
depth to the concept of evaluation system.   
In relation to evaluation use, evaluation systems are generally assumed to have a 
negative effect on information and knowledge use in policy-making (Power, 1997; 
Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Pollitt et al., 1999; Furubo, 2006). 
Previous studies suggest that evaluative knowledge tends to be made relevant 
primarily for administrators and not for policy-makers, and that use in 
administrations will be linked to procedural assurance and legitimisation of the 
organisation rather than policy-making (see also Furubo, 2006; Langley, 1998). 
The purpose of this thesis is to continue the research on the effect of evaluation 
systems on evaluation use, and to provide empirical evidence where presently 
there is little. The next section elaborates on the phenomenon of evaluation use. 
3.3 EVALUATION USE 
The 1950s and 1960s saw a massive expansion of public interventions in the 
construction of welfare states in Western Europe and North America. A positivist 
approach to social engineering was prevalent and policy-makers believed in social 
betterment through targeted interventions that changed people’s behaviours 
(Porter, 1995). Part of this paradigm was a belief in the ability of policy-makers 
and administrators to learn lessons from previous interventions and thus to 
constantly improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending 
and interventions. In Easton’s terminology (Easton, 1965), evaluation relates to 
the feedback that policy-makers receive as input for improved policy making. 
However, this positive view on policy-making and public interventions was soon 
challenged in both organisational studies on decision-making and implementation 
studies (Cohen et al., 1972). Scholars and practitioners of evaluation and science 
started to question whether evaluative and scientific knowledge was, in fact, used 
to improve policies (Lazarsfeld et al., 1967). Though the paradigm to which 
Easton belonged assumed feedback happens and improvements are made, very 
little evidence existed to support this theory. In fact, subsequent research into the 
use of scientific knowledge and evaluation use often illustrated how existing 
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knowledge was not used to improve policies. This phenomenon was referred to by 
some scholars as a ‘utilization crisis’ (Patton, 1997). 
Because of concern over evaluation findings not being used, a large body of 
literature related to evaluation use developed from literatures on the use of 
scientific results in policy making (Lazarsfeld et al., 1967; Porter, 1995; Vedung, 
2010; Weiss, 1998; Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980). At present, the substantial 
literature on ‘evaluation use’ exists independently of the literature on the use of 
scientific results and knowledge, mainly because the field of evaluation is a 
relatively specific practitioner field. Science and knowledge use are much broader 
categorisations and investigated mainly by organisational sociologists.  
Nevertheless, ‘evaluation use’ can be viewed as a sub-field in the literature on 
knowledge use. The knowledge-use literature and the evaluation-use literature are 
already very closely related, though cross-referencing does not always take place. 
Knowledge use is obviously broader than evaluation use; however, evaluation use 
does have particular attributes due to the specificity of evaluation itself. First of 
all, evaluation is an administrative tool invented in order to improve feedback to 
policy-makers and to secure accountability. One purpose of evaluation is thus to 
be used to improve the knowledge of policy-makers so that policies will also 
improve. This is different from, for example, scientific knowledge production, 
which does not aim to guide policy-makers but instead to increase our 
understanding and knowledge about our lives and the world we inhabit. A second 
objective of evaluation is related to accountability, which is again related to 
democratic control and oversight of public administration. This also is not shared 
by scientific knowledge production.  
In the wake of disenchantment over the scarce evidence of use of evaluations, the 
literature turned to the question of why evaluations were, or were not, used  
(Leviton and Hughes, 1981; Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). After the evaluation 
literature more or less had converged on a typology of four categories of use (see 
below), research was then dedicated mostly to explanatory variables and to 
answering the question of interest to all evaluators: what makes my evaluation 
useful? This resulted in numerous case studies that inferred relationships between 
contextual variables or conditions and the four evaluation use categories or 
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variations based on them. The literature focused on factors related to the attributes 
of the evaluation (e.g., methodology, quality, and relevance of findings) or the 
immediate contextual factors pertaining to the organisation, in which the 
evaluation is implemented (e.g., political climate, timing of the evaluation relative 
to decision-making and so on). These categories were empirically informed from 
the late 1970s and onwards (see for example Leviton and Hughes, 1981). Other 
streams of literature look into the building of evaluation capacity in organisations 
or formative, process, empowerment and developmental evaluations, which are 
attempts to enhance the use of evaluation through a change in evaluation practice 
(Preskill and Torres, 1999; Patton, 1997). With Michael Q. Patton’s ‘discovery’ of 
process use (Patton, 1997), questions related to the users of evaluation also 
became more central. 
3.3.1 DEFINITION OF USE 
Leviton and Hughes (1981) argue that two ‘bottom-line’ criteria must be satisfied 
in order for something to be called use:  
1) There must be a conscious attempt to relate the evaluation findings to the 
policy or program issue under study in order for evaluations to be 
considered used (Cook and Pollard, 1977: 161). Merely reading the 
evaluation report is not considered use. Weiss (1978) calls this ‘information 
processing’.  
2) In order for evaluation use to be observable, there must be evidence that in 
the absence of the evaluation, those actors and stakeholders involved with 
the policy or programme activities would have thought or acted differently. 
That is to say, there must be an impact on the programme or policy activity 
of the stakeholders involved. This evaluation-use criterion is obviously 
more difficult to satisfy. 
A practical definition of evaluation use is provided by Kelli Johnson: Evaluation 
use is ‘any application of evaluation processes, products, or findings to produce 
an effect ’(Johnson et al., 2009a: 378). In relation to Johnson’s definition, a 
number of critical points are raised. One could argue that use of, for example, 
findings, does not – strictly speaking – need to produce an effect to be classified as 
use, as is the case with Johnson’s definition. Therefore, one could argue that the 
definition of evaluation use could be limited to ‘any application of evaluation 
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processes, products or findings’. Such a definition would expand to incorporate 
more instances of application.  
For example, this implies that simply reading the evaluation would also classify as 
evaluation use. This thesis leans towards this broader definition that does not 
entail an effect or policy impact of the evaluation. It does so, because effects and 
impacts of evaluations are very hard to research empirically. To attribute a change 
in policy to one document is often hard, if not impossible. Second, it is arguably a 
type of use, if policy-makers read and acquire knowledge from evaluations. 
Consciously deciding to read or otherwise engage with the evaluation or the 
implementation of the evaluation is also using it, just as reading a book is ‘using’ 
that book. Broadening the definition of evaluation use in this way allows for a 
much more explorative approach to evaluation use, which was necessary in the 
context of this thesis due to the complexity of the study object. 
Nevertheless, broadening the definition of evaluation use too much is also a 
problem. Johnson already commits the fallacy of redundancy, when she defines 
use as application. This merely says that use is use, which is not a strong 
definition. In this thesis, I keep the concept of use entirely open to interpretation 
by my interviewees. When conducting the data collection for the thesis, this 
approach allowed interviewees to speak freely. Opening ‘use’ to interpretation 
during the data collection also mitigated the risk of pre-defining the term for the 
interviewees. Also, the focus of the thesis is to explain the effect of the evaluation 
system on use. Therefore, the definition of use should be left pen to allow for as 
much variance in the data as possible in order to gauge all types of effects that the 
evaluation system has on use. This also includes learning, which some 
interviewees considered a type of use.  
While openness to divergent interpretations of use was chosen for the data 
collection, the analysis and coding of these data was guided by a typology of use. 
The next section elaborates on these types that have emerged over the decades of 
research in evaluation use.  
3.3.2 TYPES OF EVALUATION USE 
When data was collected for this thesis, interview guides were designed to be open 
towards different interpretations of use. However, during the analysis of the data, 
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several pre-existing concepts of use were used to categorise and code the 
interview data. This section explains the origins of these use concepts.  
Evaluation use was traditionally divided into three categories: instrumental, 
conceptual, and symbolic (Leviton and Hughes, 1981). Instrumental use refers to 
instances where someone has used evaluation knowledge directly. Conceptual use 
refers to cases when no direct action has been taken, but where people’s 
understanding has been affected. Symbolic use refers to examples where a person 
uses the mere existence of the evaluation, rather than any aspect of its results, to 
persuade or to convince. These three categories are still used as the basis for much 
research, though newer and more elaborate conceptual frameworks have been 
suggested (Alkin and Taut, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000; Henry and Mark, 2003; Weiss, 
1998).  
The three categories are summarised here: 
1. Instrumental use was defined by Rich (1977: 200) as ‘cases where
respondents cited and could document ... the specific way in which research
was being used for decision-making or problem-solving purposes’.
‘Instrumental use’ signifies a direct and concrete transfer of evaluation
findings and recommendations into the reshaping or reconfiguration at any
level of policy or programme. This type of use is expected to be traceable
through concrete signs of findings in the subsequent policy or programme,
though in practice this is often very difficult.
2. Conceptual use of research information was defined by Rich as
‘influencing a policy maker’s thinking about an issue without putting
information to any specific, documentable use’ (Rich, 1977: 200).
‘Conceptual use’, which is more indirect and relates to ‘enlightenment’,
signifies a more general knowledge use or conceptual development
(Stufflebeam, 2001; Owen and Rogers, 1999; Weiss, 1979). For example,
programmers could make conceptual use of evaluation when applying
theories of change and related concepts to their programme through
interaction with the evaluators of the programme.
3. Persuasive use/symbolic use/legitimising use involves drawing on
evaluation evidence to convince others to support a political position, or to
defend such a position. (This category is termed ‘symbolic’ by Pelz (1978);
and Young and Comptois, 1979). Owen and Rogers (1999) distinguish
between legitimising use and symbolic use. The former involves justifying a
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prior decision and the latter concerns enhancing the reputation of the 
organisation or programme. In the latter case, it is the evaluation process ‒ 
the simple fact that an evaluation is being conducted ‒ that legitimises the 
organisation. For example, the organisation commissioning the evaluation 
will use the evaluation as a means to justify its own existence in order to 
avoid changes such as budget cuts. Legitimising use is when an evaluation 
is used to justify or legitimise the policy or programme being evaluated 
(Owen and Rogers, 1999; Patton, 1997; Weiss, 1979). The legitimising use 
of evaluation results is linked to persuasion on compliance issues and 
accountability, and therefore it was originally called ‘persuasive’ use. 
Another category of evaluation use appeared not much after the other three. It was 
termed ‘process use’. Process use was defined by Patton (1997: 90) as ‘individual 
changes in thinking and behaviour and program or organizational changes in 
procedures and culture that occur among those involved in evaluation as a result 
of the learning that occurs during the evaluation process’ (Preskill et al., 2003). 
Process use happens in the evaluation process when stakeholders and the 
evaluation commissioner are drawn into the process of evaluation with the 
evaluator. Process use is therefore not dependent on a final evaluation report or 
other output per se, but happens subsequently to the evaluation process.  
These four use categories dominated (and still do dominate) the conceptualisation 
of evaluation use in the literature. However, several researchers also grew 
dissatisfied with them. They were displeased with the multitudes of potential 
evaluation uses and influences that did not fit into these four vaguely defined 
categories of use (Alkin and Taut, 2003; Henry and Mark, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000; 
Weiss, 1998). Some criticism was directed at the operationalisation and 
measurement of the concepts. The appropriate typologies of use are still debated, 
most probably because assessing the influences and effects of evaluations 
continues to be difficult (Alkin and Taut, 2003; Hofstetter and Alkin, 2003; 
Johnson et al., 2009a; Kirkhart, 2000; Mark and Henry, 2004). 
There is little doubt that the four categories of evaluation use represent the 
backbone of the theoretical conceptualisation in the literature on evaluation use. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with the typology, particularly in 
relation to the operationalisation of them. It has been argued by several scholars 
that there is an overlap between the categories due to the very broad definition of 
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these concepts. Especially conceptual use can be confused with both process use 
and instrumental use if an evaluation does not result in immediate instrumental use 
or process use.  
Also, it has been argued that the causality of the evaluation use types is not clear. 
The normal inferred causality and order of events from evaluation to use can be 
challenged if, for example, instrumental use is determined by external factors such 
as the policy cycle or other events. So, instead of being put to use immediately by 
the administration, evaluation use might be determined by the policy cycle or 
other events much later. If a decision is pending, then instrumental use is more 
likely. If not, then conceptual use or persuasive use from that evaluation might be 
more likely. So, it might not be the qualities of the evaluation that determine use, 
but rather the external context and timing. Also, conceptual use might lead to 
symbolic use or instrumental use of the evaluation. So, it is not clear if one 
category of use acts as an intermediate variable to other categories of use and how 
this contribution problem should be tackled by researchers.  
Finally, it has been argued that symbolic use does not satisfy Leviton and Hughes 
(1981) criteria of use described earlier. Using evaluations to delay action, to allow 
policy-makers to appear concerned about a problem, or to compete for political 
positions (Pelz, 1978; Rich, 1977) are not instances of use, if there is no evidence 
that evaluations were seriously discussed or consciously used this way. However, 
researchers such as Leviton and Hughes (1981) would argue against this. They 
would argue that symbolic use should be understood more broadly to  cover the 
activity of evaluation as a legitimising act.  
The literature also points to more general problems and difficulties related to 
research on evaluation use (Kirkhart, 2000): 
First, all of the categories are difficult to measure and operationalise in a research 
project. This is a common problem in studies on learning and knowledge use. The 
categories are often intangible and hard to measure and understand, both for the 
researcher as well as the interviewees. This is particularly the case with the 
symbolic category, because it is perceived as a ‘negative’ or ‘strategic’ type of use 
that data subjects are not easily willing to admit to the researcher. Also, the 
conceptual category is difficult to measure, as conceptual ‘enlightenment’ or 
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learning is notoriously hard to measure. Only rarely is it possible to test policy-
makers to see if they understood the concepts and information they have been 
given.  
Second, there is a time aspect to the use of evaluation, which makes research on 
evaluation use harder. Evaluation use does not necessarily take place immediately 
after the evaluation, and respondents cannot necessarily remember or link 
evaluation results to actual decisions or other types of use. Retrospective analysis 
depends heavily on the respondents’ memories. Only cases of explicit use might 
be recalled, and not less tangible ones. Also, respondents might be biased toward 
saying that the public organisation they represent actually used the evaluation. 
Thus, it is harder to attribute evaluation use with policy-making. Also, a political 
or administrative decision to, for example, change a programme usually evolves 
over time and depends on many different inputs. The actual effect of the 
evaluation is therefore almost impossible to gauge. 
Third, instrumental use and conceptual use often take place without any 
documentation (such as oral conclusions in a meeting). This makes it hard for the 
researcher to identify the decisions made and then to attribute them to the 
evaluation. Conceptual use is particularly difficult to measure, since it concerns 
the thoughts and ideas of the administrators or organisation as a whole. 
Fourth, most existing studies on evaluation use are case studies. Their strength is 
to show linkage between evaluation findings and their use in qualitative studies. 
Their weakness is lack of generalisability and confounding of situational factors. 
Thus, because case studies are the main approach found in the evaluation literature 
due to the uniqueness of most evaluation interventions, evaluation use is often also 
treated as unique cases. This increases variability in the way concepts are applied 
in each case to match the unique features of the case under study.  
3.3.3 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS OF EVALUATION USE 
To remedy the problems with the old framework based on the four categories of 
evaluation use, several approaches have been proposed. Some key shortcomings 
were identified by, in particular, Kirkhart (2000), which inspired Henry and Mark 
(2003) and Alkin and Taut (2003) to make similarly important contributions. In 
addition to the criticisms summarised in the previous section, Henry and Mark 
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also argued that the conceptual framework of evaluation use failed to focus on 
important change processes caused by evaluation. In other words, the literature 
gives limited guidance about the underlying processes from an evaluation output 
(a report) to its eventual impact on social betterment through policy 
improvements. This is a reasonable criticism, as empirical studies have found 
several categories of use at different points in time. To many researchers it seemed 
unsatisfactory that the multitudes of evaluation uses should simply be made to fit 
into four vague categories.  
Kirkhart (2000) for her part favoured the concept of ‘influence’ over that of use. 
Her definition of influence is ‘the capacity or power of persons or things to 
produce effects on others by intangible or indirect means’ (Kirkhart, 2000: 7). 
Influence, according to her, includes ‘effects that are multidirectional, 
incremental, unintentional, and non-instrumental, alongside those that are 
unidirectional, episodic, intended, and instrumental (which are well represented 
by the term use)’ (Kirkhart, 2000: 7). She thereby marks the conceptual 
boundaries of use and points to a much wider concept of evaluation effects that 
takes into account ‘non-results-based applications, the production of unintended 
effects, and the gradual emergence of impact over time’ (Kirkhart, 2000: 6). 
Kirkhart (2000) theory of influence encompasses three dimensions: 
1. Intention (unintended vs. intended): Evaluation influence is usually guided
in an intended direction for the ultimate creation of social betterment.
However, the effects of an evaluation cannot always be predicted, and thus
evaluation influence can be unintended as well.
2. Source (process vs. results): Evaluation influence might stem from both
evaluation results and the evaluation process.
3. Time (immediate, end-of-cycle, long-term): The time variable is made up of
three categories, which Kirkhart admits are not perfect. Nevertheless, they
allow for long-term impacts of an evaluation study.
Even though Kirkhart adds more precision, I will argue that her concept of 
influence on top of the ‘old’ use categories muddies the picture even more. For 
that reason, this thesis relies on the old categories but distinguishes between 
process use and findings use as two ‘meta’-types of evaluation use, in which three 
‘sub’-categories of evaluation use pertains. This is described in the section below. 
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3.3.4 CHOICE OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS THESIS 
If evaluators want to answer the one basic evaluation question of interest (‘What 
works?’), then use is the dependent variable and thus not the primary object of 
study. In order not to make claims about inference too complex, ‘less is more’ in 
this regard and a few subtle categories allow researchers to present results more 
clearly and simply. Too many independent and dependent categories will make it 
impossible to reach any valid conclusion about the causality and generalise across 
different organisational contexts. A strong theory is generic and simple and for 
that reason this thesis uses a broad definition of evaluation use as described 
earlier. 
In an important contribution, Alkin and Taut (2003) argue that process use is in 
fact not a fourth category of evaluation use, but rather a conceptual frame for other 
types of use. They argue that there are two categories of evaluation use; namely, 
‘findings use’ and ‘process use’. The difference between these two categories is 
that findings use takes place after the evaluation has been conducted, while 
process use takes place during the process of evaluation.  
In both process use and findings use, instrumental, conceptual and 
symbolic/legitimising use exist. An instrumental change might thus happen during 
the evaluation process as the result of, for example, learning in the organisation 
and thus before the evaluation report materialises at the end of the evaluation. 
Process use may also occur conceptually. The evaluation process may change the 
attitudes of users about the importance of evaluation or about the potential role of 
multiple stakeholders in decision-making. This distinction between process use 
and findings use is important for this thesis and in particularly in article 3, where it 
is applied.  
Moreover, Alkin and Taut (2003) use Owen and Rogers (1999) distinction 
between symbolic use and legitimising use. However, they argue that legitimising 
use pertains to the findings use type, because it happens after the evaluation result 
to legitimise the intervention. Symbolic use, however, is more likely to happen 
during the evaluation process, because the evaluation process is used to justify the 
existence of the organisation.  
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In addition to instrumental, conceptual, legitimising and symbolic uses, the 
evaluation literature has also proposed two other categories that relate to the use of 
evaluation understood simply as a source of information – a type of use that often 
precedes other use forms (Alkin and Stecher, 1983; Finne et al., 1995). An 
instance of information use would be using evaluation information in a 
presentation or simply reading the evaluation to acquire knowledge. ‘Information 
use’ can take place both before and after the completion of the evaluation and is 
thus related to both ‘findings use’ and ‘process use’.  
Finally, scholars have pointed to a fifth type of use often referred to as ‘strategic 
use’. Strategic use is distinguished from symbolic and other use types as it is not 
related to securing organisational or programme legitimacy, but rather to advocacy 
in relation to decision- or policy-making (Weiss, 1992; Pröpper, 1987: cited in 
Van der Knaap, 1995: 211). Strategic use needs to be included, because 
legitimising use originally proposed by Rich (1977) does not appropriately cover 
the strategic and political use of arguments found in evaluations and which is used 
to justify political arguments and decisions. Legitimising use is the justification by 
the evaluating organisation of the programme or policy being evaluated. However, 
an evaluation system involves other actors, who have an interest in using the 
evaluation as a source of legitimacy to back their positions and political 
arguments. This type of use I call ‘strategic use’, as it is not necessarily related to 
legitimising the programme (legitimising use) or the justification of the evaluating 
organisation (symbolic use). Instead it is related to other issues, such the use of 
facts from the evaluation to back a certain position in the renegotiation of a new 
programme. 
3.3.5 LEARNING UNDERSTOOD AS EVALUATION USE 
The broad approach of this thesis to evaluation use includes uses related to 
learning. Empirically, use and learning are difficult to differentiate, mainly 
because learning indirectly is assumed in several of the use categories (conceptual, 
instrumental, and information use). To simplify, in this thesis learning is 
considered an outcome of evaluation, similar to evaluation uses. This is done in 
order to broaden the scope of evaluation use and evaluation outcomes in the 
context of the evaluation system. Overall, learning is therefore considered a type 
of evaluation use.  
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Over the years, the knowledge-use literature overlapped the policy-learning 
literature, when policy learning theory developed in the 1960s as an alternative 
explanation of policy change. Previously, the stress had been on power and 
conflict, particularly among social classes. At that time, cognition and knowledge 
utilisation appeared as alternative explanations (Grin and Loeber, 2007). Simon 
(1957), Deutsch (1966) and Heclo (1974) were the first to take up these new ideas. 
Learning studies then gained a particular prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, 
when several different approaches were developed (Grin and Loeber, 2007). 
However, empirical studies in the field of policy learning are scarce (Dobbin et al., 
2007; Freeman, 2006; Grin and Loeber, 2007; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013).  
According to Dunlop and Radaelli (2013: 3), there is a general feeling of 
disappointment (see also Egan, 2009; James and Lodge, 2003; Volden et al., 
2008), and the field is still ‘struggling to produce truly cumulative knowledge’. It 
is the same case in the evaluation literature, where the focus on ‘evaluation use’ 
has dominated the focus on learning. This is another important reason for 
including learning in the conceptual framework related to evaluation use.  
Following the general views on learning of James March (March, 2010), and more 
specifically on policy learning (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Dunlop and Radaelli, 
2013), learning is defined in this thesis as the adaptation of beliefs and views that 
result from the learner’s sense-making of past experience. Therefore, the learning 
that emanates from a specific evaluation exercise is the adaptation of that specific 
policy area, programme or other government intervention that results from making 
sense of past experience systematically gathered through that evaluation. 
Naturally, for authors interested in studying the conditions for the use of 
evaluation results, the assumption is that organisational learning and the use of 
evaluation results are intrinsically linked (Preskill, 2008; Radaelli and Meuwese, 
2010).  
3.3.6 CONCEPT OF MISUSE 
The concept of misuse is very much related to non-use (Cousins, 2004). Cousins 
(2004) distinguishes between two types of misuse; namely, ‘mistaken use’ and 
‘mischievous use’. The former relates to a situation in which a user’s misuse of 
evaluation findings is not deliberate, typically because the user lacks an 
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understanding of evaluation methodology and analysis. The user may be guided 
by personal interest or organisational interests, which can lead to ‘cherry picking’ 
or biased stress on positive recommendations while leaving negative findings out 
of communications and subsequent decision-making. At its worst, misuse can be 
related to manipulation and behaviour that thwarts the improvement of policies or 
administrative practices.  
This thesis does not make use of the term ‘misuse’ because of several drawbacks 
related to it. First, it is a normative term resting on a normative and often 
subjective foundation. Misuse is strongly related to the rationalist paradigm that 
evaluation is based on (see earlier sections). However, misuse is ‘the evil twin’ 
when evaluation findings are not used by a strategic and politicised organisation. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis assumes that organisations will do most 
things to stay legitimate and survive in the organisational field. In other words, the 
assumption of organisational institutionalism is that policy-makers are likely to 
use evaluations in any way they see fit to attain this objective. The concept of 
misuse is therefore laden with controversy and normativity. Evaluators are likely 
to be concerned about the ‘proper’ use of their evaluations, while administrators 
and politicians would take a more ‘strategic’ approach to using evaluation 
findings.  
Second, and related to the first point, misuse looks like strategic or legitimising 
use,  depending who the judge is. This thesis represents research that is as 
objective as possible within the scope of this thesis and its premises. For this 
reason, the term misuse is ill-suited for use in academic research, as it contains 
value-laden judgement about very intangible human intentions and actions. It is 
appropriate to use a more value-free conceptual framework that describes 
evaluation use better, such as strategic use and legitimising use. Whether these 
types of use are misuses would have to be discussed on a case-by-case basis.  
Third, misusing an evaluation is not an end in itself and for that reason the term is 
not a strong concept in empirical investigation. Strategic use and legitimising uses 
have defined ends, while no administrator would admit to misusing anything. In 
most cases what some would term ‘misuse’, an administrator would describe 
differently.  
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Fourth and finally, evaluation misuse also relates to the empirical case 
investigated. If an evaluation was made in order to be used in a particular way, 
then it would be possible to identify misuse in relation to the actual way it was 
used. However, the evaluations investigated in this case (and in most cases) did 
not emphasise any particular subesequent use or intention of use. In practical 
terms, it is therefore up to the commissioner of evaluations to use evaluations in 
the way they see fit.  
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4 OBJECT OF STUDY 
The object of study in this thesis is the European Union’s evaluation system, with 
a particular focus on the special role that the European Commission plays in this 
system. The case is the European Commission, but the EU’s evaluation system is 
the systemic context in which the Commission operates. The object of study is 
both the case and the context of the case. This is important to stress, because the 
theoretical assumptions made previously about how organisations seek legitimacy 
from their organisational field relates to the context of the organisation. Thus, in 
order to answer the research question and gauge whether evaluation use takes 
place in the system, we need to understand the systemic context of the 
Commission to understand what the demand is for accountability in this field.  
4.1 CHOICE OF CASE 
The object of study is the European Union’s evaluation system and the case of 
interest is the European Commission. This case is interesting for the following 
reasons: 
First, several studies have shown the Commission to be very preoccupied with 
accountability vis-à-vis the other EU organisations, such as the European 
Parliament, the Council and also EU Member States (Grøn, 2009). The 
Commission is a supranational organisation with powers often reluctantly 
transferred by the EU Member States. This, as well as the Sander Commission’s 
demission in 1999, have increased scrutiny of the Commission and the 
Commission’s interest in increasing its accountability. With the focus on 
accountability so pronounced, the Commission makes an interesting and extreme 
case to investigate.  
Second, the focus on the EU’s evaluation system and the Commission’s evaluation 
practices are novel in the academic literature. In fact the literature has very few 
empirical investigations of evaluation systems or of the evaluative practices in the 
European Commission (Stern, 2009). The literature on evaluation systems took a 
leap forward in 2006, as I explained above. Since then, contributions have been 
mainly theoretical. This thesis represents an empirical investigation of the effects 
of an evaluation system.  
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Third, the Commission has not only been absent as a case in the evaluation 
literature, but it is also highly relevant to study due to its importance in the global 
field of evaluation. The Commission’s evaluation practices are applied all over the 
world through EU Aid. Through EU enlargements, evaluative practices have 
spread across Europe as a prerequisite for getting Structural Funds or IPA-funding 
(candidate countries). It is therefore immensely important to study the European 
Commission’s evaluative practices, the extent to which evaluations are used, and 
their contribution to improving European policies.  
4.2 THE EU EVALUATION SYSTEM 
The European Union’s evaluation system is a case in point. Figure 2 illustrates the 
main constitutive actors and reproductive patterns in the system. The arrows 
signify the primary direction of communication in the system. 
Figure 2 EU evaluation system 
 
The EU evaluation system constitutes a relatively well-defined system within the 
EU institutions, as well as the EU Member States. In Figure 2, only the evaluators 
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are not (always) public organisations. In the EU evaluation system, the European 
Commission is the most active organisation in terms of numbers of evaluations. 
Over the last 30 years, the Commission institutionalised evaluation practices in 
response to internal and external pressures (see article 2). Practices and ideas were 
drawn from other organisations in the field and an EU evaluation system slowly 
emerged. Evaluation is a common practice in each Directorate General (DG) and 
is institutionalised through evaluation policy, guidelines and standards auditable 
through internal and external audits. In the Commission, the practices of 
evaluation are commonly referred to as the ‘evaluation system’. This system 
encompasses all aspects of evaluation activity in the Commission, including 
formal institutions such as DG evaluation policies, evaluation functions, 
communications, the internal control standards, the Financial Regulation and so 
on. Also, evaluation is an integral part of the activity-based management and 
budgeting system of the Commission and thus formally related to decision-making 
regarding EU budgetary allocations. The system’s core consists of the European 
Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Council (Council).  
In the Commission DGs, designated evaluation units supervise and guide 
evaluation activity with support from the Secretariat-General. The evaluation units 
are subject to internal audits as described in the Internal Control Standards of the 
Commission services. The Commission  undertakes most evaluations in the 
system, but the EP and Member States also carry out or commission evaluations, 
usually subject to EU evaluation standards and supervised by the Commission (in 
the case of Member States). About 80 per cent of all evaluations are externalised 
to consultants or groups of experts (Commission and Jacobsen, 2007) and the 
consultancies are thus also part of the system. Overall, the EU evaluation system 
constitutes a relatively easily defined evaluation system. The example adheres to 
the definition proposed previously and thus was selected as a valuable and 
interesting case for this thesis. 
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5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter elaborates on the research design and methodology applied in the 
four articles that constitute the empirical and theoretical contribution of this thesis. 
The articles vary in terms of type of data used and methodology applied. Apart 
from the first article, which is purely theoretical, the other three articles apply a 
case-based research design and a qualitative methodology. Since the first article is 
theoretical, only the methodology of the three empirical articles will be explained 
in more detail in the following sections. A distinction is made between research 
design, methodology and method. The following sections will elaborate on all 
three elements of this study. 
5.1 CASE STUDIES 
This thesis uses case studies in all three empirical articles. However, the case 
studies are different and constitute several types of case study research designs. 
This will be elaborated below.  
Case studies are widely used in organisational studies and across the social 
sciences (Hartley, 2004). According to Stake (2000), case studies have become 
‘one of the most common ways to do qualitative inquiry’. As in organisational 
sociology, case studies are also among the preferred research designs in the 
evaluation literature. For example, Easterby-Smith et al. (Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2000) note that ‘case study examples have always played an important role in the 
field. In the public sector, with quantitative measures much less well developed 
than for private firms, case studies have been especially prominent’. The reason 
for this is straightforward, as organisations and evaluations alike are very 
contingent on complex environments and complex internal dynamics that are hard 
to systematise, generalise and define. Another important feature of at least 
political organisations as well as of evaluations is their tendency to be unique. In 
other words, there is rarely a population of political organisations or evaluations 
from where a sample can be extracted and inference made. 
5.1.1 DEFINING A CASE STUDY 
Some disagreement exists on exactly what a case study is. In this thesis, a case 
study is a research design that serves mainly to refine the focus of research. A case 
study is not a method (as indicated by Bryman), as case studies are not data 
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collection tools like interviews or surveys. Case studies are not methodologies 
either, because a methodology is a system of procedures and assumptions on how 
to analyse the data that have been collected. Consequently, case studies may be 
conducted either quantitatively, qualitatively or both, with several methods, data 
types and even several methodologies (Yin, 2003). 
Stake (2000) defines a case to be a ‘bounded system’ that operates in a coherent 
and systematic way. In other words, a case is a stable system and its features can 
be observed and defined in time and space. The social phenomenon, which cannot 
be defined in time and space, is not a case, because it is undefined and 
indistinguishable from its environment. To draw closer to a precise definition, 
Stake argues that a case study ‘is not a methodological choice but a choice of what 
is to be studied’. (Stake, 2000: 435). The approach in this thesis agrees with Stake 
in relation to the latter.  
Therefore, this thesis is closer to the point of view of Yin (2003: 13-14), who 
places less emphasis on the boundedness of cases: ‘A case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.’ 
In fact, Yin stresses the case study’s ability to investigate the complexity of cases 
and their environments, making it the point of case studies to study complex social 
phenomena with complex contexts. Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) concurs with Yin, 
stressing that case studies are very context dependent and provide concrete and 
tangible understandings of social phenomena in all their complexity. He adds that 
case studies provide value to social science exactly because of the complexities of 
social phenomena and the consequent lack of universal and predictive theories 
inherent to the social sciences (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Following Yin and Flyvbjerg on 
this point means accepting that a system will never be completely bounded or 
isolated in the social world, and that the researcher has to be open to contingencies 
on the ‘out of system’ context. 
The case studies in articles 2, 3 and 4 are all explanatory (as opposed to 
descriptive and exploratory (see Yin (2003). They focus on a given phenomenon 
(use, learning and the evaluation system) and describe it while also trying to 
explain it. Article 2 is a single longitudinal case study and article 3 is a single case 
study. Article 4 is a multiple case study involving three programme cases. Stake 
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(2006: 437) distinguishes between intrinsic case studies, instrumental case studies 
and collective case studies. The first two are both one case study, which is either 
the object of study itself or an instance of the case study being used to study 
another object of study and where the case is instrumentalised to shed light on this 
very phenomenon. In this thesis, article 4 uses several cases to research the 
phenomenon of policy learning from evaluations in the context of the evaluation 
system. This is therefore a collective case study. Article 3 is an instrumental case 
study, where four LIFE evaluations are used to understand how the Commission 
uses evaluation in the context of the EU’s evaluation system. Article 2 is an 
intrinsic case study of the European Commission’s evaluation system. 
5.1.2 CONSIDERATIONS ON SCIENTIFIC CRITERIA  
The strength of a case study design is its richness in terms of understanding the 
case itself and its relations with its environment. Because case studies are very 
suited to analyse complexity, ‘how’ and ‘why’ are the questions most commonly 
answered through case studies (Yin, 2003). A case study develops deep 
knowledge of a particular case and all or most of its features and attributes, such 
as its history, development, internal processes, appearance, reasons for actions, 
institutions and so on. On the other hand, case studies are not suited for studies 
that aim to generate generalisable knowledge in time and space (Bryman, 2012; 
Yin, 2003: 10). Yin (2003) describes it like this: ‘case studies [...] are 
generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In 
this sense, the case study [...] does not represent a ‘sample’, and in doing a case 
study, your goal will be to generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not 
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)’ (p.10).  
In other words, the external validity (or generalisability) of case studies is 
considered to be low (see Flyvbjerg (2006) for an interesting discussion on this 
point). On the other hand, the internal validity of case studies is high. The case 
study allows the researcher to understand causal relationships because of the in-
depth understanding of the case. Moreover, the construct validity (or conceptual or 
measurement validity) is also high (Bryman, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The case 
study is an excellent approach to testing or understanding social science concepts, 
because it goes into depth with the particular phenomenon.  
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Another important feature of case studies is their ecological validity, which is the 
research design’s level of application to the real world. Ecological validity exists if 
the data subjects and practitioners find the research findings relevant and reliable. 
This is particularly relevant for an industrial PhD thesis such as this one, which 
relies heavily on data from practitioners of one particular organisation (the 
European Commission). 
In the field of knowledge utilisation, case studies have been widely used (Cousins 
et al., 2004) because not many cases or observations are available. By far the most 
common unit of analysis is an organisation. Organisations are plentiful, but within 
a given field and context such as evaluation use, the sample of organisations 
available to the researcher is often limited. Collecting quantifiable data from 
organisations is another difficulty, as organisations as well as their evaluations 
differ. More importantly, knowledge utilisation is from the outset a qualitative 
judgement from the observer (the researcher) or the interviewees in the 
organisation. A quantification is difficult, because the phenomenon analysed in 
this study is qualitative in nature. 
5.1.3 CASE SELECTION 
The case study is the methodological framework of this study. First, the sample of 
organisations is small and too small to warrant sampling DGs to produce 
inferential statistics. Second, to answer the research question, it is necessary to 
gain qualitative knowledge of the evaluation institution and the use of evaluation 
knowledge in the DGs in question, and to understand the complex organisational 
dynamics at play within the organisations as well as between the DGs in the 
European Commission. A case study provides a better understanding of the 
qualitative relationships, processes and causal effects of the study object and the 
factors that affect it and how it affects evaluation use. Moreover, a case study 
typically produces high conceptual validity, which is needed in the literature on 
evaluation use, and which is well suited for generating hypotheses relevant to a 
larger population (political organisations more generally). The weakness of a case 
study is its particularity (the difficulty of generalising the findings to a population) 
and its weak insight into the population as a whole (width) as well as the dynamics 
that can be found there. However, as the EU (and the Commission) claims to be a 
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sui generis organisation, from the outset it is difficult to talk about a genuine 
‘population’ of complex international organisations such as the EU Commission. 
5.2 ARTICLES 
The research designs applied in the three empirical articles are all case-based, 
including longitudinal case study (2nd), single case study (3rd) and multiple case 
study (4th). An overview of the four articles and their respective research designs, 
methodologies, methods and data sources is provided below. 
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Table 5-1 Overview of article methodologies 
No Title 
Research 
design 
Methodology Methods Data sources 
1 Evaluation use in the 
organisational 
context – changing 
focus to improve 
theory 
NA Literature 
review 
Bibliographic 
search 
Scientific 
articles 
2 Evaluation in the 
European 
Commission – for 
learning or 
accountability? 
Longitudinal 
case study 
(The European 
Commission’s 
evaluation 
system) 
Qualitative 
content 
analysis 
Historic 
analysis 
Unstructured 
expert 
interviewing 
Document 
review 
Transscribed 
interviews 
Documents 
Homepages 
Literature 
3 Evaluation use in 
evaluation systems – 
the case of the 
European 
Commission and its 
LIFE programme 
Single case 
study 
(LIFE 
programme) 
Qualitative 
content 
analysis 
Semi-
structured 
interviewing 
Transscribed 
interviews 
Documents 
4 Evaluation and 
Policy Learning –the 
learner’s perspective 
Multiple case 
studies(LIFE 
programme, 
Intelligent-
Energy Europe 
II programme 
and FP7) 
Qualitative 
content 
analysis 
Structured 
interviewing 
Transscribed 
interviews 
5.2.1 FIRST ARTICLE 
The first article is purely theoretical, and uses organisational institutionalism to 
create a model for different types of evaluation use. It is based on a literature 
review that focuses on the application of organisational institutionalism in the 
evaluation literature. Therefore, this article is the theoretical starting point for this 
thesis, as it discovers that organisational institutionalism has not been used to 
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investigate evaluation use in the evaluation literature. The article thus discovers a 
gap that is filled theoretically by itself and the other articles in this thesis.  
5.2.2 SECOND ARTICLE 
The second article is based on a case study of the Commission’s implementation 
of evaluation practices over time. Thereby, the article investigates how an 
evaluation system is implemented and how the issues of accountability and 
learning are reflected in the practices implemented. 
The article is based on data generated from 58 recorded interviews, two group 
interviews and one conference on evaluation in the EU, along with numerous 
informal talks with experts and Commission desk officers and personal 
observations including evaluation steering committee meetings. Interviewees were 
sampled purposefully and according to availability, and included Commission 
employees working in evaluation units and policy units as well as external 
evaluators, evaluation trainers and consultants working with the Commission in 
the setting up of the evaluation system. Several of the interviewees were senior 
staff who had performed key roles in the early implementation of the evaluation 
system and thus had a good historical overview of evaluation in the Commission. 
Interview data were validated with document data comprising more than a 
hundred public and non-public documents, such as internal evaluation policy 
papers, guidelines, and minutes of meetings in the evaluation network (on 
document analysis see Stewart and Kamins, 1993). 
Data were analysed according to the principles of qualitative content analysis 
(Schreier, 2012; Mayring, 2002; Mayring, 2000; Mayring, 2004; Kohlbacher, 
2006) and by using the NVIVO software package (Bazeley, 2013). Qualitative 
content analysis focuses on both latent and manifest content through stressing the 
visualisation of patterns in the data. The data were coded according to the 
interviewees’ perceptions of accountability and learning, as well as their 
rationalisation of the Commission’s evaluation practices. Findings were 
triangulated and validated with document data, and interviewees had the 
opportunity to comment on the findings. Finally, the reliability of the findings was 
strengthened by the author’s prolonged engagement in the field over a period of 
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two years as well as five years of professional experience with evaluation of EU 
policies. 
5.2.3 THIRD ARTICLE 
The third article analyses the use of four evaluations of the Commission’s 
Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) over a ten-year 
period. The LIFE programme was chosen because it is a ‘classic’ centrally 
managed EU expenditure programme (parts of the programme was externalised to 
EACI in 2014). The programme has experienced a full Commission evaluation 
cycle (ex ante, midterm, final and ex post), and therefore represents a complete 
picture of evaluation use over an entire policy cycle as well as an entire evaluation 
cycle. Moreover, by looking at four evaluations over time, we get a more 
diversified idea of the effects of the evaluation system on the use of evaluations.  
The analysis is based on 16 semi-structured in-depth interviews and eight follow-
up interviews. The informants were sampled purposefully according to relevance 
and availability and consisted primarily of staff from the Directorate General for 
the Environment (DG ENV), consultants who performed the evaluations, 
representatives of Members of the EP’s Committee for the Environment (member 
assistants) and Council members. The data collection continued until ‘saturation’ 
was achieved. Document data were also coded and used primarily to validate 
interview data through triangulation (Bryman, 2012). The document analysis 
comprised four retrospective evaluations of the LIFE programme (midterm, 2003; 
ex post, 2009; midterm, 2010; final, 2013) and several other documents, including 
DG ENV presentations to the Committee of Regions and the EP, internal 
Commission documents, the combined ex ante and impact assessment along with 
fiches and Commission position papers for the new LIFE programme 2014‒2020.  
The methodology applied in the paper is based on the principles of qualitative 
content analysis, and the coding and analysis of data was carried out using the 
NVIVO software package. The first 16 semi-structured interviews were analysed 
with a view to existing conceptual frameworks developed in the evaluation 
literature and described earlier, and the eight follow-up interviews were conducted 
to check for saturation. Coder reliability was sought by using the existing 
conceptual frameworks and subsequently running three rounds of coding on the 
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interview data (Kohlbacher, 2006). The credibility of the findings was further 
strengthened by a prolonged engagement in the field, with the researcher 
conducting interviews in four consecutive waves over a period of one year. In 
addition, the researcher has several years of experience with evaluation of EU 
programmes, including working as evaluator on the ex post evaluation of LIFE 
from 2009. Findings were triangulated and validated with document data, and 
follow-up interviews and interpretations were checked against interview data. 
Interviewees were debriefed and were given the opportunity to comment on the 
findings of the article, and peers with comprehensive knowledge of the subject 
gave important comments to the draft article before submission.  
5.2.4 FOURTH ARTICLE 
The research design of the fourth article is an example of a collective of three 
cases. The case evaluations are midterm or interim evaluations commissioned by 
the European Commission and produced by external parties using a methodology 
comparable to that of all European Commission midterm evaluations. The cases 
are of similar budget sizes for the programme cycle 2007‒2013. Moreover, the 
programmes work in similar ways through project support and are all managed by 
the Commission or by a Commission executive agency. The first case is the 
midterm evaluation of the Programme for the Environment and Climate Action 
(LIFE). The second case is the midterm evaluation of the environmental research 
programme within the Framework Program 7 for Research and Development that 
was conducted in 2010. The third case is the interim Evaluation (2009) of 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) ‒ Intelligent 
Energy ‒ Europe (IEE). 
The fourth article was based on data generated from 25 structured in-depth 
interviews from the three case evaluations. The interviews were structured around 
20 questions that related general features of the evaluation system to learning from 
evaluation. The questions probed the design and implementation phases of the 
evaluation, as well as the learning from the evaluation. Interviewees were sampled 
purposefully and according to availability, and included Commission officers in 
the programming unit (the principal learners) as well as Commission officers in 
the steering committee that managed the evaluation implementation. External 
experts and consultants directly involved in the evaluation implementation were 
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also interviewed. Interview data were validated with document data comprising 
the three case evaluations and other relevant documents, such as the impact 
assessments and ex ante evaluations of the new programme cycle 2014‒2020.  
As with the two previous articles, the methodology applied in this article was 
qualitative content analysis, and the coding and analysis of data was carried out 
using NVIVO. As described by Mayring, the data was classified (coded) along the 
lines of the existing conceptual framework from Dunlop and Radaelli (Dunlop and 
Radaelli, 2013), basically following the interview guide.  
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
The data analysis in the three empirical articles is qualitative. The choice of 
methodology is contingent on the nature of the research question(s) and the 
available data, two factors that are mutually dependent as well. For this study, 
quantitative data were not available in relation to evaluation use and learning in 
the European Commission. Therefore, the articles in this thesis apply qualitative 
methods to generate qualitative data. Consequently, a qualitative methodology was 
chosen as analytical framework for the data analysis. Qualitative methodology is 
very suitable for asking ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, which are the questions asked 
in the articles of this study. According to Cassell and Symon (1994: 1), qualitative 
methods are the most appropriate to research questions focusing on organisational 
processes and outcomes.  
According to Cassell and Symon (1994: 4), qualitative research is ‘less likely to 
impose restrictive a priori classifications on the collection of data’. Consequently, 
qualitative research is more likely to be inductive, explorative and concerned with 
emergent concepts and themes rather than with the testing of hypotheses. 
However, several qualitative methodologies can also be used with existing 
conceptual frameworks deduced from state-of-the-art literature. Qualitative 
methodologies generally emerge from phenomenological and interpretive 
epistemologies where social reality is inter-subjective and negotiated (Cassell and 
Symon, 1994: 2). The assumptions behind the choice of methodology are also 
described in the next section. Within qualitative methodologies, the most 
prominent in organisation studies are ethnography, symbolic interactionism, 
historic methodologies, discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis. This 
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study applies qualitative content analysis as described more in detail in the next 
section.  
The core of qualitative research is the ‘search for patterns’, where the researcher 
looks for regularities and associations between different parts of the data 
categories. Bernard and Ryan (2010) describe qualitative data analysis in the 
following way: ‘Analysis is the search for patterns in the data and for ideas that 
help explain why those patterns are there in the first place.’ In other words, 
analysis involves disintegrating data parts and bringing them together again to 
look for patterns. Similarly, Dey (1993: 42) argues that the essential part of 
qualitative analysis is breaking up data and compiling it in new ways. This 
classification is often conducted through coding text or transcripts of interviews. 
Graphic representation of results is important in qualitative data analysis for 
communicative  reasons as well as for replicability. 
Qualitative data analysis tends to be inductive and exploratory, but it can also 
integrate theoretical or research-based concepts or assumptions about the way 
classifications are constructed. Bernard (2013) emphasises the importance of 
building assumptions from tacit knowledge or research, and of exploring the 
associations between these assumptions. In relation to analysing qualitative data, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) summarises the process as three steps: 1) data 
reduction; 2) data display; and 3) conclusion. Data display involves reducing the 
complexity of data to ‘manageable sizes’ that can be meaningfully communicated 
to the reader to account for the analytical processes. Displaying data practically 
and visually illustrates the patterns in the data in such a way that the reader can 
relate to the findings of the research. This was particularly relevant but also 
difficult to do in this thesis, due to the article-based format chosen.  
The ‘groundedness’ of, or ‘closeness’ to, the observed phenomenon is a key asset 
of qualitative studies. Qualitative research is also excellent for collecting 
meanings, perceptions and assumptions that people might have about a given 
phenomenon. The main weakness of qualitative research is the lack of 
standardised procedures in the field (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
consequence of a lack of clear procedures is a low level of replicability, and thus a 
weakened trustworthiness or reliability. In qualitative research it is generally not 
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reported how data are reduced and classified, analysed and interpreted (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). This weakens not only the transparency of a study, but also its 
replicability or reproducibility, and has consequences in relation to trustworthiness 
and reliability. In fact, the problem of reliability is central to the critique of 
qualitative social science. The ‘deconstruction’ of data into classifications or codes 
is based on subjective interpretations made by the researcher. Since it is often hard 
to replicate or reconstruct qualitative social science studies, inter-coder reliability 
during the study becomes more important. This can be established in several ways 
but, usually, to ensure consistency of coding several coders will review the same 
material. Also, results can be validated by experts or interviewees or triangulated 
with findings from other data analyses or documents (Mayring, 2004). Inter-coder 
reliability is probably the most effective way of establishing internal consistency 
and reliability. However, it is also demanding in terms of time and resources.  
Another criticism often raised about qualitative research is the generalisability or 
the inference of results. Generalisability refers to ‘the degree to which the findings 
are applicable to other populations or samples’ (Ryan and Bernard, 2000: 786). 
Thus, it draws on the degree to which the original data were representative of a 
larger population (ibid). Narratives, interviews and documents can have varying 
degrees of idiosyncracy and particularity that is hard to generalise.  
5.3.1.1 QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Qualitative content analysis develops from quantitative approaches to content 
analysis, where words and other attributes of texts were counted to say something 
about the texts. As the name implies, qualitative content analysis focuses on the 
qualitative aspects of text and thus its explicit and implicit meaning. Four types of 
qualitative content analysis have emerged. They are cross-case analysis, thematic 
analysis, grounded theory and simple qualitative content analysis. While grounded 
theory is commonly regarded as an inductive theory-generating methodology, 
qualitative content analysis is appropriate and relevant to answer how, why and 
when questions and also questions involving existing theoretical constructs. 
Qualitative content analysis does entail some degree of interpretation, but not at 
the level of methodologies used in hermeneutic traditions. At the same time, it 
does not quantify as much as thematic analysis and cross-case analysis. 
Qualitative content analysis involves numbers and the counting of ordered 
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classifications, categories or data break-downs, but also allows for the 
interpretation of text. In fact, the strength of qualitative content analysis lies in its 
combination of qualitative interpretation with quantitative elements according to 
techniques used by classic content analysis (Titscher et al., 2000: 64; Remenyi et 
al., 2002: 6).   
The data-reduction techniques in qualitative content analysis reduce large amounts 
of qualitative data to categories of manageable sizes that can be analysed 
quantitatively. The systematic approach gives the methodology increased validity 
and reliability. At the same time, the methodology retains the reflexitivity and 
interpretation that are the main characteristics of qualitative methodologies in 
general. Schreier (2012) defines qualitative content analysis as follows: 
‘Qualitative content analysis is a method for systematically reducing data and 
describing the meaning of categories through latent examination of their context.’ 
Bryman (2012: 542) offers a rather similar definition: ‘[Qualitative content 
analysis is] an approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator 
in the construction of the meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis on 
allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the significance for 
understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being analysed (and 
the categories derived from it) appeared.’ Mayring (2000), who is the main 
contributor to qualitative content analysis (Kohlbacher, 2006), offers the following 
definition of qualitative content analysis: ‘An approach of empirical, 
methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, 
following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash 
quantification’. Mayring stresses four elements of qualitative content analysis. 
First, data need to be reduced and segmented into meaningful units. Second, the 
researcher looks for patterns in the segmented data. Third, the results are verified 
by checking results with other explanations, contradictory data or ‘outliers’. 
Finally, the results are displayed using tables or graphs to illustrate the distribution 
of categories, etc. Data display is an important point in illustrating the break-
downs made by the researcher and thus in giving the reader access to the 
interpretations of the researcher and a better foundation for questioning the results. 
The key feature stressed by Mayring in relation to qualitative content analysis is 
‘structuring’. Structuring is the classification and categorisation explained earlier 
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that allows for a quantification of the data material. This procedure is related to 
classic content analysis that is mainly quantitative. The classifications and the 
categories emanate from the unit of analysis and might or might not be established 
on a theoretical basis. During the analysis, the categories and classifications are 
evaluated and altered and, if necessary, the text is recoded accordingly. Finally, 
qualitative examples are extracted together with a data presentation.  
It follows from the above that qualitative content analysis can both be inductive 
and be based on assumptions or existing categories developed from theory. The 
methodology in the work of Mayring emphasises mainly theory-driven research, 
but inductive categories can also be developed with the procedures of qualitative 
content analysis (Mayring, 2003: 74-76). For the purpose of this study, qualitative 
content analysis is applied differently in the three articles. Article 2 is the most 
inductive, with open questions and little prior theorising. Article 3 uses established 
concepts and semi-structured interviews that allow for more quantification of 
categories. Finally, the structured interviews of article 4 that made it possible to do 
an even more quantifiable version of qualitative content analysis is much in line 
with Mayring’s writing. 
5.3.2 METHODS AND DATA 
The main method applied in the three articles is in-depth interviews (Legard et al., 
2003). In the three empirical articles, 58 interviews were conducted. The 
interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews taped and transcribed. 
Article 2 relies on all the interviews and, in particular, on 35 open semi-structured 
interviews conducted primarily with desk officers and consultants who work (or 
have worked) with evaluation in the Commission. Articles 3 and 4 rely on 16 and 
25 interviews respectively. In article 3, the 16 interviews were semi-structured, 
whereas article 4 used a more structured approach with 20 interview items. 
However, both approaches qualify as ‘semi-structured’, as they both allowed the 
interviewee to deviate to some extent from the interview questions and because all 
the questions were open.  
Interviews were conducted with desk officers in the respective evaluation units, 
heads of unit and desk officers responsible for policy, as well as with some of the 
key consultants who carried out externalised evaluations, and relevant researchers 
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and other stakeholders. The interview questions followed directly from the 
hypotheses and were open to allow the interviewee to describe processes and 
attitudes in detail. In this regard, the thesis was driven by conceptual deduction, 
but at the same time also encompassed conceptualisations and insights from the 
interviewees that might finally be constitutive for theoretical improvements. The 
interview data were analysed in NVIVO and coded. The line of coding followed 
from the typologies developed earlier on evaluation institution, learning and 
knowledge utilisation.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigates the effect of evaluation systems on evaluation use. The 
articles constitute the theoretical and empirical work of the thesis as they respond 
to the three sub-questions that support the overall research question. The three 
sub-questions relate to the three gaps identified in the literature. Table 6-1 
summarises the research question and the sub-questions. 
Table 6-1 Research question and sub-questions 
What effect do evaluation systems have on the use of evaluation? 
1) How can non-use and justificatory uses of evaluation be explained?
(addressed in articles 1, 3 and 4)
2) How can evaluation use be explained in its systemic organisational context?
(addressed in articles 1, 2, 3 and 4)
3) How are evaluations used in evaluation systems? (addressed in articles 2, 3
and 4)
6.1 ANSWERING THE SUB-QUESTIONS 
The following sub-sections answer the sub-questions of this thesis. 
6.1.1 HOW CAN NON-USE AND JUSTIFICATORY USES OF EVALUATION BE
EXPLAINED?  
In article 1, the phenomena of non-use and justificatory use are investigated 
theoretically through the lens of organisational institutional theory. By assuming 
that organisations will implement technologies such as evaluation in order to 
legitimise themselves in the face of other organisations in the system, this article 
reinterprets the raison d’être of evaluation completely, when compared to previous 
assumptions in the evaluation literature that regard evaluation as a feedback 
mechanism to improve policy- making.  
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In this new theoretical framework, non-use of evaluations and justificatory uses 
are explained by the internal propensity to evaluate as well as by the external 
pressures on the organisation. Article 1 illustrates four outcomes of adaptation to 
the system that organisations will follow depending on these two variables.  
In articles 3 and 4, the EU evaluation system is investigated and several empirical 
explanations for the non-use and justificatory use of evaluations were found. 
Articles 3 and 4 do not use the theoretical framework developed in article 1. 
Nevertheless, the overall findings fit very well to the ‘mimetic’ model of 
adaptation envisaged in the theoretical framework for organisations that have a 
high propensity to evaluate as well as high external pressure. The Commission has 
both, and thus evaluation practices have been institutionalised both formally and 
informally in the Commission, as predicted by the theory developed in article 1.  
Articles 3 and 4 also illustrate how important the evaluation system is when 
explaining non-use and justificatory uses. The evaluation system is designed to 
deliver sound, credible and independent evaluations of high quality for use at 
particular decision points at the end of programme periods. This is to increase 
bargaining power for the Commission and legitimise the programme at the time 
decision-makers’ attention is likely to be on the programme; that is, just before 
renegotiation of the new programme budget in the programming cycle of the 
Commission. However, this focus on evaluation use in the decision point reduces 
use (particularly process use) during the programming period before the decision 
point is reached.  
Moreover, if evaluations miss important decision points, the relevance of 
evaluations is affected negatively, potentially leading to non-use. Further, 
evaluation use is hampered by competing information in the system such as other 
studies and audits. Due to mistiming of evaluations, other competing information 
and non-innovative findings, the relevance of evaluations’ to decision-making is 
very limited. These two findings imply a de facto de-politicisation of programme 
evaluations in the EU evaluation system, where evaluation information conforms 
to the administrative context of programme management in the Commission 
instead of the political context of policy-makers.  
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For these reasons, programme evaluations are rarely used for policy-making in the 
evaluation system. They are used for justificatory purposes but, according to one 
interviewee in the Commission, the legitimacy is already built into the system 
itself.  
Also, the legal structures that govern the Commission’s work reduce the 
possibilities of innovative and surprising recommendations in the evaluations, 
because consultants’ recommendations are steered first of all by the evaluation 
questions in the tender material that is typically in accordance with what the 
Commission can influence within the scope of its legal competences. Thus, the 
formal structures of the evaluation system steers the evaluation use in a very 
particular direction, which is almost always within the boundaries of what is 
possible for the Commission to implement given the present legal framework it is 
working under. This effectively narrows the potential scope for evaluation use. 
Article 3 finds that the ‘de-politicisation ’ represents a paradox, since it is the EP 
and the EU Member States that compelled the Commission to develop its 
evaluation practices in the first place. But this article shows that policy-makers 
rarely use the evaluations; nor does the Commission maximise its use of 
evaluations although it allocates considerable resources to evaluations and 
numerous other internal and external assessments and audits.  
Overall, articles 3 and 4 describe how the potential scope of evaluation use is 
reduced considerably by the formal institutionalisation of the evaluation system. 
The relevance to policy-makers and administrators of evaluation is reduced in 
different ways. For policy–makers, there is a lot of competing information and 
evaluations are too general and broad-scoped to be used strategically. If 
evaluations are not critically negative, then they will not be used by policy-makers 
in the Council and the EP. At the same time, evaluations do not bring to light a lot 
of new knowledge for programme administrators in the Commission, who are 
already very knowledgeable about the programme they administrate. Often, 
evaluations are mistimed in relation to decision points, or they are too close to a 
previous evaluation to make a significant difference.  
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6.1.2 HOW CAN EVALUATION USE BE EXPLAINED IN ITS SYSTEMIC
ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT? 
All the articles of this thesis contribute to answering this question. Article 2 
explains the implementation over time of the EU evaluation system. Through this 
analysis, it is clear that the evaluation system is tied closely with the activity-based 
management system of the Commission and introduced mainly to hold the 
Commission accountable for the large expenditure programmes that the 
Commission manages.  
The linking of evaluations and their timing to the programming cycle has 
consequences both negative (non-use) and positive on evaluation use. Article 3 
finds that the Commission’s programming cycle (or policy cycle) enables findings 
use because the evaluation system is designed to deliver feedback into a particular 
decision point at the time for programme renegotiating. This decision point 
enables findings uses including instrumental, legitimising and strategic use. These 
are enabled because the decision point allows for potential programme change and 
because the Commission needs programme legitimacy and overall accountability 
when the focus of policy-makers in the EP and Council is on the programme.  
Because of the coherence between the evaluation system and the programming 
cycle in the Commission, the evaluation system is designed to deliver independent 
quality evaluations that are timely, well communicated, and credible in order to 
secure the legitimacy of the programme and the strategic position of the 
Commission in such negotiations. The institutionalisation of evaluation practices 
(including the highly standardised evaluation process, staff training and 
guidelines) almost completely negates process uses, as explained previously. 
However, it also enables a smoother execution of evaluation processes and 
ultimately delivers a more standardised evaluation product with minimal ‘risks’ to 
the Commission (Højlund, 2014a). 
Overall and as explained above, the scope for evaluation use is considerably 
limited by the formal structures of the evaluation system. However, within the 
narrow framework of the evaluation system, evaluations are produced to be used 
and to increase learning in the Commission as well as outside the Commission. 
Articles 3 and 4 find that the Commission’s programme units are the main users of 
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the evaluations for small-scale adjustments to the programme or conceptual or 
information use. Evaluators also learn from conducting the evaluations for the 
Commission. However, apart from these two stakeholder groups that are both 
involved in evaluation implementation, very few people use the evaluations 
directly.  
As explained, the evaluation system is aligned with the programming cycle as well 
as the programming and planning of new interventions. Thus, impact assessments 
are required to take into consideration previous evaluations. Also, the draft budget 
needs to be based (to the extent that it is possible) on previous evaluation of 
budget lines. These initiatives do testify to a willingness to use evaluations 
actively for decision-making, but the impact on actual decision-making is very 
limited.  
6.1.3 HOW ARE EVALUATIONS USED IN EVALUATION SYSTEMS?  
Articles 3 and 4 in particular address this question through empirical investigation. 
They find that evaluations are used in a number of ways, ranging from making 
small-scale instrumental changes to the programme to more conceptual learning 
about the programme. The programme unit and the evaluators are the main users 
of the evaluations, although some evidence exists that policy-makers in the EP 
also use evaluations strategically and to get information.  
Article 2 finds that the Commission’s evaluation practices are implemented to 
increase controls and oversight of the Commission by other organisations in the 
evaluation system. The evaluation system is introduced for purposes of 
accountability over those of learning. However, a focus on learning does coexist 
with accountability and the two are therefore not mutually exclusive. Article 3 
finds that the EU evaluation system is conducive to evaluation use of programme 
evaluations in several ways. Evaluations are used instrumentally to improve the 
programme and strategically to acquire knowledge or for advocacy purposes. 
Evaluation use takes place in windows of decision-making and typically in 
relation to an impact assessment or ex ante evaluation. 
In relation to use, the most striking finding was probably that evaluations are not 
used during the evaluation process. The evaluation system dictates a very formal 
and independent type of evaluation where the evaluator is relatively remote from 
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the evaluation management (steering committee) in the Commission. This is 
because the EU evaluation system is primarily designed to feed information into 
the EU decision-making procedure every seventh year, before the beginning of a 
new programme cycle. Thus, due to the institutionalisation of evaluation practices 
that are fitted to the activity-based management system in the Commission, the use 
of evaluations takes place mainly just before important decision points. The 
limited process use is a consequence of deliberate choices to secure and improve 
findings use for decision-making, in particular decision points before programme 
renegotiation. Thus, the loss of process use is a direct consequence of systemic 
factors related to policy-making practices in the EU political system that influence 
the Commission’s decisions in relation to implementation of evaluation practices. 
6.2 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Based on the findings of the articles that reply to the three sub-questions, I direct 
my attention to the main research question. The conclusion from the case study of 
the EU evaluation system is that evaluation systems have an effect on evaluation 
use and that this effect is significant.  
6.2.1 EVALUATION SYSTEMS HAVE AN EFFECT ON EVALUATION USE 
The articles find that evaluation systems have an effect on evaluation use. 
Theoretically as well as empirically, the articles demonstrate how formal and 
informal structures such as evaluation guidelines, standards and administrative 
practices and rules affect evaluation use in various ways.  
The EU evaluation system is constituted by the Commission, the European 
Parliament, the Council and several other organisations. Together they partake in 
the system by playing different roles. The Commission plays the most active role 
due to pressures from the Member States and the European Parliament for more 
oversight and control with EU-spending. As a consequence of the external 
pressure, the Commission adopted and institutionalised evaluation practices with 
guidelines and standards that included formally and legally committing the DGs to 
evaluation. Through this process, the evaluation system was created as a common 
normative framework, and formal guidelines for evaluation were put in place. 
Evaluation was delegated to particular bodies within the Commission and was 
made a repeated praxis through the policy cycle and the activity-based 
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management system in the Commission. Hence, the system achieved permanence 
and all the attributes required for it to meet the definition of an evaluation system.  
By analysing the EU evaluation system with a particular focus on the European 
Commission, the thesis demonstrates how formal structures are introduced to 
increase oversight of the Commission by other organisations in the system and 
how evaluation is used to increase accountability in the Commission. Article 2 
finds that evaluation is, in fact, primarily institutionalised in the Commission for 
accountability purposes. The evaluation system is thus set up with a main aim of 
securing the legitimacy through accountability for the Commission. Nevertheless, 
articles 2, 3 and 4 all show that, despite this aim of the evaluation system, there is 
still room for evaluation use within the framework of the evaluation system’s rules 
and standards.  
The three main effects of the evaluation system on evaluation use are: 1) the 
‘sacrifice’ of process use for findings use and accountability in decision points 
(explained above); 2) a very narrow scope for evaluation use, due to the formal 
institutionalisation of evaluation; 3) a de-politicisation of evaluation.  
First, and as a consequence of the policy cycle, the possibility of evaluation use in 
the evaluation process is decreased because of the tightly managed and 
standardised evaluation process and the stress on evaluator independence that 
ultimately secures the legitimacy of the evaluation output and the Commission. 
Also, process use is sacrificed as a logical consequence of the fact that 
programme changes are usually attainable only in the design phase of a new 
programme (and not during its implementation), at which time the Commission 
needs credible, trustworthy and independent evaluations to increase its own 
legitimacy as well as that of the new proposal. In other words, process use as 
envisaged by, for example, Michael Q Patton, with a very interactive and engaging 
evaluation process to bring about significant programme changes immediately 
during the evaluation process, is in the EU context unlikely to yield more 
programme changes because of the rigidity of the decision-making and the legal 
constraints the Commission works under. 
Second, evaluation recommendations tend to suggest small procedural programme 
changes rather than large-scale programme changes that only the EP and Council 
90 
could decide upon. Evaluation findings and recommendations for programme 
change are usually not surprising or innovative because political and legal 
structures limit the implementation of recommendations. For example, the terms 
of reference, the evaluation questions and the Commission staff guide evaluators 
towards recommendations that are feasible on a managerial level and that do not 
require a political decision-making procedure or that go against the legal structures 
of the Commission. 
Third, the two previous findings imply a de facto de-politicisation of programme 
evaluations in the EU evaluation system, where evaluation information conforms 
to the administrative context of programme management in the Commission 
instead of the political context of policy-makers. Evaluation does not challenge the 
policies because evaluation is institutionalised, formally and informally, so that 
evaluation content and outputs conform to programme-specific recommendations. 
As an example, out of the three case evaluations of article 4, only one 
recommendation was not possible for the Commission to implement on its own. 
The recommendation was to increase the budget of the programme in question, 
which might be the reason why it was not objected to by the Commission during 
the implementation of the evaluation.  
We have now seen how the evaluation system has several effects on evaluation 
use both inside and outside the Commission. The evaluation system limits the 
potential evaluation use, but also enables or improves some uses at specific times. 
In other words, the formal and informal structures of the system create a playing 
field where only a certain range of outcomes is possible. However, at the same 
time the evaluation system’s standards and procedures, as well as staff 
commitment to evaluation and experience with evaluation, also enable evaluation 
use by securing a usable evaluation product. Evaluations are highly complex and 
potentially very political. The Commission’s standards and procedures for 
evaluation implementation limits the possible evaluation outcomes, as explained 
above, but at the same time they increase the chance of a legitimate, sound and 
relevant evaluation product that is more likely to be used by the Commission. 
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6.2.2 OTHER FINDINGS 
A number of other findings from the four articles are indirectly linked to the 
research question. First, the articles together show the importance of analysing 
phenomena such as evaluation and evaluation use in their systemic organisational 
context. When trying to explain evaluation use, the evaluation literature has 
focused on the evaluation much more than on the context of the evaluation. The 
main contribution of this thesis is to introduce to the evaluation literature 
empirically tested assumptions of organisational institutionalism, thereby 
illustrating that a theory of organisation is better at explaining evaluation uses than 
evaluation theory. The purpose of the evaluation system is to secure the 
Commission’s accountability. Justificatory use is therefore the most important 
type of use for the Commission and this raison d’être can explain why process 
uses are not made possible in the evaluation system and why findings uses are 
significantly limited to mainly small-scale programme changes. 
An important finding of this thesis is that the concept ‘evaluation system’ needs 
more theoretical depth. If an ‘evaluation system’ is defined only in terms of its 
boundedness, units and institutionalisation then we fail to understand how 
accountability and organisational effectiveness affects evaluation practices and 
evaluation use. This thesis shows very clearly how organisational accountability 
plays an important role in determining how evaluations are used.  
6.3 PERSPECTIVES ON FINDINGS 
The conclusions of this thesis point in several directions and have implications for 
the setting up of evaluation systems. Some of these implications have been raised 
before, but are nevertheless all the more relevant, given the conclusions in this 
thesis regarding non-use. 
6.3.1 STUDIES RATHER THAN SYSTEMS 
One of the main points in the book From studies to streams (Rist and Stame, 
2006) is that evaluations used to be implemented as ad hoc studies rather than as 
streams of evaluations implemented in evaluation systems. One of the defining 
features of an evaluation system is that evaluations take place continuously and 
not on an ad hoc basis.  
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However, during the data collection for this thesis, several interviewees argued 
that evaluations were too broad in scope and did not bring about anything new 
because they were produced so frequently that nothing new had really happened 
since the last evaluation. Also, some interviewees argued that the targeted and 
specific studies they commissioned were much more useful, as they typically 
helped mitigate a problem in programme implementation and because they could 
be commissioned without adhering to the formal criteria of evaluation dictated by 
the evaluation system’s rules and guidelines.  
Therefore, administrators looking to set up an evaluation system should consider if 
learning objectives are not more easily met through ad hoc studies rather than 
through streams of standardised evaluations. There is a trade-off between, on one 
hand, learning and evaluation use and, on the other, the accountability that is 
vested in the system. 
6.3.2 PERFORMANCE AUDIT INSTEAD OF EVALUATION 
As this thesis concludes, evaluation systems are set up mainly to secure 
accountability in relation to programme spending. However, audits are already 
performed on spending programmes in the EU evaluation system and performance 
audits also investigate programme effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, it is 
worth considering the raison d’être of evaluation in the face of the development of 
performance audits.  
Audit is vested with much more credibility than evaluation due to its strong 
institutionalisation and accreditation. But it is also externalised and difficult to 
control for the evaluating organisation (e.g., the Commission). Thus, it is not in 
the interest of the organisation to give up control to external auditors who do not 
follow the rules of the evaluating organisation (e.g., the terms of reference). On 
the other hand, considerable resources are directed into evaluation management 
and outsourcing, and EU expenditure programmes are already audited on multiple 
levels. Also, audit is by its nature better equipped to investigate spending 
programmes.  
Finally, since external audits (from the Euroepan Court of Auditors) are vested 
with more credibility, they are also more useful to policy-makers in the EP and 
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Council. For overall considerations of use, in relation to expenditure programmes 
performance audits might be a better investment than evaluation systems. 
6.3.3 POLICY EVALUATION OVER PROGRAMME EVALUATION 
Evaluation systems are typically set up to secure accountability in relation to 
expenditure programmes. However, as I argued before, expenditure programmes 
are likely to be assessed better by auditors than evaluators. And as this thesis 
concludes, the use of evaluations of expenditure programmes is very limited in 
relation to significant programme change.  
Instead, evaluation is more likely to be much better suited for policy evaluation. 
Policies (understood as legal measures) rarely include a spending operation, where 
auditors should be involved, and policies do not work in cycles as do programmes. 
Many of the reasons for non-use of evaluations are linked to the close ties between 
the evaluation system and the programme cycle. Therefore, it is likely that policy 
evaluations will generate a much larger potential for evaluation use as it slowly 
becomes a reality as systematic praxis within the EU evaluation system.  
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8.1 ARTICLE 1 – EVALUATION USE IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL
CONTEXT – CHANGING FOCUS TO IMPROVE THEORY 
Reference:  
Højlund, S. (2014) Evaluation use in the organizational context – changing focus 
to improve theory. Evaluation 20(1), 26-43. 
http://evi.sagepub.com/content/20/1/26.abstract  
(To avoid any copyright issues in relation to the final print of this thesis, this 
article is conveyed in its ‘pre-script’ version. A pre-script version is a near-
published version of the article as it was after peer-review and language check by 
the author as well as after the final acceptance of the article by the journal editor. 
The pre-script version does not include the final editing and formatting of the 
article by the journal in which the article was published. The author of this thesis 
recommends readers of this thesis published by the Library of Copenhagen 
Business School to seek and purchase this article in its original version at the 
journal in which it was published.) 
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Evaluation Use in the Organisational 
Context - Changing Focus to Improve 
Theory
This article is about evaluation use. It focuses on the well-known paradox that 
evaluation is undertaken to improve policy, but in fact rarely does so. 
Additionally, the article also finds that justificatory uses of evaluation do not fit 
with evaluation’s objective of policy-improvement and social betterment. The 
article explains why the paradox exists and suggests applying organisational 
institutional theory to explain evaluation use. The key argument is that - in order 
to explain all types of evaluation uses including non-use and justificatory uses - 
focus needs to be on the evaluating organisation and its conditioning factors, 
rather than the evaluation itself.  
Keywords: neo-institutionalism, justificatory use, non-use, rationality, 
organisational theory 
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Introduction  
Evaluation use is probably the most researched theme in the literature on 
evaluation (Christie 2007, 8; Henry and Mark 2003, 294). That is because 
administrators, politicians and citizens have an interest in knowing to what extent 
evaluations are used to improve policies. Despite this great interest in evaluation 
use, it is well described that evaluations rarely do change policies (Patton, 1997; 
Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 2–3). This constitutes a paradox, since the very 
objective of evaluation is to improve policy. And so, one could ask; why evaluate 
with the objective of improving policy, if the evaluation is not used after all? This 
article addresses this paradox in new ways.  
First, the article argues that the paradox described above is inherent in the nature 
of evaluation and that this has ramifications for our understanding of types of 
evaluation uses such as legitimising- and symbolic use as well as non-use.  
Second, the article argues that the literature on evaluation use insufficiently 
addresses evaluation’s organisational context and therefore is unable to resolve the 
paradox.  
Finally, to remedy this gap in the literature concerning the lack of contextual 
explanations of evaluation use, the article argues along the lines of Sanderson 
(2000) and Dahler-Larsen (2012) that it would be beneficial to complement core 
assumptions of causality and rationality with a theory of organisation. A model is 
proposed that; 1) explains evaluation use by factors that are contextual to the 
evaluating organisation rather than contextual to the evaluation; and 2) integrates 
non-use (as well as justificatory use types) to resolve the paradox of non-use 
explained above. 
Clarifying evaluation use 
The literature on evaluation use is strongly linked with a much larger stream of 
literature on the use of scientific results and knowledge use in policy-making 
(Porter 1995; Vedung, 2010; Weiss, 1998; Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980; Lazarsfeld 
and Sewell et al., 1967). The literature on evaluation use has developed primarily 
in the US (Saunders 2012) and is often associated with the work of Michael Quinn 
Patton and Carol Weiss. A definition of evaluation use is provided by Johnson et 
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al. (2009: 378); any application of evaluation processes, products, or findings to 
produce an effect.’ 
The literature on evaluation use converged early on four main types of evaluation 
use: Instrumental-, conceptual-, process- and symbolic use. However, over the 
years, many researchers grew dissatisfied with these categories. Alkin and Taut 
were displeased with the multitudes of potential evaluation uses and influences 
that did not fit into these four vaguely defined categories of use (Alkin and Taut, 
2003; Kirkhart, 2000; Henry and Mark, 2003; Weiss, 1998). Some of the criticism 
concerned the operationalisation and measurement of the concepts: used when and 
used by whom? The appropriate typologies of use (or influence) are still debated 
most likely because it continues to be difficult to assess the influences and effects 
of evaluations (Alkin and Taut, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000; Mark and Henry, 2004; 
Johnson et al., 2009; Hofstetter and Alkin, 2003).  
In this article, a simple typology of evaluation use is applied. Evaluation use is 
either referred to as findings use (instrumental, conceptual, legitimising) or 
process use (instrumental, conceptual, symbolic) in line with Alkin and Taut's 
(2003) refinement of the old categories. They recognised that process use (use 
during the evaluation process) could be instrumental, conceptual and legitimising 
(e.g. evaluation is legitimising the organisation). Moreover, the evaluation result 
(typically an evaluation report), could also be used instrumentally, conceptually 
and symbolically (e.g. evaluation legitimises the evaluated programme). In this 
article, legitimising- and symbolic use are referred to as 'justificatory' uses.  
There are good reasons for applying newer frameworks (e.g. Kirkhart, 2000; Mark 
and Henry, 2004), but the previously explained concepts serve adequately the 
purpose of reference in this article that is mainly concerned with the factors 
explaining evaluation use and the legitimising- and symbolic use types. 
Understanding the paradox 
This section elaborates on the nature of evaluation, evaluation use and the paradox 
associated with it. The problem for the literature is defined and a possible solution 
to this problem is found in organisational institutional theory. 
The nature of evaluation 
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If one can talk about a ‘general logic’ of evaluation, this logic is inherently realist 
and rational (Albaek, 1995; Van der Knaap, 1995; Schwandt, 1997; Sanderson, 
2000). The often-stated purpose and idea behind evaluation is rooted in 
assumptions of rationality and causality. Evaluation is commonly understood as a 
tool providing a feedback mechanism informing policy-makers and civil servants 
of what works and what does not. Most evaluation models and assumptions of 
evaluation use are derived from this primary rationale and function along logics of 
cause and effect (see e.g. Mark and Henry, 2004: 38; Cousins and Leithwood, 
1986; Pawson and Tilley, 1997). This is ontologically and epistemologically 
linked to realist and positivist understandings commonly found in classical 
economic thinking and rational choice, where the actor is perceived to be rational 
and pursuit goal-attainment and utility-maximising behavioural patterns of action 
(Sanderson, 2000). These assumptions contain an underlying positive and 
evolutionary assumption of progress and betterment, whether of the bureaucracy 
or the policy. In evaluation, this positive assumption also dominates through the 
general conception of 'social betterment' as the ultimate objective of evaluation 
(Henry and Mark, 2004; Dahler-Larsen, 2012). 
According to Albaek (1995), the positivist assumptions behind evaluation has 
been weakened somewhat over the last decades, as positivism was challenged by 
phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions as well as critical theory. However, 
Sanderson (2000) questions whether evaluation has completely escaped positivist 
logics of cause and effect as they are still dominating evaluation models even if 
methodological plurality is accepted widely.  
The inborn paradox 
Evaluation itself was born in a time of believe in a better world through rational 
interventions and social engineering (Vedung, 2010) and therefore evaluation is 
inherently rationalist, causal and evolutionary in nature (Sanderson, 2000). This is 
apparent considering the raison d'être of evaluation that is included in mainstream 
definitions of evaluation: Evaluation is commonly defined as a ‘systematic inquiry 
leading to judgements about program (or organisation) merit, worth, and 
significance, and support for program (or organisational) decision making’ 
(Cousins et al., 2004: 105; see also Vedung, 1997). It is clear from the above that 
the use of an evaluation is an intrinsic part of the evaluation itself. However, this 
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also constitutes a logical paradox since an un-used evaluation would then seize to 
be an evaluation according to the definition.  
The example above serves well to illustrate the point. However, in all fairness, all 
definitions of evaluation do not include a stated purpose of evaluation. 
Nevertheless, the paradox remains insofar as the stated purpose of evaluation is to 
improve political interventions, develop knowledge or assess merit and worth, 
which is almost always the case (see e.g. Henry et al., 2000). 
Justificatory uses 'tacked on' 
The fundamental assumption of linear cause and effect is intrinsically linked with 
the instrumental use category: Ideally, evaluation improves policy through the 
instrumental appliance of an evaluation’s results (conclusions and 
recommendations) to improve policy. However, evaluation does not deliver on its 
promise to inform policy-makers (Patton, 1997; Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 2–3). 
This was realised quite early in the evaluation literature (Shulha and Cousins, 
1997) and more sophisticated categories of evaluation use were devised so that 
evaluation use was not only instrumental but also related to conceptual 
enlightenment, process, symbolic use and legitimising types of uses (Patton, 1997; 
Pelz, 1978; Alkin and Taut, 2003).  
Nevertheless, there is a logical problem between the general assumption of 
linearity towards social betterment and the inclusion of symbolic and legitimising 
uses (as well as non-use) in the causal chain. The two types of use were 
recognised by Pelz (1978) quite early, but nevertheless they have not been 
appropriately integrated into the causal logic prevailing in models of evaluation 
and evaluation use. Kirkhart notes: "Other types of use [than 'results based use'] 
are secondary, 'tacked on' or seen as important primarily in the service of results 
based use." (Kirkhart, 2000: 6). There is no doubt that justificatory uses exist and 
should be kept as separate categories of use apart from instrumental uses, but it is 
very hard to argue that symbolic and legitimising use of evaluation lead to social 
betterment; e.g. water quality is not improved because an aid organisation use its 
evaluation process to legitimise itself. The argument of rationality would need to 
be stretched very far to argue that symbolic and legitimising evaluation use can 
actually improve living conditions for human beings (i.e. social betterment). So 
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contrary to the main rational assumption of the purpose of evaluation, evaluating 
organisations or actors are likely to have a very different objective with 
evaluation. It seems that the evaluation literature empirically have recognised 
justificatory uses, but theoretically have disregarded this acknowledgement’s 
implications for the overall rationalist and causal foundation of evaluation 
thinking.  
Paradox – and so what? 
The paradox explained above is well described by the literature on evaluation use. 
It remains to be seen how justificatory use types can be properly integrated into a 
model of evaluation use without just being ‘tacked on’ as Kirkhart notes (Ibid.). It 
seems unsatisfactory to empirically acknowledge justificatory uses of evaluation 
and widespread non-use of evaluations – and to call it a ‘utilization crisis’ (Patton, 
1997) – while not having a good explanation for the phenomena.  
The problem might be that the evaluation use literature often focuses on the 
evaluation itself; its implementation, its outputs, its conditioning factors etc. and 
largely ignores the organisational context. However, on the organisational level, 
there might be forces at play that are so strong that they overrule a persuasive 
evaluation result and cancels instrumental use. On this note, Christina Boswell 
states that: 
‘Despite a huge expansion of literature on knowledge utilization from the mid-1970s 
onwards, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the symbolic functions of 
knowledge. (…) Moreover, contributions in organizational sociology have shown how 
organizations derive legitimacy through signalling their commitment to knowledge 
utilization (…). However, there has been little attempt to develop a theory setting out the 
conditions under which symbolic knowledge utilization may be expected to occur, or 
testing these claims through empirical enquiry.’ (Boswell, 2008: 471-472). 
In this article, the claim is that organisational factors are more important, in terms 
of explaining evaluation uses and non-uses, than the literature so far has 
acknowledged. It is argued that an organisation's concerns of its external 
legitimacy are likely to have priority over evaluation findings and thus in certain 
cases lead to non-use of these findings no matter how relevant they might be to the 
organisation. This argument will be further developed in the following section.  
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Drawing inspiration from Boswell (2008), organisational institutionalism seems
like a good place to start in order to explain justificatory uses. Selznick (1949) and 
later a large number of studies observed that organisations act contrary to the
rational utility-maximizing behaviour that is expected and contrary to the 
objectives organisations set themselves. Instead, organisations mostly act
according to norms and values in their environment in order to legitimise
themselves (Zald and Denton, 1963; Scott and Meyer, 1994). An interesting
conclusion from these early studies on institutions was that organisations adapt to
the practices that are legitimised by the organisational environment (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). This is particularly the case if the organisation perceives itself to
be operating in an unstable environment, where there is uncertainty about the
distribution of resources between itself and rival organisations (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991: 30–1). DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 190) argue that organisations
are concerned with reducing uncertainty and stabilizing social relations
(exemplified in Selznick, 1984) and thus not primarily with maximizing power or 
maximizing outputs as e.g. a rational-choice perspective would be arguing (see 
also Scott, 1995: 21; Weick, 1995: 86–7). Hence, symbolic and legitimizing uses 
of evaluation are in line with the most basic argument of organisational
institutionalism that organisations have a need to legitimise themselves in order to 
survive as organisations (Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991;
Boswell, 2008).  
The argument put forward in this section is that the institutional context influences 
evaluation use and that context has not received the attention I claim it should have
with regard to explaining evaluation use. According to Peter Dahler-Larsen (2012: 
34), ‘evaluation is strongly dependent on its social and organizational context.’ 
Parallel to Dahler-Larsen, Boswell (2008: 473) argues that: ‘Any account of how 
organizations use knowledge will inevitably be premised on a theory of
organizations: a set of claims about the sources and nature of organizational 
interests, and how these translate into organizational action.’ Along the lines of that
argumentation, the argument put forward here is that evaluations are almost 
exclusively embedded in organisational contexts one way or the other. Typically, 
evaluations are procured by organisations, carried out by organisations (enterprises
or teams of individuals), maybe read and acted upon by a third organisation etc.
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So far, the majority of literature on evaluation use focuses on identification of uses 
and influences and factors and conditions related to the evaluation. The three 
reviews on the evaluation use literature by Leviton and Hughes (1981), Cousins 
and Leithwood (1986) and Johnson et al. (2009) covering the period from 1971 to 
2005 do not find or mention institutional explanations of evaluation use. Cousins 
and Leithwood's findings were later challenged by Levin (1987), who found 
contextual factors to be highly important. Shulha and Cousins (1997) later 
produced another important review concluding that contextual factors and 
organisational contexts were gaining more prominence in the literature. But the 
review did not mention institutional theory either (Saunders 2012). Neither did 
two later reviews of the literature by Cousins et al. (2004) and Amo and Cousins 
(2007). Not so long ago, Ledermann (2011: 160) argued that ‘…it is time to 
abandon the ambition of finding 'the important' characteristic for use and to adopt 
a focus on context-bound mechanisms of use instead’.  
Turning to the evaluation literature for answers rooted in institutional theory 
yields few results. A bibliographical search in four leading evaluation journals 
(American Journal of Evaluation; Evaluation; Evaluation Review; Canadian 
Journal of Programme Evaluation) resulted in 24 articles and two papers referring 
to ‘institutionalism’ or ‘neo-institutional*’.i The majority of the articles merely 
refers to or mentions the institutional context without applying the theory (e.g. 
Van der Knaap, 1995; Sanderson, 2000; Saunders, 2012; Barnes, 2003). However, 
Van der Knaap (1995) and Sanderson (2000) are two important articles in terms of 
articulating the need for contextual analysis of evaluation research. Another part 
of the articles looks to define evaluation institutions at work in organisations 
(Barnes et al., 2003; Hanberger and Schild, 2004; Verone and Jacob, 2005; Jacob, 
2005). A third part of the articles that turned up in the search used institutional 
theory as a framework for understanding the evaluation institution's diffusion and 
adoption (Hansen and Borum, 1999, 2000; Radaelli, 2009). These articles apply a 
traditional organisational institutional analysis to illustrate how evaluation and 
impact assessment are diffused in an organisational field. Finally, two articles go 
further by looking into how institutionalised evaluation practices influence 
performance and evaluation use (Sager and Rissi, 2011; Eckerd and Moulton, 
2011). However, Eckerd and Moulton (2011) are the only authors that apply 
institutional logics to explain evaluation use. Their valuable contribution is an 
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important source of inspiration and backing to the model put forward later in this 
article. So, despite the multitude of explanatory factors and conditions that are 
analysed in the literature on evaluation use, organisational institutional theory is 
not evoked systematically as an explanatory framework. 
Since institutional theory as a means to explain evaluation is almost absent in the 
evaluation literature, one can either conclude that it is not significant as 
explanatory factor of evaluation use, or that it may have been overlooked so far as 
a theoretical framework for understanding evaluation use. The claim in this article 
is that the latter option is the case, and therefore the next chapter investigates how 
institutional theory can be applied to explain evaluation use. 
Explaining evaluation use with organisational theory 
In this section, the article proposes an explanatory model linking assumptions 
from organisational institutionalism with new findings from research on 
evaluation and knowledge use. The model includes the external and internal 
factors that are at play in an organisation. It is empirically supported by the 
findings of Boswell (2008) and Eckerd and Moulton (2011). But first, the next 
section describes the institution of evaluation. 
The Institution of Evaluation 
At heart of institutional theory is the definition of an institution. First, institutions 
should not be confused with organisations. Rather they are the frames for action of 
organisations or simply put; the taken-for-granted formal and informal rules of the 
game. Scott (1995: 49) writes; ‘…institutions are multifaceted, durable, social 
structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material 
resources.’ From this definition it is important to stress that institutions are 
resilient to change and that they consist of cultured-cognitive, normative, and 
regulative elements that provide meaning to social life (Scott, 1995: 48). Thus, 
formal and informal rules shape social action, constraining actors and limit their 
choice of action and might be the subject of conflict between competing interests 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). An institution requires a clear typification (e.g. 
'evaluation'), social knowledge or sedimentation. Though it is difficult to assess 
the degree or power of an institution, indications of its strength are: 1) the level of 
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taken-for-grantedness or automation; 2) the severity of sanctions when it is not 
followed.  
The institution of evaluation is taken for granted in many organisations. There are 
a number of relatively stable interpretations of concepts, practices, principles, 
norms, ethics, values and artefacts associated with evaluation. In other words, 
evaluation fits well Scott’s definition of an institution previously mentioned. Peter 
Dahler-Larsen (2006) argues that evaluation has become a protected discourse and 
that ‘Evaluation has stepped into character as a mandatory political and 
administrative ritual, which priorities and decisions need to adhere to in order to 
be socially valid’ [my translation]. Schwandt (2009) refers to the 'evaluation 
imaginary'. In other words, evaluation has become a de facto legitimising 
institution – a practice we in many cases take for granted without questioning.  
The strength of an institution can be assessed by the severity of sanctions 
associated with non-adherence to the institution. E.g. A foundation granting a non-
profit organisation means to carry out a particular project might include a 
provision in the contract instructing the non-profit to evaluate the project ex-post 
or face the sanction of returning the money. The foundation might not face the 
same level of sanctions if it fails to e.g. evaluate its organisation. Hence, the 
evaluation institution is over time supposedly becoming stronger in the non-profit 
compared to the foundation. 
The notion of ‘field’ is also important in institutional theory. Scott (1995: 207-
208) defines it in the following way: ‘... the notion of field connotes the existence 
of a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and 
whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than 
with actors outside of the field.’ The most important actors in the field of 
evaluation are arguably the World Bank, OECD, UN, the American Evaluation 
Association and the European Evaluation Society as well as regional supranational 
political organisations such as the EU and some national donor agencies etc. 
(Furubo and Sandhal, 2002; Verone et al., 2005; Stern, 2006). They mutually 
reinforce and constantly negotiate the evaluation institution through their 
production of guidelines and practices as well as exchanges of opinions in public 
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debates and at evaluation seminars, -courses and -conferences etc. The field is an 
important concept, because this is what an organisation adapts to.  
While the institution of evaluation is commonly believed to produce instrumental 
and rational outcomes (Sanderson, 2000), it is also a result of the legitimacy-
seeking behaviour of organisations (Dahler-Larsen, 2006, 2012). Hence, according 
to institutional theory, the institutionalisation of evaluation depends on the 
pressure from the field.  
External pressure  
The core idea of organisational institutionalism is that organisations are 
fundamentally concerned with securing legitimacy by meeting societal 
expectations about their structure, practices, rhetoric or outputs (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). Organisations do this in order to reduce uncertainty and stabilise 
social relations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 19; Scott, 1995: 21; Weick, 1995: 
86–7). DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 147-160) identify three main processes of 
institutional adaptation (they refer to it as 'isomorphism'); 'coercive' related to 
dominance and legitimacy in the field, 'mimetic' related to field uncertainty and 
'normative' related to professionalization in the field. They define isomorphism 
(process of adaptation) as a "constraining process that forces an organisation in an 
organisational field to resemble other organisations facing similar environmental 
conditions" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 66).  
Coercive isomorphism takes place when an organisation is constrained by cultural 
expectations (e.g. as manifested in laws) to adopt certain standards or practices in 
order to sustain legitimacy and avoid sanctions. Mimetic isomorphism takes place 
when an organisation faces uncertainties (e.g. unstable political support, 
fluctuating markets etc.) in the organisational field and seeks to limit these 
uncertainties by emulating successful organisations' practices to render itself more 
successful. Normative isomorphism takes place when an organisation meets 
normative expectations in the organisational field. These expectations are typically 
linked to the professionalization and education and brings changes to 
organisations when e.g. the organisation use external consultants, who bring along 
new ideas, or by the recruitment of new managers. The table below list some of 
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the predictors that DiMaggio and Powell associate with the three processes of 
institutional adaptation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Coercive isomorphism 
(cultural constrains in 
environment) 
Mimetic isomorphism 
(uncertainty in environment) 
Normative isomorphism 
(normative expectations in 
environment) 
An organisation is most likely to adapt its institution to the environment when… 
…it is constrained by 
regulation or decisions of 
another organisation. 
…it is dependent on a single 
organisation for e.g. funding, 
expertise, technology etc. 
…it is dependent on one 
organisation for political 
action/decisions in order to 
operate. 
…it faces great (external)
uncertainty (e.g. political or 
financial uncertainty). 
…it is able to identify 
successful organisations, 
who are 'first movers' or have 
adapted the institution 
already . 
…the choice of institutions 
to adopt is limited. 
…it is hiring on the basis 
of academic credentials. 
…it is very integrated in 
professional organisations 
and networks. 
…the field is very 
professionalised. 
Table 1 Predictors of institutional adaptation (adapted from DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
A few evaluation studies use institutional theory and consider adoption of 
evaluation practices in organisations and countries (Hansen and Borum, 1999, 
2000; Radaelli, 2009; Sager and Rissi, 2011; Verone and Jacob, 2005; Benjamin, 
2012). Linked to the use of knowledge, Boswell (2008: 485-6) finds evidence that 
an organisation uses knowledge to legitimise itself in an unstable and uncertain 
environment as predicted by institutional theory. Dahler-Larsen argues that 
"institutional theory can contribute to describe the relatively mechanical diffusion 
of a phenomenon like evaluation, where the adopted standard in the respective 
organisation, however, remains a symbolic facade, which does not affect the 
organisation's core activities significantly." (Dahler-Larsen, 2004: 297; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
On the basis of the theory and the predictors in Table 1, it is possible to roughly 
graduate the external pressure that an organisation is under in a high and a low 
category. Pressures are considered high if the organisation is strongly influenced 
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or dependent upon other organisations for survival in an uncertain environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In the opposite case, the pressure is low. 
Internal Propensity to Evaluate  
Adoption of evaluation practices does not only depend on the pressure and the 
condition of the organisational environment but also on internal factors in the 
organisation: 
In her study on knowledge useii in the European Commission, Boswell (2008) 
uses Brunsson's distinction of ‘action’ organisation and ‘political organisation’, 
which constitute two extremes on a continuum (Brunsson, 2002). The 'action 
organisation' is focused on its efficiency because it gains its legitimacy from its 
ability to produce outputs. Therefore, this type of organisation is likely to use 
knowledge instrumentally to improve its efficiency and thereby increase its 
legitimacy. The organisation is likely to have a culture of evaluation to support its 
desire to increase efficiency. An example of this type of organisation in the public 
domain could be executive agencies or a homecare provider. The 'political 
organisation' draws its legitimacy from political decisions and action-taking on 
issues. This type of organisation has a low propensity to evaluate, because the 
policy outputs and impacts are often not measureable and therefore more difficult 
to evaluate. Also, the political organisation does not have a culture of evaluation, 
and for those reasons, political organisations tend to use knowledge - such as 
evaluations - symbolically rather than instrumentally when legitimising 
themselves (Boswell, 2008: 473-474). The distinction between these two ideal 
types of organisations draws on Meyer and Rowan's (1977) distinction between 
output legitimacy and normative legitimacy. They write: ‘Some organizations use 
routine, clearly defined technologies to produce outputs. When output can be 
easily evaluated… . …efficiency often determines success.’ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977: 353-54). And they continue: ‘Increasingly, such organizations as schools, 
R&D units, and governmental bureaucracies use variable, ambiguous technologies 
to produce outputs that are difficult to appraise.’ (Ibid).  
Boswell also finds that in the same organisation, management have a tendency to 
act politically and use knowledge symbolically towards the external organisational 
environment, while operational staff involved in core production activities tend to 
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be more instrumental in their use of knowledge. This also comes with different 
objectives of work; the operational staff having an interest in increasing outputs, 
while top management also has as their objective to legitimise the organisation in 
other ways such as demonstrating that the organisation is evaluating 'just like any 
respectable organisation should be doing'. 
In their empirical study on non-profit organisations, Eckerd and Moulton (2011) 
reach a conclusion that supports (albeit cautiously) the idea in this article that 
Brunsson's two organisation types can be associated with both adoption of 
practices (such as evaluation practices) as well as the evaluation use following 
from these practices. Eckerd and Moulton write; ‘…while an increase in emphasis 
[by non-profits] on service provision and innovation is associated with the 
instrumental uses of evaluation, an increased emphasis on political advocacy or 
social capital creation is associated with an increase in symbolic uses’ (Eckerd and 
Moulton, 2011: 114). In other words, if the role of the non-profit organisation is 
hard to measure like 'political advocacy' or 'social capital creation', then the 
organisation is likely to use evaluations symbolically. Hence, the idea that the 
propensity to evaluate should have an effect on evaluation use seems to be 
supported by findings by both Boswell and Eckerd and Moulton. 
Applying Brunsson’s two ideal type organisations, we find the action organisation 
in one end and the political organisation in the other. To label the continuum to the 
context of evaluation use, the term 'internal propensity to evaluate' seems fitting. 
An organisation with a high internal propensity to evaluate is seeking legitimacy 
by producing outputs. Therefore, it is interested in increasing its efficiency by e.g. 
adopting evaluation practices and using evaluation findings to improve efficiency. 
This type of organisation is characterised by producing measurable outputs and 
having a culture of measurement. The organisation with low internal propensity to 
evaluate is characterised by few measureable outputs and little propensity to 
evaluate and measurement practices. It will primarily use evaluation symbolically  
to legitimise itself and its activities.  
Figure 1 illustrates how external pressure and internal propensity to evaluate 
determine the adaptation of an organisation to the environment by adoption of an 
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evaluation institution and subsequently determine the primary mode of evaluation 
use.  
 
Figure 1  Overview of linkage between two explanatory factors, evaluation adoption and 
evaluation use 
 
In the following section, a model is presented based on the two factors; external 
pressure and internal propensity to evaluate. The article considers these two 
factors to be important in relation to an organisation's adoption and use of 
evaluation.  
Adoption and implications on evaluation use  
On the basis of the two factors (or continuums) described previously, four 
'extreme positions' or ideal types can be envisaged. These are: Coercive adoption, 
mimetic adoption, normative adoption and voluntary adoption. The former three 
are inspired by organisational institutionalism. The latter represents the pure action 
organisation that voluntarily adopts evaluation practices when needed in order to 
increase efficiency and outputs much in accordance with the ‘common’ idea 
behind evaluation (see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2 Four 'extreme positions' 
The following sections describe and exemplifies the four extreme positions. 
Coercive adoption  
Coercive adoption of evaluation practices takes place in an organisation that is 
under, 1) high pressure from its organisational field due to e.g. funding 
dependency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); and 2) because the organisation has a 
low internal propensity to evaluate due to e.g. non-measurable outputs and no 
culture of measurement (Boswell, 2008).  
External 
Pressure 
Internal Propensity to 
High 
Low 
Low 
High 
Voluntary adoption
Mimetic adoption
Coercive adoption
Normative adoption
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This organisation will adopt evaluation practices, but will most likely 'decouple' 
them from the normal processes of the organisation. Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
notes the following:  
‘Sometimes institutional pressures contradict with internal efficiency needs. When 
that happens, organizations may claim to adapt when they in reality do not. Instead they 
may decouple action from structure to preserve organizational efficiency while also 
obtaining legitimacy.’  
Formal structures and evaluation practices will be in place to 'satisfy' donors or 
other funding organisations (DiMaggio, 2001), but paradoxically the organisation 
does not seek to instrumentally use the evaluations. So, if the organisation uses its 
evaluations, it will most likely be symbolically to legitimise itself to the 
organisational field. This explains the behaviour, which is commonly considered a 
paradox in the evaluation use literature.  
One example could be the small non-profit relief organisation working with NGO-
support in a failed state. The organisation could be totally dependent on donors 
and is working in an unstable and politicised area, where funding can be cut 
almost from one day to the other for numerous reasons, which are out of the 
organisation's control (e.g. one supported NGO might suddenly be accused of 
being infiltrated by the government, of being corrupt, contributing to terror etc. 
and thus harming the PR of the donor organisation, which is also under pressure). 
Moreover, the organisation is small and overstretched depending on voluntarism 
and idealism of its staff. It has no internal evaluation capacity though its activities 
have to be evaluated according to the donor contract. Staff will most likely find 
evaluation a burden, counter-intuitive and non-applicable with regard to their 
everyday objectives and tasks related to e.g. capacity building in small NGOs.  
Mimetic adoption 
Mimetic adoption of evaluation practices takes place in organisations, where the 
propensity to evaluate and receptiveness towards evaluation is high but where the 
pressure to evaluate from the organisational field is also high. Because the 
organisation is highly receptive to the ideas and concepts of evaluation, it will 
adopt evaluation practices easily and not only because of coercion, but rather 
strategically to emulate practices from the best in the field in order to learn and 
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become more efficient. However, the organisation is also working in an uncertain 
organisational environment, where e.g. budgets are likely to be cut, and therefore 
the organisation also seeks to boost its normative legitimacy as well as its output 
legitimacy. 
The result is that the organisation will not decouple but rather use evaluations 
actively to legitimise its programmes or policies (not the organisation itself as was 
the case in the coercive adoption mode). The organisation will both have formal 
structures (common guidelines, evaluation schedules and rules etc.) to satisfy the 
field but also a strong informal evaluation culture.  
An example of mimetic adoption could be a school or university. Suppliers of 
education operate in a volatile and changing field. Teaching methods and curricula 
are almost permanently scrutinised and debated in public and governments are 
forced to take action accordingly or as reaction to international benchmarking 
results etc. At the same time, most outputs are measureable and the organisation 
has a culture of evaluation and measurement (e.g. exams). Therefore, evaluations 
are likely to be used both to satisfy the public by legitimising outputs as well as 
instrumentally to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the organisation.  
Normative adoption 
Normative adoption of an evaluation institution in an organisation takes place 
because spread of ideas in professional networks, managers changing position, 
consultants applying the techniques as part of an assignment in the organisation 
etc. The organisation is under low external pressure and has low propensity to 
evaluate and it is therefore not likely to adopt evaluation in the first place. When 
the organisation evaluates, it is thus more coincidental and linked to a particular 
manager's idea than an actual institutional practice resulting from a need to 
legitimise the organisation towards the external organisational environment. 
Therefore, the evaluation institution will only be weakly institutionalised - if 
institutionalised at all - and when evaluations are carried out, the most common 
learning type is likely to be conceptual use or no use. Thus, evaluation will not be 
a taken-for-granted practice, and consecutive evaluation output will differ much in 
quality and content due to organisational inexperience with evaluation. 
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An example of normative adoption could be a national security organisation like 
the secret service that is under relatively weak external pressure and that does not 
have internal propensity to evaluate (see study of internal evaluation in the FBI in 
Sonnichsen, 1999). Such an organisation would normally not evaluate regularly (it 
might evaluate ones under sudden pressure linked to a particular case of e.g. 
misuse of power) unless management alone has the idea to do so. That could be 
the case, if management comes from another sector, where evaluation is more 
common.  
Voluntary adoption  
Voluntary adoption of evaluation practices takes place in organisations facing 
little external pressure that have a high internal propensity to evaluate. The 
evaluation institution will most likely be adopted 'loosely' and practices will be 
informal and ad hoc rather than very rule-based, as formal rules and practices are 
only applied to the extent that they make sense for the overall purpose of 
increasing efficiency. Every time the organisation evaluates, the purpose is to use 
the evaluation instrumentally to increase efficiency and organisational outputs. 
Evaluations are typically designed on a case by case basis to maximise 
organisational utility.  
This type of adoption fits the action organisation. An example of such an 
organisation could be a large municipality. A municipality produces a range of 
outputs and the municipality draws its legitimacy primarily from its delivery of 
these outputs to the citizens. If there are holes in the roads or no maintenance of 
streetlights, the Mayor will not be re-elected. At the same time (depending on the 
country), municipalities are relatively autonomous and are usually not required to 
evaluate their own programmes or initiatives (however, country-wide evaluations 
of schools and other comparable organisations might be carried out centrally by 
the state).  
129 
Below, Table 2 provides an overview of the four extreme positions of 
organisational adoption of evaluation institutions and evaluation use.  
Adoption 
Adoption mode Coercive Adoption Mimetic adoption Normative adoption Voluntary 
adoption 
Adoption of 
evaluation practices 
Evaluation practices are 
directly or indirectly forced 
upon the organisation by 
one or more organisations 
in the field 
Evaluation practices are 
adopted to emulate 
successful organisations in 
the field 
Evaluation practices are adopted 
because of professionalization, 
use of consultancies or new 
management in the organisation 
and not because of pressures or 
because of a perceived need to do 
so. 
Evaluation 
practices are 
adopted voluntary 
to fit the 
organisation's 
needs for 
evaluation 
Consequences for evaluation practices and use 
Purpose of 
evaluation in 
organisation 
Legitimise organisation to 
secure its short term 
survival 
Legitimise activities of 
organisation; e.g. 
programme or policy 
Purpose can vary according to 
the manager / consultant. 
Increase efficiency, 
output and output-
legitimacy. 
Evaluation mode Regular summative 
evaluations with clear 
standards matching 
demands from principal 
organisation(s). 
Regular summative or 
formative evaluations with 
practice matching the leader 
in the organisational field. 
Evaluations are unpredictable 
and unregular. 
Ad hoc formative 
evaluations that are 
adapted to needs 
and problem or 
policy. 
Institutionalisation Very formalised but with 
discrepancy between 
activities and evaluation 
purpose leading to 
decoupling. 
Both formal and informal. Neither formal nor informal 
institutionalisation. 
Formal structures 
match need for 
evaluation. 
Informal culture of 
evaluation. 
Primary use types No use or symbolic use Legitimising and 
instrumental use 
No use or conceptual use Instrumental and 
conceptual use 
Examples 
Examples A non-profit organisation 
entirely dependent on 
funding from one particular 
organisation in a highly 
politicised and volatile area 
of operation like e.g. NGO 
support in a failed state. 
A school or university is 
both under strong external 
pressure to deliver the best 
education available while at 
the same time having 
measureable outputs and a 
culture of measurement 
cultivated over time.  
Military or secret service 
organisations with non-
quantifiable outputs (e.g. national 
security) that are so fundamental 
to the society that the 
organisation is almost beyond 
criticism i.e. little external 
pressure.  
A municipality 
supplies services 
and draws its 
legitimacy from 
doing so.  
Table 2 Overview of four ideal typical adoption modes and the associated expected 
evaluation uses. 
Conclusion  
This article investigates one of the old paradoxes of evaluation use, namely that 
evaluations are rarely contributing to policy-making despite it being the main 
reason for undertaking them. The paradox consists of a logical inconsistency 
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between, on the one hand, the causal assumption that evaluation leads to policy-
improvements, and on the other hand, that the empirical literature on many 
occasions find non-use and justificatory uses, which do not lead to policy-
improvements or social betterment.  
We learn that; 1) justificatory use types and non-use need to be better integrated 
into a theory of evaluation use; and 2) that a theory of evaluation use should take 
into consideration the organisational and institutional context of the evaluating 
organisation.  
Evaluations are almost exclusively embedded in organisational contexts one way 
or the other. Typically, evaluations are procured by organisations and carried out 
by organisations. Therefore, we need to focus more on the organisational context 
of evaluation and less on the evaluation and its immediate conditioning factors. In 
other words, evaluation use or non-use are likely to be explained better by 
understanding the organisational context, in which the evaluation takes place, 
rather than the evaluation’s attributes or other ‘micro-level’ explanations of 
conditions and factors. The article finds that the literature on evaluation use has 
been very good at describing the evaluation, its conditioning factors etc. while 
neglecting the organisational context, in which the evaluating organisation 
operates in as well as the organisation’s ability to evaluate.  
The article demonstrates how organisational institutional theory can explain 
justificatory uses of evaluation as well as non-use. Organisational institutional 
theory explains well non-use of evaluation as well as justificatory uses by arguing 
that organisations sometimes act contrary to their objectives. Therefore, it 
complements core assumptions of causality and rationality, which are inherent to 
evaluation. The article provides a short review of the application of institutional 
explanations in the evaluation literature. Only very few articles applied 
institutional theory, and only one article really used an institutional framework to 
predict evaluation use.  
A simple explanatory model illustrates the points of organisational institutional 
theory combined with elements from Brunsson’s theory of organisation. The 
model consists of two explanatory factors (external pressure and the propensity to 
evaluate) and aims at demonstrating that these factors can explain; 1) the adoption 
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of evaluation practices that an organisation is likely to make; 2) the subsequent use 
of evaluations that the organisation is likely to have. By applying institutional 
theory to evaluation in this way, we can integrate justificatory use categories and 
non-use meaningfully in a genuine theoretical framework, where organisational 
rationality is not a priori.  
So far, the literature on evaluation use has been much more focused on causal 
explanations on the theoretical micro-level, i.e. demonstrating that high evaluation 
quality leads to increases in use. This model, seeks explanations at a theoretical 
medium-level arguing that it is more important to understand the evaluating 
organisation’s internal and external conditioning factors rather than focussing 
solely on the evaluation when explaining evaluation use. 
Needless to say, further work is needed to operationalise the model. For example, 
how do we assess the external pressure and the internal propensity to evaluate? 
Those are the next questions that need to be answered in order to fully take 
advantage of institutional theory when predicting and explaining evaluation use.  
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8.2 ARTICLE 2 – EVALUATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION - FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY OR LEARNING? 
Reference:  
Højlund, S. (2014) Evaluation in the European Commission - For accountability 
or learning? European Journal of Risk Regulation (Forthcoming). 
(To avoid any copyright issues in relation to the final print of this thesis, this 
article is conveyed in its ‘pre-script’ version. A pre-script version is a near-
published version of the article as it was after peer-review and language check by 
the author as well as after the final acceptance of the article by the journal editor. 
The pre-script version does not include the final editing and formatting of the 
article by the journal in which the article was published. The author of this thesis 
recommends readers of this thesis published by the Library of Copenhagen 
Business School to seek and purchase this article in its original version at the 
journal in which it was published.) 
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EVALUATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION -
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY OR LEARNING?
The article accounts for the development of the European Commission's 
evaluation system. The article shows how internal and external developments 
shape an evaluation system aiming for both accountability and policy learning. In 
58 interviews, several justifications for the evaluation system emerge, including 
four types of accountability as well as an evaluation system constructed to 
facilitate learning from past experience. In the system's commencement, financial 
and legal accountability overshadow the focus on policy learning that was 
perceived to be in contradiction with the two former. However, the article also 
demonstrates that accountability and policy learning are not necessarily opposed 
to each other.  
Keywords: 
European Union, Evaluation, Policy learning, Accountability, European Commission 
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Introduction 
This article contains a historical account of the European Commission's evaluation 
system and how its implementation was related to concerns over accountability 
and policy learning. The article applies a historical research design to answer how 
and why evaluation practices were introduced, as well as looking at their 
consequences on policy learning. The historic approach allows us to see the 
internal and external developments that shape the evaluation system, as well as 
how the Commission balances the focus of the formal implementation between 
concerns for accountability and policy learning. Evaluation as a phenomenon 
makes the perfect case because evaluation can be both learning-oriented as well as 
accountability-oriented (Scriven, 1991). To fully grasp the intricacies of the 
dichotomy between policy learning and accountability, the article breaks up 
accountability into four types that emerged during the data analysis. Over time, the 
emphasis on these four types of accountability changes with consequences for 
policy learning in the European Commission. 
The European Commission's evaluation system was chosen as the empirical case. 
On one hand, the Commission is expected to learn from past experience to 
improve its policies and drive European integration. On the other hand, pressures 
to hold the Commission accountable to the European Parliament (EP), Member 
States (MSs) and ultimately to European citizens are strong. This double pressure 
on the Commission makes it a good case for the study of how the setup of the 
evaluation system in public administrations balances considerations for 
accountability and policy learning. Moreover, research on the Commission rarely 
focuses on its internal practices (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011; Smith, 2013). 
Also, very little attention has been given to the Commission's evaluation system, 
which has been developing gradually over the last 30 years (Stern, 2009). It is in 
this area that the article makes its contribution. The Commission has had a 
significant impact on evaluation practices and the setting up of evaluation systems 
in public administrations across Europe through conditionality (Furubo et al., 
2002). This warrants a focus on the justification and implementation of its own 
evaluation practices (Hoerner and Stephenson, 2012).  
The article concludes that policy learning and accountability are not necessarily 
opposed in an evaluation system. By decomposing accountability the article finds 
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evidence for a change in the focus on accountability in time, which in turn changes 
the effects that the evaluation system has on policy learning. Hence, the focus and 
potential for policy learning from evaluation in the Commission's evaluation 
system was reduced after the major Commission reforms in the 1990s and 2000s 
due to a focus on financial and legal accountability. However, evaluations were 
more likely to induce policy learning before the evaluation system was in place 
and in the late 2000s. This points in the interesting direction that accountability 
sometimes can induce policy learning rather than only be a burden to public 
administration.  
Studying the Commission's evaluation system 
Over the past three decades, the Commission's evaluation practices have evolved 
into an 'evaluation system'. An evaluation system can be understood as permanent 
and systematic evaluation practices taking place and institutionalized in several 
interdependent organizational entities with the purpose of informing decision-
making and securing oversight. According to Leeuw and Furubo (2008), four 
elements characterize an evaluation system: 1) Participants share a common 
understanding of the objectives of evaluation and the means by which the 
objectives are attained; i.e. evaluation is taken for granted and considered 'normal' 
practice; 2) The evaluation system is institutionalized formally in at least one 
organizational structure, in which it is separated from the operational structure. 
Hence, the system has at least one formal institutionalized organizational element 
(e.g. 'an evaluation unit') that typically is in charge of planning, tendering, 
implementing, quality-checking and follow-up; 3) Evaluation systems are 
permanent in the sense that their setup has no time-limitation; 4) Evaluations are 
undertaken continuously and systematically and in relation to previous and future 
evaluations as well as to the cycle of activities of the organization (e.g. budget or 
policy cycle).  
The EU institutions constitute a very good example of an evaluation system. The 
system's core consists of the Commission, the EP and the Council. It is the 
Commission that undertakes most evaluations in the system, but the EP and MSs 
do also carry out or commission evaluations usually according to Commission 
evaluation standards. The Commission has a legal obligation to evaluate 
programmes and policies as stipulated in the Commission's management policies, 
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as well as regulations of the programmes and legislative frameworks. For this 
reason, the Commission has institutionalized evaluation practices over the last 30 
years in each Directorate General (DG) through a common evaluation policy, 
guidelines and standards. In the DGs, designated evaluation units supervise and 
guide evaluation activity with support from the Secretariat-General (SG). The 
evaluation units are subject to internal audits as they are described in the Internal 
Control Standards of the Commission services and evaluation is an integral part of 
the activity-based management and budgeting system of the Commission and is 
thus formally related to the decision-making regarding EU budgetary allocations.  
The Commission's evaluation system has expanded over the last 30 years to 
systematically cover all expenditure programmes and most Commission activities 
including policies, agencies and strategies etc. An estimated 80% of all 
evaluations are contracted out (Commission and Jacobsen, 2007) and therefore an 
evaluation industry has been created by the Commission's public procurement of 
these and similar services. Commission evaluations are usually carried out by 
teams of academic experts, consultants or research institutes. The Commission 
allocated an estimated 140 full time positions to managing evaluations in 2007 and 
spent 45 million EUR annually on evaluations (including external assistance and 
staff resources) (European Court of Auditors [CoA] estimate) (Commission, 
2007a: 17).  
Policy learning and accountability 
This article investigates the concerns for policy learning as well as accountability 
during the setup of the Commission's evaluation system. A dichotomous and 
opposed relationship between the two is well-described in several research areas, 
such as evaluation studies (Scriven, 1991; Albæk, 1995); audit studies (Power, 
2005; Boven, 2005; Dubnick, 2005) and studies on knowledge use and 
governance in the Commission (Boswell, 2008; Böhling, 2013; Mendez and 
Bachtler, 2011). Commonly it is suggested that tools such as evaluation do not 
always generate learning even though they were implemented in order to do so 
and that control systems are implemented at a cost to general performance (Boven, 
2005). In fact, the research areas mentioned above generally assume a 
contradiction between learning and accountability understood as outcomes.  
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This article focuses on policy learning happening in the political organization or 
bureaucracy itself (Schofield, 2004: 288; Bennett and Howlett, 1992). Policy 
learning is defined as ‘a process of updating beliefs about policy based on lived or 
witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction’ (Radaelli and Dunlop, 2013: 
923). Policies are understood as both legal and non-legal acts as well as 
expenditure programmes. Standard definitions of evaluation have a tendency to 
focus on the formative role of evaluation. As an example Vedung (1997: 3) 
defines evaluation as ‘careful retrospective assessment of the merit, worth, and 
value of administration, output, and outcome of government interventions, which 
is intended to play a role in future, practical action situations’.  
Public accountability is the hallmark of democratic governance. Similar to the 
definition of policy learning, accountability is broadly defined in this article ‘as a 
social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify 
his or her conduct to some significant other’ (Boven, 2005). As implied by the 
definition, accountability in a setting of public governance can be many things and 
ultimately relies on the norms, values and cognitive frameworks of actors. The 
literature distinguishes between several types of accountability of which traces of 
hierarchical, democratic, legal and financial accountability were found in the 
interview data used in this article. The four types of accountability are described 
as follows: 
1. Hierarchical accountability is the internal accountability to hierarchy that 
most public administrations build on. Therefore, hierarchical accountability 
is sometimes also called 'managerial accountability'.  
2. Legal accountability refers to the legal obligations formal organization 
builds upon. The legal framework of the Commission relates to the Treaty, 
the Financial Regulation as well as other community legislation (Harlow, 
2002).  
3. Financial accountability is related to budgetary execution and financial 
controls that an organization can be subject to. One example is audits 
(Laffan, 2003).  
4. Democratic accountability is the external accountability to democratically 
elected bodies that undertake oversight and the public: for example the EP’s 
oversights of the Commission (Wille, 2010). 
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An evaluation can be related to several types of accountability at the same time. 
As we shall see in the analysis below interviewees refer to several reasons why 
they evaluate, including several types of accountability.  
Methodology and data 
This article is based on a historical case study of the Commission’s evaluation 
system (for similar approach to studies of the Commission see for example 
Wonka, 2008; Schout, 2009; Smith, 2013; Böhling, 2013; Burns, 2012). This 
article's analysis is based on data generated from 58 recorded interviews, 2 group 
interviews and 1 conference on evaluation in the EP along with numerous 
informal talks with experts and Commission desk officers, as well as personal 
observations made during evaluations conducted for the Commission. 
Interviewees were sampled purposefully and according to availability. 
Interviewees included Commission employees working in evaluation units and 
policy units, as well as external evaluators, evaluation trainers and consultants 
working with the Commission in the setting up of the evaluation system. Several 
of the interviewees were senior staff with key roles in the early implementation of 
the evaluation system, and thus with a good overview of the history of evaluation 
in the Commission. Interview data were validated with historical document data 
(e.g. internal evaluation policy papers, guidelines, minutes of meetings in the 
evaluation network etc.). Data were analysed according to the principles of 
qualitative content analysis and by using the NVIVO software package (Bazeley, 
2013) and coded according to the interviewees' perceptions of accountability and 
policy learning (Schreier, 2012; Mayring, 2004; Kohlbacher, 2006).  
Analysis 
The analysis is presented chronologically and broken down into four periods. Each 
period emerged from the data and was marked by one or more events related to the 
evaluation system's focus on policy learning and/or accountability. Table 8-1 sums 
up the periods.  
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Table 8-1 Periods of implementing evaluation in the Commission 
1980–94 1995–99 2000–06 2007–13 
Key events - Increased 
budget 
- NPM 
paradigm 
starts in 
Europe 
- SEM2000 
- Evaluation 
linked to policy-
cycle 
- Evaluation 
units 
- MEANS 
guidelines 
- Kinnock reform 
- Better Regulation  
- Impact Assessment 
- Evaluation linked to control 
standards 
- SG takes over evaluation from DG 
Budget 
- Evidence-based policy making 
- EP and CoA policy evaluation 
capacity  
- DGs develop regulatory evaluation 
guidelines 
- Fitness check 
1980–94: Decentralized sector-based Evaluation 
The first period that emerged from the data was the period between the early 
1980s and 1994. Evaluation in the early 1980s, and possibly earlier, happened 
unsystematically in a few DGs based on sectoral best practices (Summa and 
Toulemonde, 2002: 409). Most prominent were the evaluation structures 
developed in DG Aidco (Development aid) and DG Rtd (Research), which both 
had large expenditure programmes operating in sectors with evaluation norms and 
practices already established. A former Head of Evaluation Unit (HoEU) 
explained the relationship like this: ‘[the DGs] were sharing experiences and 
practices, but at the end of the day each DG was doing its own thing.’ 
As evaluations were unsystematically implemented and managed in the DGs 
without a general Commission policy or standard for evaluation, evaluation 
practices could be tailored more easily to focus on policy learning. One 
interviewee notes about this period: ‘the main issue was the effectiveness of the 
policy [in “the golden age [of evaluation]". I think the following decade was more 
dominated by audits and control.’ In this early period prior to the setting up of the 
evaluation system, the Commission had not experienced any major reforms and 
was functioning primarily according to ideas of ex post appraisals of effectiveness 
and performance. Accountability was primarily hierarchical, emphasizing 
procedural rules and hierarchy in order to deliver effective policy formulation 
according to the Commission mandate (Christiansen, 1997; Ellinas and Suleiman, 
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2008). In DG Aidco and DG Rtd, evaluation was introduced to adapt to best 
practices in the sector but also to satisfy demands from MSs for increased controls 
with the expenditure programmes.  
However, in 1993 the budget for expenditure programmes increased and the 
demand for financial accountability increased too (Summa and Toulemonde, 
2002: 412; Laffan, 1997b). In DG Regio, systematic programme evaluation started 
in the 1990s as a consequence of a more than doubling of the budget for Structural 
Funds in the second Delors package (Eser and Nussmueller, 2006). According to 
one HoEU there were two purposes for the introduction of systematic evaluation 
in DG Regio; ‘DG Regio had to justify [the programme] in 1993 because of the 
doubling of the funds. The other reason was that there was a wave of public sector 
reforms in the EU.’ Severl interviewees refer to the New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms in Europe that stressed a focus on control of public spending, 
accountability, and effectiveness and efficiency of public interventions (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004; Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008). Together with the budget increases 
the NPM trend spawned a greater demand for scrutiny and control in the 
Commission. One HoEU explained the development in the following way: ‘it was 
an audit culture from the very beginning’. At the end of this period, evaluation of 
expenditure programmes became an instrument primarily to produce financial 
accountability rather than just internal hierarchical accountability.  
In sum, the period until 1994 saw no systematic and centralized evaluation policy 
in the Commission. DGs could evaluate more or less as they saw fit and in turn 
evaluation was primarily a tool for policy learning as well as hierarchical 
accountability.  
1995–1999: Centralized control and Accountability 
The period from 1995 to 1999 was a turbulent period for the Commission. Before 
the Santer Commission resigned, it started the most comprehensive reform 
programme of the Commission since its commencement. The reform was called 
SEM2000 and was inspired by ideas of NPM, and in 1995 the SEM2000 Stage II 
Communication called for the systematic, timely and rigorous evaluation of 
expenditure programmes (Commission, 1996). Evaluation practices were drawn 
up in the Communication from 1996 entitled 'Concrete Steps towards Best 
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Practice across the Commission' that formally set up the evaluation system in the 
Commission. The Communication justified evaluation in the following way:  
The increasing size of the general budget and the concern of 
European Union taxpayers to secure value for money from 
their contributions, together with developments in Member 
States and elsewhere towards results-oriented public sector 
management have created the necessity to review and to 
update the Commission's approach to managing the budget 
(Commission, 1996: 1).  
It is evident from reading this justification that financial accountability is the main 
concern for the Commission at this point. In relation to accountability, evaluation 
had previously been related to hierarchical accountability. But with the 
implementation of the evaluation system and its association with the budget, 
financial accountability became more important. The Financial Regulation (FR) 
was amended in 1995 and read: ‘All operations must be subject to regular review, 
in particular within the budgetary procedure, so that their justification may be 
verified.’ (Council, 1995). Evaluation thus became legally tied to the sound 
financial management of the Commission and in this period evaluation was 
therefore mainly linked to financial accountability. 
The overall responsibility for the system's implementation was delegated to DG 
Budget and DG Financial Control. These two DGs – headed by their Nordic 
Commissioners, Erkki Liikanen from Finland (DG Budget) and Anita Gradin from 
Sweden (Financial control) – also undertook the drafting of the Communication 
establishing the evaluation system (Commission, 1996; Laffan, 1997b). The 
Communication called for each DG to establish an evaluation capacity with 
responsibility for evaluation and drawing up of an annual evaluation plan for all 
programmes. DG Budget, DG Financial Control and SG were responsible for 
common evaluation guidelines, training and compiling evaluation experience. 
Retrospective evaluations (midterm and ex post) were to be implemented through 
a 'learning by doing' process and should be applied every sixth year (Commission, 
1996).  
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To support policy learning the evaluation system was decentralized, placing 
evaluation functions in the DGs to improve the timing and knowledge 
development for decision-making as close to the sectoral expertise and decision-
making as possible. Evaluation functions were implemented across all DGs even 
though some DGs did not have spending programmes. One HoU in DG Budget 
argued that;  
the misunderstanding when introducing evaluation [in 
the SEM2000 program] was that… evaluation was 
limited to spending programs. And that was actually why 
many of the DGs into which evaluation was meant to be 
introduced…did not quite understand what they were 
supposed to be doing. Because they did not have any 
spending programs.  
Consequently, the interest in evaluation across DGs was negligible and the 
implementation sluggish. Also, in DG Budget staff questioned the rationale of 
evaluation. According to a former HoU in DG Budget: ‘DG Budget was [initially] 
rather suspicious about this activity on evaluation. …they did not really see the 
point [and] you could sense that nobody really took it very seriously.’ In addition, 
systematic evaluation was only linked to expenditure programmes and not 
legislation. Some spill-over in terms of learning was envisaged. But, as one 
programme manager notes: ‘…the interest is only with the [programme 
implementing units]. The [policy units] have no interest in the evaluation and they 
do not use evaluations’. Therefore the setup of evaluation functions in each DG 
often decoupled evaluation from policy units and the attention of the hierarchy. 
In practice, as the majority of evaluations are outsourced to consultants, the 
evaluation function and the decentralized evaluation system came to operate de 
facto as evaluation management (managing and not conducting evaluations) 
ensuring ‘that, where external evaluators have to be employed to undertake 
studies, they are given clear and feasible terms of reference and consistently 
supervised so as to ensure that the Commission (and its partners) retain control 
over the content and timing of studies (evaluations)’ (Commission, 1996). The 
externalization of evaluation to consultants was stressed ultimately to secure 
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objective and sound evaluations contributing to democratic accountability. 
However, as evaluation responsibility and oversight were removed from hierarchy 
and compartmentalized, their potential impact on policy learning was reduced. An 
evaluation unit desk officer adds on learning: ‘often we are not surprised about the 
results [of evaluations]’. A former staff member in DG Budget adds to that: 
‘[evaluation] is very divorced from any serious intellectual academic thinking. 
…It becomes a ritual.’ Therefore, the evaluation system created an 'evaluation
bureaucracy' that managed mandatory evaluations according to the formalized 
rules of the system, with the aim of learning as the secondary objective (Summa 
and Toulemonde, 2002: 420). 
In 1995, DG Regio commissioned the MEANS guidelines that were the first 
comprehensive evaluation guidelines in the Commission. They laid the foundation 
for an utilization-focused and non-paradigmatic evaluation methodology in the 
Commission respecting the different practices in each DG. The MEANS 
guidelines connected evaluation with the Commission's 7-year policy cycle (Eser 
and Nussmueller, 2006). According to one key observer, the main consequences 
of this were that there were too many evaluations conducted during the 
programme cycle resulting in bad timing in relation to decision-making, which 
ultimately had a negative effect on policy learning (see also Højlund, 2014a).2 A 
programme manager noted about the frequency of evaluation over the 7-year 
programme cycle: ‘We do not even have time to really do a follow-up [of the 
evaluation] because we are just really doing the next evaluation and [then] we 
have to start drafting the new Regulation.’ Tying evaluation to the policy cycle 
was done more for accountability reasons than learning reasons, as one key 
observer puts it: ‘MEANS was just bothering [people] with evaluation. [The 
Commission] was so silly [implementing] MEANS [and] SEM2000 to provide for 
accountability [and not for learning].’ The MEANS became standard in the 
Commission as most subsequent DG-specific guidelines and all internal 
2 Ex ante evaluation is conducted about two years ahead of programme start. Midterm evaluation is conducted three 
years into programme implementation, final evaluation is conducted at programme termination, and ex post 
evaluation is conducted two years after programme termination. Effectively, the evaluation cycle is therefore not 
seven years but eleven years and overlapping each other. Including ex ante/IA, there are effectively 2–3 years 
between evaluations of a programme. 
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evaluation training in the Commission were developed and implemented based on 
the MEANS guidelines.  
In 1999, the Commission issued the Communication 'Spending more wisely: 
Implementation of the Commission's evaluation policy' that took stock of the 
implementation of the evaluation system (Commission, 1999). It concluded that 
more needed to be done in order to institutionalize evaluation in the Commission. 
Ex ante appraisals were not used systematically, DG Budget should systematize 
the use of evaluations in budgetary decision-making and DG Financial Control 
should consider how performance information from evaluation could be used to 
assess the extent to which EU spending programmes achieved their objectives (see 
Laffan, 1997a). In 1998, DG Audit produced an annual report concluding that 
evaluation practices were well developed in the areas of Structural Funds, Rtd and 
external relations. However, at this point in time, most DGs had neither evaluation 
process standards nor any strategy for using evaluation results or evaluating 
evaluation quality (Toulemonde et al., 2005: 82). Thus the evaluation system was 
designed to secure financial accountability rather than hierarchical and democratic 
accountability. In relation to democratic accountability, a key external observer of 
the Commission found that the ‘actual use of EU evaluation for accountability in 
the EP [does] not [take place] at all.’ Thus evaluation was not yet related to 
democratic accountability in practical terms. 
As a consequence of the focus on financial accountability, policy learning from 
retrospective evaluation in the evaluation system's early years did not receive 
much attention. However, the evaluation system was not implemented overnight 
and the following period would see a reinforcing of the legal structures to support 
a faster implementation of the system as a whole with a continued emphasis on 
financial accountability. 
2000–2006: Kinnock Reform and Evidence-Based Policy-Making  
In 1999, the Santer Commission resigned due to alleged corruption (Spence, 
2000). To re-establish trust, the subsequent Commission headed by Romano Prodi 
issued the Kinnock reform, named after the newly appointed British Vice 
President of the Commission. The Kinnock reform moved the Commission's 
management system from a centralized system to a performance-oriented system 
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with activity-based management as one of the key features. It was the most 
comprehensive reform undertaken to date in the Commission (Commission, 
2000b; Kassim, 2008; Schön-Quinlivan, 2008). Focus on financial accountability 
increased and financial management, control and audit came to play an important 
role in Commission thinking (Bauer, 2008; Mendez and Bachtler, 2011).  
To implement the Kinnock reform in relation to learning from evaluation, the 
Commission issued the Communication 'Focus on Results: Strengthening 
Evaluation of Commission Activities' (Commission, 2000a). It stressed in 
particular the role of the evaluation capacity to ensure better policy-making, 
programme design and planning functions in relation to resource allocation as well 
as the consolidation of existing evaluation principles. As the title suggests, the 
focus was now on all activities of the Commission and not only expenditure 
programmes. According to Toulemonde et al. (2005), the evaluation system was 
consolidated in relation to expenditure programmes at this time. 
More importantly for this period was that the evaluation system was also linked to 
the Commission's Internal Control Standards, which are binding to the 
Commission and can be audited (Commission, 2007a; Commission, 2007b). Thus, 
DG Financial Control was given the competence to conduct ‘regular review of the 
organization and the systems DGs have put into place to achieve proper evaluation 
and feedback.’ Though the entire evaluation system has not yet been audited by 
the Internal Audit Service, examples exist of evaluation functions in the DGs 
being audited by the audit capability in the DG. However, the main point to make 
here is that legal accountability became more important in order to reinforce the 
evaluation and ultimately strengthen financial accountability. Due to a previous 
sluggish implementation of the evaluation system in some DGs the 
implementation was reinforced by making evaluation subject to audits and thus 
adding an extra level of accountability.  
In order to streamline and secure the full implementation of the evaluation system, 
a working group in the Commission's inter-service evaluation network had begun 
working on common standards for evaluation. However, due to the heterogeneity 
of evaluation methods and standards across DGs, the common standards became 
watered down to common evaluation guidelines, which should represent the best 
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practice in the Commission but which did not exclude the possibility of each DG 
developing their own guidelines. All guidelines were inspired by the MEANS and 
other already existing guidelines in the DGs (Toulemonde et al., 2005: 78). Also, 
inspiration was drawn from the standards and guidelines in the OECD and 
academia. The final work was called 'Good Practice Guidelines for the 
Management of the Commission's Evaluation Function', and was adopted in 1999 
with a revision in 2000. A final edition came in 2004 and is still in use today. 
In relation to policy learning the results were limited. The Kinnock reform 
represented the completion of the evaluation system's implementation along the 
lines of NPM principles and thus completed the negative impact this integration 
had on policy learning due to what was perceived by many staff members in the 
Commission as burdensome controls (Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008; Mendez and 
Bachtler, 2011). According to a HoEU, evaluation ‘became more systematic [with 
the Kinnock reform], but [also] a kind of bureaucratic thing. I mean if you think 
how evaluation results fed into the budget cycle of the Commission, [the] impact 
is very limited.’ This is confirmed by several contributions on EU evaluation 
(Toulemonde, 2000; Batterbury, 2006; Eser and Nussmueller, 2006). One 
programme manager put it this way:  
well you know, this midterm evaluation, it is not something 
that is really very present in our minds. I mean we have to 
do it, because it is an obligation….in terms of lessons 
learned …, I would say we did not learn something really 
fundamental.  
In an inter-service survey from 2002, the majority of evaluation unit staff 
considered legal requirement to be the main reason why evaluations were 
undertaken (Williams et al., 2002: Annex, p. 61). A later stocktaking exercise in 
the Commission concluded that ‘all evidence shows that overall allocation of EU 
resources is certainly not determined on efficiency grounds, but much more by 
political decision-making. The study shows especially that such decisions are 
generally very little informed by evaluation’ (see executive summary in Laat, 
2005). Another consultant report took stock of the implementation of ABM in the 
Commission and found that there is ‘limited information in the Annual Activity 
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Reports on the “lessons learnt” from the information on the performance of the 
policies. …The design of the SPP/ABM cycle and the evaluation framework does 
not yet realise the potential benefits of evaluation results for the effective 
management of budgetary resources’ (Ecorys and COWI, 2008: 13-14). One 
example of an internal audit of a DG evaluation unit confirms that feedback to 
from evaluations is not processed optimally. 
Evaluation was eventually moved to SG in 2009 in order to bring retrospective 
evaluation closer to policy formulation and thus enhance policy learning. One 
HoEU explains:  
The traditional DG Budget approach had been very much 
focused on accountability and not so much on policy design. 
But with the move of the Evaluation Unit from DG Budget to 
the SG, it was acknowledged that we tried to have different 
purposes for an evaluation. So, [now] we really do it for 
accountability purposes but also for learning purposes [and] 
for policy design purposes.  
DG Budget could enforce evaluation of spending programmes (with basis in the 
FR and the Control Standards), but could not impose regulatory evaluations. SG 
has the clout to impose regulatory evaluation, which it has been working on ever 
since in the update of the evaluation guidelines. 
An important event for the evaluation system was the parallel introduction of 
Impact Assessment (IA) in 2002. SG headed the development of IA. IA was 
introduced as a supplement to ex ante appraisals and as an important part of the 
Better Regulation agenda of 2000 (Kassim, 2008; OECD, 2002; Francesco et al., 
2011). In the Mandelkern Group report from 2001, IA was envisaged to play a key 
role in securing evidence behind policy proposals from the Commission. Quickly 
it gained popularity in the Commission, because of its usefulness in policy- and 
decision-making processes. In relation to learning, the FR states that IAs are 
supposed to be based on earlier evaluation findings. However, in practice this 
integration was not so easy (Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010). One HoEU argues that 
‘evaluations are relatively disconnected from IAs.’ Another HoEU supports this 
claim: ‘so we have two very strict and formalized systems next to one another and 
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up until today (2013), this has not fully been sorted out.’ Several interviewees 
suggest the same and that SG was even more uncertain about the usefulness of 
retrospective evaluation than DG Budget had been previously. 
As a consequence of IA’s relevance for decision-making, IA crowded out 
evaluation in budgetary terms. One HoEU describes that ‘the pure evaluation 
activity in the Commission is actually gone down because of the growth of impact 
assessment. With all the resources going into impact assessment it was very hard 
to convince people to carry out [regulatory] evaluations on top of this.’ 
Furthermore, regulatory evaluation is often not a legal obligation written into the 
legislation, it is often perceived to be unnecessary costly and risky to perform such 
a large-scale evaluation. Therefore, regulatory evaluation was still working ad hoc 
in this period as well as in parallel with both the IA-system and the mandatory 
expenditure evaluations. 
Overall, this period is characterized by more focus on enforcing the legality of the 
evaluation system and thus reinforcing the legal structures that would secure 
compliance from the DGs in order to finally implement the evaluation system and 
secure accountability. Hence, legal accountability was the focal point in this 
period in order to secure financial accountability, which was the main purpose of 
the evaluation system in the first place. As a consequence of the focus on financial 
and legal accountability, policy learning from retrospective evaluation in the 
evaluation system's early years did not receive much attention. Furthermore, IA 
reduced the potential for retrospective policy learning by de facto decoupling 
retrospective evaluation and prospective policy appraisals (ex ante and IA).  
2007–2014: Regulatory Evaluation and Fiscal Constraint 
In the period from 2007 the Better Regulation agenda was succeeded by the Smart 
Regulation agenda. The period was characterized by more focus on policy 
learning from the introduction of systematic regulatory evaluation in the 
Commission du to an increased emphasis on evidence-based policy making. The 
Communication on Smart Regulation reads:  
[The Commission] has begun evaluating 
legislation…[and]… this approach must be extended so 
that evaluations of legislation become an integral part of 
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smart regulation. Evaluating the effectiveness and 
efficiency of EU legislation will improve the quality of 
policy-making. (Commission, 2010: 4).  
Moreover, the CoA suggested that ‘legislation and other non-spending policies are 
not yet systematically evaluated. [And that there] is the need to obtain more 
relevant results to support political decision-making within or across policy areas.’ 
(Commission, 2007a). Particularly in relation to policy learning, the SG issued the 
communication 'Reinforcing the Use of Evaluation' (Commission, 2007a), which 
had as its objectives improvement of the quality of evaluation; linking evaluation 
to the concept of 'evidence-based policy-making', as well as integrating evaluation 
further in the 'Strategic Policy and Programming cycle' and ABM-system of the 
Commission.  
In parallel to this development towards more regulatory evaluation in the 
Commission, the EP started building its own evaluation capacity and conducting 
policy evaluations and assessments of Commission IAs. Also the CoA increased 
its capacity to perform performance audits on EU programmes. The evaluation 
landscape with regard to regulatory evaluation thus became more diversified in 
this period forcing the Commission to increase its efforts to produce sound 
assessments on the effects of legislation. Therefore and inspired by on-going work 
in DG Markt and DG Infso, the SG started work on new guidelines and new 
methods to support the evaluation of legislation. The new common guidelines are 
still in public consultation (in the moment of writing) but will most likely include 
a new instrument called Fitness Check, which is a type of regulatory evaluation 
that assess the combination of Community interventions in a particular policy area 
(e.g. all legal interventions related to waste, including waste treatment etc.). 
In 2007, the Commission (Commission, 2007a) concluded that evaluation is now 
an established management tool with regard to expenditure programmes and that 
learning and evaluation's impact on decision-making needs to be reinforced. This 
conclusion was based on three reports on evaluation use in the Commission (Laat, 
2005; Williams et al., 2002; Auditors, 2005). The communication emphasizes 
evaluation use to increase learning at the evaluation unit level in the DGs: ‘The 
evaluation function must promote the use of evaluation in decision-making and 
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organizational learning by ensuring that policy implications and lessons learnt 
from (and across) evaluations are synthesized and disseminated.’ This effort is still 
ongoing and in the latest proposal to common evaluation guidelines, the 
Commission mainly stresses learning as three out of four objectives with 
evaluation are learning-oriented ('organisational learning', 'relevant advice to 
decision-making' and '[input to] efficient resource allocation'). 'Transparency and 
accountability' is the only objective related to accountability (Commission, 2013). 
One desk officer from SG stated: ‘I think the policy [evaluations] from their origin 
are going to be more used. Because if you plan a policy evaluation that already 
means that there was some plan behind the evaluation in order to use the findings 
for political reasons.’ 
In relation to accountability, no measures were taken in this period to dis-integrate 
programme evaluation from the policy cycle or ABM. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
implementation of programme evaluation and the stress on financial and legal 
accountability will be undone any time soon (for a similar findings related to audit 
see Mendez and Bachtler, 2011). However, as systematic regulatory evaluation is 
implemented with the new guidelines, democratic accountability is reinforced. As 
we learned previously, programme evaluation do not receive much attention in the 
EP, the Council nor in the media. However, regulatory evaluation is likely to get 
more attention as legislation generally has a more tangible impact on society than 
expenditure programmes, where only few benefits directly from the support. Also, 
regulatory evaluations are rare and they therefore generally produce new 
knowledge that stakeholders and politicians can use strategically for decision-
making.  
Taken together, expenditure programmes are still managed according to a stress 
on financial and legal accountability in the Commission. However, the push for 
regulatory evaluation is linked much more closely with democratic accountability 
vis-à-vis the EU, the Council and MSs. In this period, a new focus on policy 
learning has emerged together with regulatory evaluation. However, due to the 
novelty of regulatory evaluation, further research is needed to elucidate whether 
regulatory evaluations in fact induce policy learning.  
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Conclusion 
The article accounts for the development of the European Commission's 
evaluation system. The article shows how internal and external developments 
shape an evaluation system aiming for both accountability and policy learning. In 
the system's commencement, financial and legal accountability overshadow the 
focus on policy learning that was perceived to be in contradiction with the two 
former. However, the article also demonstrates that accountability and policy 
learning are not necessarily opposed to each other.  
Table  is a summary of accountability and policy learning in the four periods that 
emerged from the data. 
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Table 4 Overview of implementation history of evaluation in the Commission 
1980–94 1995–99 2000–06 2007–13 
Accountability 
Focus Hierarchical Financial Legal Democratic 
Place Internal - Decentralized Internal - Centralized 
Internal – 
Centralized 
External 
Learning 
Focus 
Organizational- and policy 
learning. 
Incremental 
programme 
adjustments. 
Incremental 
programme 
adjustments. 
Policy learning and 
evidence-based policy 
making. 
Place 
Ad hoc evaluation creates 
learning on DG-level. 
Learning limited to 
operational- and 
evaluation units. 
Learning limited to 
operational- and 
evaluation units. 
The Commission, the 
EP and the Council. 
Context 
DGs implemented 
evaluation systems 
independently of DG 
Budget, DG Financial 
Control and SG and 
according to needs and best 
practice in their sector field. 
Successive NPM reforms institutionalize 
programme evaluations legally and 
administratively to increase financial control 
and the overall legitimacy of the 
Commission. 
Regulatory evaluation 
tools are developed 
and focus on learning 
is increased.  
Key events 
- Increased budget 
- NPM paradigm starts in 
Europe 
- SEM2000 
- Evaluation linked 
to policy-cycle 
- Evaluation units in 
each DG 
- MEANS guidelines 
- Kinnock reform 
- Better Regulation  
- Impact Assessment 
- Evaluation linked 
to control standards 
- SG takes over 
evaluation from DG 
Budget 
- Evidence-based 
policy making 
- EP and CoA policy 
evaluation capacity  
- DGs develop 
regulatory evaluation 
guidelines 
- Fitness check 
The historic approach allows us to see the internal and external developments that 
shape the evaluation system, as well as the consequences the evaluation system 
has on accountability and policy learning. However, evidence is still weak and 
more specific research on the consequences of regulatory evaluation in the 
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Commission is needed to fully grasp the impact on policy learning of these new 
types of evaluation.  
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EVALUATION USE IN EVALUATION SYSTEMS –
THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
This article investigates the European Union's evaluation system and its 
conduciveness to evaluation use. Taking the European Commission's LIFE 
programme as its case, the article makes an empirical contribution to an emerging 
focus in the literature on the importance of organization and institutions when 
analyzing evaluation use. By focusing on the European Union's evaluation system 
the article finds that evaluation use mainly takes place in the European 
Commission and less so in the European Parliament and the European Council. 
The main explanatory factors enabling evaluation use relate to the system's 
formalization of evaluation implementation and use securing quality, timeliness 
and evaluation capacity in the Commission. At the same time, however, the 
system's formalization also impedes evaluation use, reducing the direct influence 
of evaluations on policy-making and effectively 'de-politicizing' programme 
evaluations and largely limiting their use to the level of programme management. 
Keywords 
European Commission, LIFE programme, programme management, evaluation 
systems, evaluation use. 
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Introduction 
In the last thirty years, evaluation practices have spread and become common 
practice in most OECD countries. In parallel with the spread of evaluation 
practices, national and international organizations have to a large extent 
institutionalized and ritualized evaluation practices into what has been termed 
'evaluation systems'. Prior research has hypothesized about the implications of 
evaluation systems on evaluation use but the phenomenon still needs more 
empirical investigation (Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Furubo, 2006; Rist and Stame, 
2006).  
This article investigates evaluation use in the European Union's (EU) evaluation 
system where evaluation practices have been institutionalized over several 
decades, particularly in the European Commission. Thereby the article aims to 
contribute empirically to the emerging focus in the evaluation literature on 
contextual organisational factors explaining evaluation use (Højlund, 2014b). It 
does so by focusing on the evaluation system understood as the institutionalization 
of evaluation practices in the EU organizational bodies – in particularly the 
Commission. The evaluation system thus becomes the systemic setting and 
context in which evaluation use is analyzed. The underlying assumption is 
therefore that the attributes of the evaluation system can explain the way 
evaluations are used in this particular system. Thereby the article relies on newer 
theoretical contributions on evaluation systems (e.g. Leeuw and Furubo, 2008) as 
well as a more general introduction of organizational theory into the theoretical 
landscape of evaluation use (Højlund, 2014b).  
The main contribution of the article is to improve our understanding of the 
implications that an evaluation system has on evaluation use. Formal and informal 
organizational practices both impede and enable the use of evaluation. Despite 
some evaluation use by policy-makers, the article finds that most use takes place 
on the programme management level in the Commission. Thus evaluation use at 
the programme level tends to be instrumental, strategic, legitimizing and 
informational, whereas policy-makers use evaluations strategically and to get 
information, albeit to an overall much lesser extent.  
This article reports five overall findings: first, the strong formalization of 
evaluation practices in the system enables findings use but impedes process use. 
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Evaluations are thus typically used after their completion and not during their 
implementation, due to the Commission's stress on the independence of the 
evaluator. Second, significant findings use typically takes place at 'decision points' 
every seventh year in the programming phase. Other uses do take place at the 
programme management level, but instrumental use that affects the programme or 
other policies are typically indirect as evaluations feed into impact assessments 
and ex-ante evaluations of the new programme. Third, evaluations have little 
overall relevance for policy-makers and programme management alike. In 
particular, evaluations are not relevant for policy-makers outside the Commission 
due to competing information and their technical nature. Fourth and for the above 
reasons, programme evaluations are 'de-politizised' and generally they are not 
something policy-makers participate in nor have any use for. Fifth and finally, the 
'de-politization' represents a paradox since it is the European Parliament and 
Member States in the European Council that required the Commission to setup the 
evaluation system and also demand evaluations to be a part of the legal basis of 
programmes such as LIFE. But this article shows that policy-makers rarely use the 
evaluations, while at the same time the Commission is burdened by the 
evaluations and numerous other internal and external assessments and audits.  
The article is organized as follows: in the first sections, evaluation systems and 
evaluation use are defined and discussed. Then a section follows describing the 
methodology used in the analysis as well as the analysis itself. Finally, a 
conclusion is followed by reflections on potential extensions of the research on 
evaluation systems and evaluation use. 
Evaluation systems 
The discussion on evaluation systems took a leap forward with the book From 
Studies to Streams edited by Ray C. Rist and Nicoletta Stame in 2006 (Rist and 
Stame, 2006). Several subsequent studies picked up the baton (Imam et al., 2007; 
Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Williams and Imam, 2007) improving our conceptual 
understanding of the phenomenon. The literature on evaluative systems relate to a 
broader focus in the evaluation literature on evaluation as a phenomena 
understood as contingent on complex societal contexts such as institutions, norms 
and power (Dahler-Larsen, 2012; Van der Knaap, 1995). Particularly Peter 
Dahler-Larsen has used institutional organizational theory to explain the 
phenomena of evaluation and adaptation of evaluative practices by public 
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organizations. Only recently has the same theoretical framework been used 
explicitly to explain the phenomena of evaluation use (Højlund, 2014b).  
This article builds on the fundamental idea that institutions and organization 
determine evaluation use. The focus in the article is on evaluation systems because 
an evaluation system is composed of several organizational entities that to some 
degree share formal and informal evaluative practices and norms i.e. a shared 
evaluation institution. Leeuw and Furubo (2008) stress the following four 
elements constituting an evaluation system:  
1. Participants in the evaluation system share a common understanding of the objectives of
evaluation and the means by which the objectives are attained.
2. The evaluation system is institutionalized formally in at least one organizational structure,
in which it is separated from the operational structure of this organization. Hence, the
system has at least one formal institutionalized organizational element (e.g. 'an evaluation
unit') that typically is in charge of planning, tendering, implementing, quality-checking and
following-up on evaluations.
3. Evaluation systems are permanent in the sense that their setup has no time-limitation.
Moreover, evaluations are undertaken continuously and systematically and in relation to
previous and future evaluations.
4. In the evaluation system, evaluations are organized and planned so that they relate to the
cycle of activities of the organization or the evaluand (e.g. budget or policy cycle).
Based on the four elements above and other contributions, a definition of an 
evaluation system could be summarized as follows: "an evaluation system is 
permanent and systematic formal and informal evaluation practices taking place 
and institutionalized in several interdependent organizational entities with the 
purpose of informing decision-making and securing oversight.”  
In relation to evaluation use, evaluation systems are generally assumed to have a 
negating effect on information- and knowledge use in policy-making (Leeuw and 
Furubo, 2008; Pollitt et al., 1999). Previous studies suggest that evaluative 
knowledge tends to be made relevant primarily for administrators and not for 
policy-makers and that use in administrations will be linked to procedural 
assurance and legitimization of the organization rather than used to inform policy-
making (see also Furubo, 2006; Langley, 1998). The purpose of this article is to 
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continue the research on evaluation systems' effect on evaluation use and provide 
empirical evidence where presently there is little. 
The EU evaluation system constitutes a very good example (Stern, 2009). 
Evaluation is an integral part of the activity-based management and budgeting 
system of the Commission and thus formally related to decision-making regarding 
EU budgetary allocations. The system's core consists of the European Commission 
(the Commission), the European Parliament (EP) and the European Council (the 
Council). As the EU executive body, the Commission is also responsible for 
commissioning, implementing and disseminating evaluations of EU programmes 
and policies. The Commission has a legal obligation to evaluate programmes and 
policies as stipulated in the Commission's management policies as well as the 
legal basis of the programmes and policies. For this reason, the Commission has 
institutionalized evaluation practices over the last thirty years in each Directorate 
General (DG) through evaluation policies, guidelines and standards. In the DGs, 
designated evaluation units supervise and guide evaluation activity with support 
from the Secretariat-General. The evaluation units are subject to internal audits as 
they are described in the Internal Control Standards of the Commission services. It 
is the Commission that undertakes most evaluations in the system, but the EP and 
Member States do also carry out or commission evaluations, usually subject to EU 
evaluation standards and supervised by the Commission (in the case of Member 
States). About 80% of all evaluations in the Commission are externalized to 
consultants or groups of experts (Commission and Jacobsen, 2007) and the 
consultancies are thus also a part of the evaluation system.  
Evaluation use 
In the 60s, scholars started to question whether knowledge is used to inform 
policy-makers in order to improve policy (Lazarsfeld et al., 1967; Weiss and 
Bucuvalas, 1980). The answer to this question was partly negative and the 
situation was referred to by some scholars as a 'utilization crisis' (Patton, 1997; 
Floden and Weiner, 1978). In the cases where evaluation information was actually 
used, evaluation research conceptualized use-categories, which have not changed 
significantly over the years (Leviton, 2003). Four main types of evaluation use 
emerged: instrumental-, conceptual-, process- and symbolic use. These four 
categories are still used as the basis for most research, though newer and more 
165 
elaborate conceptual frameworks have been suggested (Kirkhart, 2000; Henry and 
Mark, 2003; Weiss, 1998).  
In the wake of the disenchantment associated with the scarce evidence of use from 
evaluations, the literature instead asked why evaluations were used or not used 
(Leviton and Hughes, 1981; Cousins and Leithwood, 1986). Studies focused on 
factors related to the attributes of the evaluation (e.g. methodology, quality, 
relevance of findings etc.) or the immediate contextual factors pertaining to the 
organization in which the evaluation is implemented (e.g. political climate, timing 
of the evaluation relative to decision-making etc.). These categories were 
empirically informed from the late 70s and onwards (see for example Leviton and 
Hughes, 1981). This article leans on the broad definition of evaluation use 
provided by Johnson et al. (2009b: 378): "any application of evaluation processes, 
products, or findings to produce an effect.” This definition captures the variety of 
use types applied in this article (see Research question and design). 
In relation to the interest in evaluation systems, Furubo (2006: 151) suggests that 
the literature could still benefit from a better understanding of the effects that 
evaluation systems have on evaluation use. In general, it seems that most evidence 
on evaluation use is still linked to single ad hoc evaluation studies rather than 
systematic evaluation information and does not specifically address the evaluation 
system. It is on this topic that this article makes its contribution. Similarly, only 
very few studies in the evaluation literature take into account organizational 
explanations when analyzing evaluation use (Højlund, 2014b). 
Research question and design 
This article investigates whether evaluation systems are conducive to evaluation 
use. In order to properly answer this question, three sub-questions are proposed: 1) 
How are evaluations used in evaluation systems? 2) who uses evaluation findings 
in evaluation systems? 3) why do – or do not – evaluation systems support the 
utilization of evaluation findings?  
Consequently, the dependent factors are evaluation uses. Considering evaluation 
use, the article distinguishes between ten different types of evaluation use 
organized under two headings: 'findings uses' (instrumental, conceptual, 
legitimizing, information and strategic) and 'process uses' (instrumental, 
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conceptual, symbolic, information and strategic) (Alkin and Taut, 2003; Weiss, 
1998; Leviton and Hughes, 1981; Leviton, 2003). Table 1 below gives an 
overview of the ten types of evaluation use in the analysis. 
Table 1 The ten evaluation use types. 
Process use 
(evaluation use during the process of evaluation; 
typically use of preliminary results etc.) 
Findings use  
(evaluation use after the evaluation process has 
ended; typically use of the findings and 
recommendations of a report) 
- Instrumental: The evaluation findings are used to 
change the evaluand or the conditions that it is 
working under. 
- Conceptual: The evaluation is used to gain new 
conceptual knowledge. 
- Symbolic: The evaluation is used to legitimize the 
organisation that is responsible for the evaluand. 
- Information: The evaluation is used to acquire 
information. 
- Strategic: The evaluation is used for advocacy. 
- Instrumental: The evaluation findings are used to 
change the evaluand or the conditions that it is 
working under. 
- Conceptual: The evaluation is used to gain new 
conceptual knowledge. 
- Legitimizing: The evaluation is used to legitimize 
the evaluand. 
- Information: The evaluation is used to acquire 
information. 
- Strategic: The evaluation is used for advocacy. 
The ten use categories are informed by existing literature on evaluation use. 
Hence, Alkin and Taut (2003) proposed the conceptual division between findings 
use and process use as they recognized that process use (use of the evaluation 
during the evaluation process) was not a type of use in itself as it could both be 
instrumental, conceptual and legitimizing (e.g. evaluation is legitimizing the 
organization).3 In addition to instrumental-, conceptual-, legitimizing- and 
symbolic uses, the evaluation literature has also proposed two other categories of 
uses that relate to the use of evaluation understood as simply a source of 
information – a type of use that often precedes other use forms (Alkin and Stecher, 
3 At this point it should be noted that these well-known categories are all ex-post to evaluation implementation and therefore do not include the 
effects and evaluation that exist ex-ante as a consequence of evaluation anticipation (for example redressing or window-dressing before the 
evaluator starts working). This use type was not included in the analysis because data on such uses is difficult to collect up to one decade after 
the evaluation was finalized. Moreover, the data collection allowed for accounts of ex-ante uses by asking several open questions, but no 
examples were given by the interviewees.  
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1983; Finne et al., 1995). An instance of information use would be to use 
evaluation information in a presentation or simply reading the evaluation to 
acquire knowledge. 'Information use' can take place both before and after the 
completion of the evaluation and is thus be both related to 'findings use' and 
'process use'.  
Finally, scholars have pointed to a fifth type of use often referred to as 'strategic 
use'. Strategic use is distinguished from symbolic and legitimizing use types as it 
is not related to securing organizational or programme legitimacy, but rather to 
advocacy in relation to decision- or policy-making (Weiss, 1992; Pröpper, 1987: 
cited in Van der Knaap, 1995: 211). Strategic use needs to be included because 
legitimizing use originally proposed by Rich (1977), does not appropriately cover 
the strategic and political use of arguments found in evaluations and used to 
justify political arguments and decisions. Legitimizing use is the evaluating 
organization justifying the programme or policy that is evaluated. However, in an 
evaluation system there are more actors involved, who have an interest in using 
the evaluation as a source of legitimacy to back their positions and political 
arguments. This type of use I call ‘strategic use’ as it does not necessarily have to 
be related to legitimizing the programme (legitimizing use) or the justification of 
the evaluating organization (symbolic use). Instead it is related to other issues, 
such as when facts from the evaluation are used to back a certain position in the 
renegotiation of a new programme.  
The overall independent factor is the context of the EU evaluation system. 
However, to better understand the processes in play, the analysis contains 
intermediate explanatory factors providing for a more detailed understanding of 
barriers and enablers of evaluation use in the evaluation system. Here, the article 
relies on the conceptual framework of Cousins and Leithwood (1986) and Johnson 
et al. (2009a). They refer to twelve specific factors that can influence evaluation 
use. These factors are divided into two categories. The first category is ‘evaluation 
implementation’ (a. evaluation quality, b. evaluation credibility, c. evaluation 
relevance, d. communication quality, e. evaluation findings, f. timeliness), and the 
second one is ‘decision or policy setting’ (a. information needs, b. decision 
characteristics, c. political climate, d. competing information, e. personal 
characteristics, f. receptiveness to evaluation). The first category relates to traits 
about the evaluation in question. The second relates to factors linked to the 
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organizational decision-making and other contextual factors not directly linked 
with the evaluation.  
Table 2 Explanatory factors. 
Explanatory factors Explanation 
Decision- and policy setting 
Commitment and receptiveness Staff commitment, receptiveness, responsiveness etc. to evaluations, evaluation 
procedures and practices. 
Competing information The influence of other reports, studies and prior knowledge. 
Decision characteristics The influence of the procedures and practices of decision-making including the 
barriers and enabling factors that are related to decision-making (e.g. timing, 
legal framework etc.) 
Information needs The influence of new information on the performance and of the organization. 
Personal characteristics The influence of the involved person’s personalities and experience.  
Political climate The influence of the saliency of an issue, political or public focus. 
Evaluation implementation 
Timeliness Timeliness of reports and other deliverables in the evaluation implementation. 
Credibility Perceived credibility of the evaluation overall as well as findings. 
Evaluation quality Overall perception of evaluation quality, soundness of methods and 
methodology. 
Findings Saliency of findings, conclusions and recommendations. 
Relevance Overall relevance of the evaluation including its methodology, methods and 
evaluation questions. 
Communication quality Quality of communication in the evaluation deliverables. 
Data and methodology 
This article analyzes the use of four evaluations of the Commission's Programme 
for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) over a ten-year period (2003-
2013). The case is thus the EU's LIFE programme. Case studies like this one are 
common to the evaluation literature and mirror the fact that interventions and their 
evaluations are often uniquely tied to a particular organizational or systemic 
context as is the case here (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). The EU evaluation 
system is a well-constituted evaluation system that matches the definition of an 
evaluation system as described earlier. 
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The choice of the LIFE programme as the case was made because of data 
availability and because the LIFE programme has experienced a full Commission 
evaluation cycle (ex-ante, midterm, final and ex-post) and therefore it represents a 
complete picture of evaluation use over an entire policy cycle as well as an entire 
evaluation cycle. Further, evaluation use in the Commission has been given little 
attention by researchers so far (see Bienias and Iwona, 2009; Zito and Schout, 
2009) with the exception of two Commission-sponsored reports (Williams et al., 
2002; Laat, 2005). This is unfortunate, because the Commission is important in 
terms of spreading evaluation practices in Europe (Toulemonde, 2000; Furubo et 
al., 2002).  
The analysis is based on sixteen semi-structured in-depth interviews and eight 
follow-up interviews. The informants were sampled purposefully according to 
relevance and availability and consisted primarily of staff from the Directorate 
General for the Environment (DG ENV), consultants that performed the 
evaluations, representatives of Members of the EP’s Committee for the 
environment (ENVI-Committee) and Council members (Ritchie et al., 2003). In 
addition, thirty six background interviews were conducted with Commission staff 
working in other DGs on other EU programmes to qualify the information and 
understand the evaluation system. The analysis also included relevant documents 
such as the four retrospective evaluations of the LIFE programme (Midterm, 2003; 
ex-post, 2009; midterm, 2010; final, 2013) and several other documents including 
DG ENV presentations to the Committee of Regions and the EP, internal 
Commission documents, the combined ex-ante and impact assessment (IA) along 
with explanatory policy fiches and Commission position papers for the new LIFE 
programme 2014-2020.  
The methodology applied in the article was based on the principles of qualitative 
content analysis (Schreier, 2012; Mayring, 2000) and the actual coding and 
analysis of data was carried out using the NVIVO software package (Bazeley, 
2013). The first sixteen semi-structured interviews were analyzed with a view to 
existing conceptual frameworks developed in the evaluation literature and 
described earlier. The eight follow-up interviews were conducted to check for 
saturation. The semi-structured interview guides gave the interviewees flexibility 
to elaborate on evaluation use and explanatory factors in relation to the evaluation 
in question and to the extent the interviewee found it relevant. Coder reliability 
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was sought by using the existing conceptual frameworks and subsequently running 
three rounds of coding on the interview data (Kohlbacher, 2006; Mayring, 2004). 
Further, the credibility of the findings was strengthened by a prolonged 
engagement in the field, conducting interviews in four consecutive waves over a 
period of one year. Findings were triangulated and validated with document data 
and follow-up interviews and interpretations were checked against interview data. 
Interviewees were debriefed and had the opportunity to comment on the findings 
of the article, and peers with comprehensive knowledge on the subject gave 
important comments on the draft article before submission. Finally, the researcher 
has several years of experience with evaluation of EU programmes including work 
as an evaluator on the ex-post evaluation of LIFE. 
Analysis 
The analysis is divided into three sections in answer to the three research 
questions. The first section is dedicated to the use of four LIFE evaluations 
produced between 2003 and 2013. The second section treats the explanations for 
evaluation use and the final section in the analysis summarizes who the users of 
the LIFE evaluations are. In each section the findings are recapped at the end of 
the section. 
Uses of LIFE evaluations 
This section contains an analysis of the process uses as well as the findings uses of 
the LIFE evaluations. Table 3 summarizes the distribution of the qualitative codes 
on three groups of interviewees and provides examples of interviewee quotes. 
Most notable is the lack of process use, but there are several interesting patterns in 
the findings uses as well that are described and summarized below. 
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Process use. The interview data on process use rarely contains references to 
process use. The few accounts of process use in the data concerns mainly strategic 
use. In the evaluation process, key stakeholders have the opportunity during the 
evaluation implementation to influence evaluation findings by coordinating 
answers to interview questions or raising particular issues of concern in 
interviews. The impact from this can be directed towards short-term decision-
making within the Commission as well as towards programme change. 
Additionally, the evaluation system makes a strong link between evaluations 
inducing evaluators to build on previous findings. Evaluations are therefore also 
used strategically in the long run as issues raised in consecutive evaluations gain 
prominence in decision-making. Also, symbolic use of evaluations were found to 
play a role in the evaluation process as DG ENV as well as other DGs are 
concerned about reducing negative findings about their organizations in the 
evaluation.  
Apart from these few instances of evaluation process use, there were no accounts 
of process uses in the data. There are two main reasons: first, the evaluation 
process is carried out mainly by the external evaluator in relative seclusion from 
potential users in the Commission or in other parts of the evaluation system. The 
evaluation process is typically managed by one desk officer in DG ENV, who is 
the liaison between the evaluator and the Steering Committee that oversees the 
evaluation at regular intervals (5-7 meetings during the evaluation process). This 
process is standard in the Commission and is meant to secure the independence of 
the evaluation as well as the proper and efficient evaluation execution. However, it 
also limits use in the evaluation process, because the potential users are rarely 
directly involved in the evaluation activity. Second, the evaluation findings can 
rarely be put directly to use during the evaluation process in DG ENV. Whether 
process findings are instrumental or symbolic, the use would normally require the 
evaluation to be finalized in order for them to be used for instrumental use and 
symbolically as well. DG ENV is expected to evaluate as it is stipulated in the 
LIFE Regulation. Flagging evaluation activity as a symbolic act during the 
evaluation process to gain external legitimacy in the system is therefore not 
necessary, as evaluation is expected by the organizational environment. One 
interviewee from the Commission put it this way: "…the legitimacy [from 
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evaluations] is by now almost automatic…" However, failing to evaluate or 
delaying evaluation activity would be perceived negatively by other actors in the 
EU evaluation system.  
The LIFE evaluations analyzed in this article took place every 2-3 years. 
Therefore the conceptual use of LIFE evaluations related to methods and 
programme-related concepts was limited, as evaluation practice and findings were 
repetitive. The staff implementing the evaluation were also very knowledgeable 
about the LIFE programme and therefore there is also little information use 
during the evaluation implementation.  
Findings use. LIFE evaluations are mainly used conceptually in the Commission, 
whereas policy-makers do not mention conceptual use in the interviews. 
Evaluations are used conceptually to inform discussions in DG ENV about 
evaluation methodology, programme indicators and the purpose of evaluation and 
programme impacts. The Commission's own ideas and opinions about the 
programme are clarified and sharpened by evaluations. This includes findings that 
might go against the conventional wisdom of the programme management such as 
the feasibility of indicator systems across the heterogeneous project portfolio of 
the LIFE programme.  
Instrumental use is linked intrinsically to programme management in the two 
LIFE units in DG ENV. Instrumental use takes place to a large extent based on the 
evaluation's recommendations through follow-ups and most recommendations are 
addressed after evaluation implementation. Examples of instrumental use could be 
work optimisation or improved internal communication between the LIFE units 
and the thematic units in DG ENV. However, fundamental changes to the 
programme administration are rare because they require changes to the LIFE 
Regulation or the Commission’s Financial Regulation. Also, the programme has 
been optimised over twenty years and thus several interviewees argue that most 
workable options have already been tried out.  
On the other hand, the data suggests that policy-makers did not use LIFE 
evaluations instrumentally. That is, evaluations did not directly inform policy-
making on the policy-level through, for example, the evaluation's 
recommendations. Policy-makers do not in general read the LIFE evaluations, so 
evaluations feed into the policy cycle through instrumental use on the programme 
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management level, where evaluations are the knowledge base for policy 
development in, for example, ex-ante evaluations and IAs. Thus, the effect of 
evaluations on policy is indirect. Additionally, evaluations are also used to update 
the evaluation system based on knowledge and experience linked to evaluation 
practices. This information is collected by the Commission's Secretariat General. 
As a result of changes to evaluation practice, a final evaluation is no longer a 
requirement in the new LIFE Regulation (2014-2020). 
Information use was referred to by all interviewees. NGOs and potential 
beneficiaries as well as people new to the programme use evaluations to get an 
overview and understanding of the way the programme works. MEPs use the 
Commission's presentations but also the evaluation documents needed to get up to 
speed with the LIFE programme. When a decision has to be made regarding LIFE, 
they read the executive summary and browse or search keywords in the document. 
Also, MEPs and particularly the LIFE units in DG ENV use evaluations for 
presentations and to communicate about LIFE. Evaluations typically contain 
aggregated information and facts about the programme as well as graphs and 
figures, which can readily be used for presentation purposes. However, 
evaluations seldom contain information that is completely new to the programme 
management. Finally, evaluations are systematically referred to in evaluation 
tender material and so evaluation findings and recommendations are used by other 
evaluators in subsequent evaluations. Information use is linked closely to 
legitimizing and strategic uses. Using evaluations to legitimize the programme is a 
common practice, mentioned both by programme management and policy-makers. 
Legitimizing use is most common in relation to informational practices such as 
when DG ENV is required to report evaluation findings or make presentations to 
the EP, the Council or the LIFE Committee (consisting of Member State 
representatives). The extent to which these activities are related to legitimizing use 
depends very much on the timing of the evaluation. Flagging that the Commission 
is doing a good job is important. One key informant in DG ENV described it in 
the following way: "our evaluation reports and results are used and when we have 
them, it is something that people are happy about, because they prove that we in 
most cases are doing a good job." Legitimizing use, however, is not the most 
common use type because many of the recommendations are programme-specific 
and not orientated towards legitimizing the programme on a political level. 
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Interviewees specified that the evaluation system carries legitimacy by default and 
therefore one LIFE evaluation does not add significantly to the legitimacy of the 
programme. Rather, it is the EU evaluation system that gives legitimacy to the 
LIFE programme and DG ENV. Finally, the LIFE programme is very popular 
among stakeholders and not very contested. Evaluations of larger EU expenditure 
programmes as well as policies may be considerably more contested resulting in 
more legitimizing evaluation use.  
Strategic use of the LIFE evaluations coincided with legitimizing use, particularly 
when DG ENV presents evaluation results to the EP and the Committee of 
Regions in relation to the new LIFE programme proposal. In addition to this, DG 
ENV uses the evaluations as a reference document to raise issues and problems 
about the programme that they are aware of, but which are easier for them to 
communicate with an independent evaluation. This is done externally to the EP 
and Council but also internally to other units in the DG. Internally, other units in 
DG ENV needed to be convinced about certain directions of the programme. The 
Members of Parliament (MEPs) and Member States used the LIFE evaluations as 
a basis for arguments in the negotiation for the new LIFE programme and in 
questions to the Commission. The MEPs can base opinions on evaluation data or 
findings. Occasionally, lobbyists raise issues to MEPs stemming from an 
evaluation that the MEP might in turn take up with the Commission.  
Summary of uses of LIFE evaluations. The main finding of the analysis of 
evaluation use is that process use almost never takes place. On the other hand, 
several instances of findings use were discovered. The data suggests that after the 
LIFE evaluations were implemented, instrumental- and information uses were the 
most common, followed by strategic use. Legitimizing and conceptual uses were 
mentioned less often by interviewees. On the level of programme managers, 
instrumental use happens to adjust the programme within the limitations of the 
LIFE Regulation and the Commission's Financial Regulation. Also, instances of 
legitimizing- and strategic uses were found in the data related to programme 
managers.  
Regarding policy-makers, evaluations were used to acquire information 
(information use) and to advocate certain policy issues or positions (strategic use). 
Data suggests that programme evaluations are not used in a direct instrumental 
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way by policy-makers for the purpose of making significant programme changes. 
Rather, they are used indirectly to support IAs and policy fiches in the 
negotiations for the new programme at the end of each programme cycle. 
Evaluators, who have an informed outsider's look at things, mainly refer to 
information use and instrumental use of the evaluations.  
Explaining evaluation use of LIFE evaluations 
This section contains the analysis of factors explaining evaluation use observed 
from the LIFE evaluations. Table 4 gives an overview of the factors that explain 
evaluation use. The table summarizes the distribution of the qualitative codes for 
three groups of interviewees and provides examples of interviewee quotes. The 
findings from the data are described and summarized below. 
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Decision and policy setting. Regarding the explanatory factors relating to 
Decision and policy setting, the EU evaluation system has institutionalized a high 
level of receptiveness and commitment to evaluation in the Commission and 
also in DG ENV. Evaluation practice is considered part of the administrative 
practice in DG ENV including obligations towards the other organizations in the 
system, which again creates commitment. Overall, the interviews and desk 
research point to an organizational willingness to use evaluations. However, 
receptiveness in relation to LIFE programme evaluations is largely limited to the 
desk officers involved in programme management within the Commission. 
Interest and knowledge of LIFE evaluations in the EP and Council is very low, 
mainly due to low relevance of evaluation information to the work of policy-
makers.  
There is a lot of competing information regarding LIFE evaluations. This is one 
factor that impedes evaluation use both for programme managers and policy-
makers. Competing information primarily includes previous evaluations of LIFE 
(either produced by the Commission or, for example, by the European Court of 
Auditors). But the experience that programme managers have managing the LIFE 
programme should also be considered as competing information. It is simply very 
difficult for consultants to bring about new information, new findings or produce 
knowledge that the experienced programme staff do not already have. Finally, 
evaluations are relatively broad in scope, covering the entire programme. In terms 
of use, specific studies about parts of the programme are more focused on key 
contested areas, which according to interviewees make them more likely to be 
used than the broadly-scoped evaluations. At the same time, however, 
interviewees consider LIFE evaluations to be the best general source of 
assessment information about the LIFE programme.  
According to many interviewees, the decision characteristics of the EU 
institutions do to a large extent impede direct evaluation use, particularly on the 
level of programme management. The seven-year budget period in the EU makes 
substantial and incremental programme changes difficult. Also, political decisions 
about the programme are complex and depend on several political actors (EP and 
Council) potentially with very diverse political interests and priorities. 
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Nevertheless, evaluation use is an integrated part of the evaluation system every 
seventh year when the new programme is being prepared. An IA must draw on 
available information, including evaluations, and the importance of the budget 
decision draws attention to all available information on LIFE. Thus the EU policy 
cycle – which the evaluation system is designed to feed information - both enables 
and impedes evaluation use.  
In relation to evaluations of the LIFE programme, the programme management 
also has information needs, despite the fact that the programme management is 
by far the most knowledgeable in relation to the programme. Nevertheless, some 
specific parts of the programme might be unknown even to the programme 
management, in which case an evaluation can be used to shed light on the issue. In 
the EP and the Council, the need for evaluation information is much lower, mainly 
because policy-makers need information that communicates key information about 
issues related to decision-making. This is rarely considered to be the case for 
programme evaluations of the LIFE programme. 
Interviewees did not often mention personal characteristics in relation to 
evaluation use. DG ENV has substantial experience with evaluation over several 
decades. As the practice of evaluation is highly institutionalized, the LIFE 
evaluations were carried out and supervised according to the Commission's 
general evaluation policy and standards. Both the Commission and the external 
evaluators had sufficient capacity to manage and carry out the evaluations. The 
data suggests that the institutionalized practice of the evaluation system has a 
positive effect on evaluation use because staff are trained and used to working 
with evaluations, which in turn influences the quality of the evaluations positively. 
Few interviewees mentioned the political climate as an explanatory factor in 
relation to evaluation use. Evaluations are more likely to be used to justify 
positions, if the programme or an issue is contested politically (Cousins and 
Leithwood, 1986). But as the LIFE programme is an overall popular and well-run 
programme, the political climate is not important for the use of evaluation findings 
in this case. As long as evaluations are not very negative, evaluations are used 
mainly as information in the IAs. Hence, evaluations are not brought into policy-
making directly but only as secondary information after IAs and fiches in the 
programming of the new LIFE programme.  
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Evaluation Implementation. Considering the explanatory factors linked to 
Evaluation implementation, the interviewees mentioned these factors considerably 
less than the decision and policy setting. Very few interviewees mentioned 
timeliness as an important factor. Similar to the personal characteristics, the 
evaluation system produces evaluations with a high degree of professionalism and 
timeliness. Evaluation management in the Commission is supervised by the 
evaluation unit and the capacity to manage evaluations is highly developed in the 
organization. At the same time, evaluators are carefully selected through 
tendering. Due to the institutionalization of evaluation practice in the evaluation 
system, timeliness is less of an issue. However, timeliness is important for the 
evaluation system because of the policy cycle, and therefore securing timely 
delivery of evaluations has a positive impact on evaluation use.  
The credibility of evaluations is considered crucial for the use of evaluations in 
the Commission. To several of the interviewees in DG ENV, the credibility of 
Commission evaluations is related to the credibility of the Commission itself as 
well as the high quality of evaluation work and independence of evaluators. The 
high credibility of Commission evaluations enables the justificatory uses of the 
LIFE evaluations towards the EP and Council, particularly in the renegotiation of 
a new programme. This is induced by the way the evaluation system is 
constructed, with a stress on external evaluation and thus a relative independence 
in the evaluation implementation. 
The situation is similar in relation to evaluation quality. The evaluation quality is 
perceived by interviewees to be high and is also considered important for 
evaluation use. Contrary to the enabling factor played by the evaluation quality in 
the evaluation system, interviewees see evaluation findings as constrained by the 
Commission's evaluation guidelines and standards. The Commission’s evaluation 
tenders include evaluation questions as well as a relatively rigid format for the 
evaluation process including a specific number of meetings with the Steering 
Committee. Some interviewees argue that this procedural format leaves little room 
for innovation during the evaluation process as well as in evaluation findings 
because both the process and the findings are scoped and framed relatively 
narrowly by the tender material which is more or less standardized in the common 
evaluation guidelines. In turn, this impedes evaluation use as evaluators are 
constrained in the process and findings seldom are surprising or completely 
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innovative to the Commission. The lack of innovative recommendations is also 
due to knowledge-asymmetry between the evaluator and programme management. 
This is linked to the high complexity of the LIFE programme and the decision 
characteristics mentioned earlier, which often render innovative recommendations 
useless due to legal constraints on the Commission that can render innovative 
recommendations useless.  
The relevance of evaluations is considered by interviewees to be very important 
for evaluation use of the LIFE programme. In the EU evaluation system, the 
relevance of evaluations is closely linked to the timing of the evaluation relative to 
decision-situations in which the evaluation can be used. That is crucial both on the 
political level as well as the administrative level in the Commission. If the timing 
of the evaluation does not match the programme cycle, then it can have several 
implications. First, if the evaluation is too early, there is little new data available 
and the evaluation will be less usable compared to the previous evaluation (partly 
the case in the 2010 midterm evaluation). If the evaluation is too late, then the 
evaluation findings are of little or no use (the case in the 2012 final evaluation). 
Also, an evaluation can be timed too close to other evaluations and thus leave no 
time for follow-up before the next evaluation starts. Mistiming of evaluations 
relative to decisions or other evaluations is an impeding factor relative to 
evaluation use.  
LIFE evaluations were not perceived to be relevant directly for policy-making as 
the information contained in evaluations is too general and relates exclusively to 
programme implementation and less to the overall political rationales behind the 
programme. Also, evaluations are considered too technical and detailed by policy-
makers. Evaluations are therefore not directly relevant for policy-makers, except 
when they serve as information feeding into the Commission's preparations for a 
new programme at the end of every programme cycle.  
Finally, the data suggests that the standard evaluation implementation process of 
the Commission also secures a high communication quality of evaluations often 
through an iterative work process involving several parallel quality checks in the 
final phases of the evaluation implementation.  
Summary of factors explaining evaluation use in LIFE evaluations. The results 
of the data analysis show that decision and policy settings are far more important 
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than factors related to evaluation implementation. In relation to the decision and 
policy setting, the most prevalent impeding explanatory factors on evaluation use 
are competing information and decision characteristics. Particularly for policy-
makers, there is a lot of information and very little time to digest it. For 
programme management, both are major obstacles to the use of evaluation 
findings and recommendations and substantial changes to the programme are 
difficult to make. Also the political climate is impeding evaluation in this case, as 
the LIFE programme is a small and not very contested, hence the Commission's 
need to prove accountable and the EP's urge to check the Commission are reduced 
relative to other programmes. 
At the same time, explanatory factors related to decision and policy settings also 
enable evaluation use. The personal characteristics are enabling use, as evaluation 
training as well as procurement procedures make the right people available for the 
job both internally and externally. Evaluation use is also enabled by high 
receptiveness and commitment to evaluation in the Commission. The advantages 
of the system's institutionalized practice is mainly relevant for the Commission 
and less so for other organizations in the system such as the EP and Council. 
However, all actors in the system share the need for information, which is a major 
enabling factor both in the Commission as well as outside the Commission. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the explanatory factors’ effect on use as they are 
reported by interviewees.  
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Table 5 Overview of the effect of the explanatory factors. 
Explanatory factors 
Enabling/impeding 
Decision and policy settings 
Commitment and receptiveness 
Enabling 
Competing information 
Impeding 
Decision characteristics 
Impeding 
Information needs 
Enabling 
Personal characteristics 
Enabling 
Political climate 
Impeding 
Evaluation implementation 
Timeliness 
Enabling 
Credibility 
Enabling 
Evaluation quality 
Enabling 
Findings 
Impeding 
Relevance 
Impeding 
Communication quality 
Enabling 
In relation to evaluation implementation, the main findings of the analysis are that 
the evaluation system reduces the most negative effects of several of the 
explanatory factors linked to evaluation implementation. Hence, timeliness, 
credibility, evaluation quality and communication quality are all factors that are 
supported by routinized and systematized institutions of practice in the 
Commission. Also, these advantages of the system's institutionalized practices are 
mainly relevant for the Commission and less so for other organizations in the EU 
system such as the EP and Council.  
As just explained, the institutionalized practices of the evaluation system enable 
evaluation use. However, the rigidity of the system's practices also impedes 
evaluation use by controlling and thereby reducing the innovation and possible 
outcome of evaluation findings. The relevance of evaluations is limited to policy-
makers in terms of content and to programme managers because of evaluation 
timing, which is not always optimal for evaluation use. The relevance of 
evaluations is limited to policy-makers in terms of content and to programme 
managers because of the timing. Evaluation findings and relevance are the 
impeding factors related to the evaluation implementation.  
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Users of LIFE evaluations 
The main users of LIFE programme evaluations are the programme management 
in DG ENV. Evaluation use by other actors depends mainly on the relevance 
(timing relative to a decision) and the demand for information. Generally, 
evaluations are not used directly for policy making outside the Commission; i.e. 
the programme management will use evaluations to prepare the new LIFE 
programme and adjust its implementation. Thus LIFE programme evaluations are 
supporting documents in the programme proposals that decision-makers outside 
the Commission read and use every seventh year in the policy cycle. Therefore 
evaluation use for policy making is mainly indirect outside the Commission. 
Rather, evaluations outside the Commission are used for information purposes and 
sometimes for advocacy (strategic use) by for example NGOs. 
Table 6 summarizes the findings from the above sections including the 
explanatory factors and use types that were mentioned most by interviewees. 
Explanatory factors not included in the table were those perceived to be less 
significant by interviewees. These include evaluation quality, timeliness, 
credibility, personal characteristics etc.  
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Table 6 Summary of most mentioned evaluation use types and explanatory factors per 
user group. 
Programme management Policy-makers 
Most relevant explanatory factors 
Enabling - Commitment and receptiveness 
- Information need 
- Information need 
Impeding - Decision characteristics 
- Findings 
- Relevance 
- Competing information 
- Commitment and receptiveness 
- Relevance 
Most common use types 
Process 
use 
NA NA
Findings 
use 
- Instrumental  
- Legitimizing use 
- Strategic use 
- Information use 
- Strategic use 
Commitment and receptiveness to programme evaluations is an enabling factor 
mostly relevant to the programme management, as evaluations are too detailed and 
not directly relevant for policy-makers and other stakeholders. However, most 
stakeholders to the LIFE programme express a need for knowledge. Information 
need is thus an enabling factor for most evaluation users.  
Regarding factors impeding evaluation use, interviewees mentioned mostly 
decision characteristics, relevance and findings and competing information. For 
programme management it is the decision characteristics of the programme cycle 
and the EU decision-making structure that impede evaluation use. Given that 
programme managers are the most knowledgeable with regard to the programme, 
institutionalized evaluation practices limit the relevance and innovation of 
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findings, which could induce evaluation use. For policy-makers overload of 
information, lack of receptiveness to evaluation and the low relevance of 
evaluations are the main obstacles to evaluation use.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this article is to find answers to how, who and why – or why not – an 
evaluation system affects the utilization of evaluations. Throughout the analysis it 
has been demonstrated that in the case of the LIFE programme, the EU evaluation 
system is conducive to evaluation use, while at the same time also impeding use in 
several ways. The article finds that the evaluation system is conducive to 
instrumental-, strategic- and legitimizing types of evaluation use on the level of 
programme management. On the level of policy-makers, the evaluation system is 
conducive to strategic- and information types of uses. Regarding the users of 
evaluation findings, the instrumental use of LIFE evaluations is linked intrinsically 
with programme management in the two LIFE units in DG ENV while being far 
less used by policy-makers in the EP and the Council. While the system does 
enable uses, it also impedes process use of evaluations during the evaluation 
implementation.  
With that in mind, the decision characteristics are key in order to understand the 
use of the LIFE evaluations and in particular the absence of process use. Decision 
characteristics are contextual relating to the legal- and organizational setup as well 
as the formal and informal practices of the evaluation system. The Commission 
decision characteristics largely determine the effect that other explanatory factors 
have on evaluation use. In particular, the alignment of programme evaluation to 
the Commission's budget- and policy cycle has several consequences for 
evaluation use. These consequences of Commission decision characteristics are 
elaborated in the five main findings below. 
Findings use over process use.  
The EU evaluation system is primarily designed to feed information into the EU 
decision-making procedure every seventh year before the beginning of a new 
policy cycle. Commission staff working with programme evaluation are managing 
the evaluations with the main objective of satisfying the evaluation obligation by 
securing the timeliness, quality and independence of the final output. To that end, 
the evaluation standards including the guidelines and terms of reference specify in 
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great detail how the evaluation process should be executed in such a way that 
process use - as envisaged by for example Michael Patton (1997) - is not enabled. 
As will be elaborated below, the limited process use is a consequence of choices 
made deliberately to secure and improve findings use for decision-making, in 
particular 'decision points'. The loss of process use is thus a direct consequence of 
policy-making practices in the EU political system as a whole as well as the work 
practices decided for and by the Commission. 
Findings use in 'decision-points'. 
The policy-cycle's decision-points enable findings use because the evaluation 
system is designed to deliver feedback into a particular decision-point at the time 
for programme renegotiating. In the case of the LIFE programme, this decision-
point enables findings uses including instrumental-, legitimizing and strategic 
uses. These types of findings use are enabled because the decision point allows for 
potential programme change and because the Commission needs programme 
legitimacy and overall accountability when the focus of policy-makers in the EP 
and Council is on the programme. It is at these points in time that LIFE 
evaluations will be used indirectly (through for example IAs) to change the 
programme. The evaluation system is designed to deliver independent quality 
evaluations that are timely, well communicated, independent and credible in order 
to secure the legitimacy of the programme and the strategic position of the 
Commission in such negotiations. The institutionalization of evaluation practices 
including the highly standardized evaluation process, staff training and guidelines 
almost completely negates process uses as explained previously. However, they 
also enable a smoother execution of evaluation processes and ultimately deliver a 
more standardized evaluation product with minimal 'risks', as potential negative 
influences from personal characteristics of evaluators and staff, organizational 
deficiencies etc. are largely avoided. 
Low evaluation relevance regarding significant programme change. 
Due to mistiming and competing information, LIFE evaluations are seldom 
relevant to potential users in decision-making. The relevance of evaluations is 
affected negatively and directly by decision characteristics. Sometimes, 
evaluations are mistimed in relation to decision events such as the preparation of 
an IA or the proposal for a new programme. Further, the evaluation system 
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generates competing information, including first and foremost many evaluations 
on the LIFE programme as well as other studies and audits. Altogether, this 
reduces the relevance of evaluations and impedes the instrumental use of them. 
Also, the legal structures that govern the Commission's work (Financial 
Regulation etc.) reduce the possibilities of innovative and surprising 
recommendations because consultants' recommendations are steered first of all by 
the evaluation questions in the tender material that is typically in accordance with 
what the Commission can influence within the scope of its legal competences. For 
example would potential improvements to the LIFE Regulation be downplayed 
relative to recommendations that could readily be applied by the programme units 
in DG ENV.  
The 'de-politicization' of programme evaluations. 
Following the three previous points, instrumental evaluation use is mainly limited 
to managers of the LIFE programme. Also, evaluations are rarely used in 
evaluation implementation and only rarely used directly for policy-making (for a 
similar finding see Laat, 2005). Due to mistiming of evaluations, other competing 
information and non-innovative findings, evaluations' relevance for decision-
making is very limited. These two findings imply a de facto de-politicization of 
programme evaluations in the EU evaluation system, where evaluation 
information conforms to the administrative context of programme management in 
the Commission instead of the political context of policy-makers.  
The paradoxical evaluation system. 
The 'de-politization' represents a paradox since it is the EP and the EU Member 
States that compelled the Commission to develop its evaluation practices in the 
first place. But this article shows that policy-makers rarely use the evaluations 
while at the same time the Commission also does not maximize utility of 
evaluations. Also, the Commission allocates considerable resources to evaluations 
and numerous other internal and external assessments and audits. This paradox is 
probably explained best by turning to the complex nature of the inter-institutional 
context of the EU evaluation system and EU evaluations (see for example Dahler-
Larsen, 2012; Højlund, 2014b). To do that would be too much to cover at this 
point and more evidence is also needed to support such an analysis. But hopefully 
this article will spawn more interest in other aspects of the EU's evaluation system, 
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such as the birth of systematic policy-evaluations (Stern, 2009). These often-
contested and highly political evaluations have other attributes than the 
Commission's programme evaluations and therefore they are also likely to be used 
in different ways than we have seen is the case with the Commission's programme 
evaluations.  
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EVALUATION AND POLICY LEARNING – THE 
LEARNERS’ PERSPECTIVE 
Abstract 
This paper examines how evaluation induces policy learning, a question largely 
neglected by the scholarly literature on evaluation and policy learning. Following 
a learner’s perspective, the paper attempts to ascertain who the learners are, and 
what and how learners actually learn from evaluations. In so doing, it focuses on 
what different types of learners actually learn within the context of the evaluation 
framework (the set of administrative structures defining the evaluation goals and 
process). Taking the empirical case of three most-similar EU program evaluations, 
the paper examines the patterns of policy learning emanating from them. The 
findings are that only two types of actors involved in the evaluation are actually 
learning (program units and external evaluators), that learners learn different 
things (program overview, small-scale programme adjustments, policy change, 
and evaluation methods), and that different learners are in control of different 
aspects of the evaluation (learning objectives and processes) according to the 
evaluation framework established by the European Commission. 
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Introduction 
Most democratic countries have significantly increased their emphasis on the 
evaluation of government interventions in the last two decades (Furubo et al., 
2002). Evaluation generally has two objectives: it aims at enhancing 
accountability, as well as learning (van der Meer and Edelenbos, 2006; Scriven, 
1991). Whereas the former emphasizes retrospective assessment in view of 
attaining political legitimacy of the government intervention in question 
(summative evaluation), the latter emphasizes improvement of the government 
intervention via learning (formative evaluation). Both dimensions are included in 
standard definitions of evaluation: "[Evaluation is the] careful retrospective 
assessment of the merit, worth, and value of administration, output, and outcome 
of government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future, practical 
action situations" (Vedung, 1997: 3). This paper looks at the second dimension of 
evaluation, examining how it induces policy learning4. 'Evaluation' is understood 
here as the generic name of different assessment exercises of governmental 
interventions (intervention programs or regulations). These are usually done in ex-
ante, midterm, final or ex-post forms. 
Generally there is the understanding that evaluation provides systematic 
knowledge about the evaluated government intervention in question, and that this 
knowledge constitutes an important basis for the social process of policy learning 
(Van der Knaap, 1995; Balthasar and Rieder, 2000; Radaelli, 2009). However, the 
scarce literature that looks into this has tended to address learning normatively, in 
aspirational terms, rather than analytically. This means that these studies tend to 
treat learning in generic terms, obscuring the learner as the agent of learning and 
disregarding different types of learners and learning. Even if some recent literature 
makes approaches to different types of learning, ‘learners’ are typically considered 
in a single category, without distinguishing among different types of learners and 
how these learners might be related to different types of learning. In this paper, 
learning is defined as the adaptation of beliefs and views that result from the 
learners’ sense-making of past experience 
4 This paper uses the term “policy learning”. See section 2 for the definition and analytical levels of policy learning.  
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This paper aims at bridging the gap between the evaluation literature, on the one 
hand, and the policy learning literature, on the other. It does so by focusing on the 
empirical questions of “who is learning” and “what is being learnt and how” when 
government interventions are evaluated. Hence, it aims at developing an approach 
that puts the learner’s role at the centre of evaluation, one that understands 
learners’ learning as a socially embedded process. This paper approach on 
different types of learners aims to contribute to the literature on policy learning, 
establishing an unexplored link between the types of learners and the types of 
policy learning. Furthermore, this paper focuses on the “evaluation framework”, 
understood as the set of administrative structures, rules and practices that – to 
varying extent - define the objectives as well as the processes of the evaluation 
(Leeuw and Furubo, 2008). Introducing the evaluation framework into the 
equation of policy learning is the second contribution of this paper.  
However, it is important to note that the evaluation framework is far from 
automatically determining the actual learning (of what and how learners learn). 
Learners will always act according to their own interpretation of the evaluation 
framework, and will make sense of the evaluated intervention. In so doing, the 
learners might be learning along the lines expected by the evaluation framework, 
or might be learning in different ways. This means that the way in which the 
learners learn in a context of evaluation, and the types of policy learning that 
emanate from this is an open question for both the evaluation literature as well as 
the policy learning literature.   
Empirically, the paper takes the case of the European Commission and studies 
what is learned from three midterm evaluations of three most-similar EU 
expenditure programs. With a learners’ perspective, the paper ascertains what 
learners actually learn from the evaluation. The study finds that two types of 
actors (program units and external evaluators) learn from evaluation. Learners 
learn different things related to program overview, small-scale program 
adjustment, policy change and evaluation methods. The study also finds that these 
different forms of learning is related to the fact that different learners are in 
control of different aspects of the evaluation (learning objectives and processes) 
according to the evaluation framework established by the European Commission.  
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The paper proceeds as follows: the next section explores the literature on 
evaluation and policy learning and identifies some important gaps. Sections three 
and four describe the theoretical assumptions underlying the study, as well as the 
analytical approach and methodology. Sections five, six and seven analyse the 
data, and section eight concludes based on the paper’s findings. 
Evaluation and policy learning: Multiple actors and multiple forms 
of learning 
The literature on evaluation has been preoccupied with the use of evaluations and 
the conditions under which evaluations are being used (Shulha and Cousins, 
1997). Naturally, for authors interested in studying the conditions for the 
utilization of evaluation results, the assumption is that organizational learning and 
the use of evaluation results are intrinsically linked (Preskill, 2008; Radaelli and 
Meuwese, 2010). Several scholars have argued in favour of participatory 
evaluation forms that let the evaluated participate in the process of evaluation in 
order to increase evaluation use and learning (Patton, 1997). The current approach 
linking evaluation use, participation and learning is related to what some scholars 
have portrayed as the transition from a “traditional-objectivist” paradigm towards 
an “argumentative” turn in evaluation studies. The former assumes that the 
knowledge produced by evaluation is invariably a source of information used for 
changing policy programs, while the latter focuses on evaluation results and 
processes as a framework for dialogue within which learning takes place (Van der 
Knaap, 1995; Owens et al., 2004; Radaelli and Meuwese, 2010). These two 
approaches might seem to have quite different views on “evidence-based 
knowledge”, not only in epistemological terms, but also in terms of how to design 
the process of evaluation as such (Sanderson, 2000; Hansen et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, they share the acknowledgement that evaluation takes place in 
complex policy and organizational contexts formed by different levels of action 
and populated by multiple actors (Sager and Rissi, 2011).  
This acknowledgement of social and institutional embededness and actors’ 
interactions in the learning process provides the background for this paper, which 
builds from the few evaluation studies that look into learning, and from the few 
policy learning studies that look into learners. From the literature on evaluation, 
the approach of this paper is based on two general assumptions: First, the 
understanding, in analytical terms, that the multiple actors, who take part in the 
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evaluation process, have in fact multiple and different views (van der Meer and 
Edelenbos, 2006). Multiple actors have multiple views, and this reflects on the 
learning process. For van der Meer and Edelenbos (2006: 209) the multiplicity of 
actors has two implications: “First, not all actors will perceive a certain evaluation 
as equally relevant and usable. This need not be a problem in itself, but it may 
complicate cooperation and mutual adaptation. Second, certain insights from 
evaluation may not lead to learning effects at all if they do not - to some extent - 
fit within existing institutional patterns and distribution of competencies.” (van der 
Meer and Edelenbos, 2006: 212). The second general assumption from the 
evaluation literature that this paper follows is that there are different types of 
learning (Balthasar and Rieder, 2000). These authors (inspired by Van der Knaap, 
1995) identify two types of learning that result from evaluation activities: direct 
learning, caused by the feed-back information from findings and recommendations 
in the evaluation, and indirect learning caused by stimuli and strong political 
arguments indirectly associated with the evaluation (Balthasar and Rieder, 2000: 
250). Their findings suggest that learning from evaluation activities will tend to be 
direct learning at the operational level.  
Turning now to the literature on policy learning, it is worth noting that recent 
scholarly developments have focused on the above two key assumptions too 
(multiple actors and different types of learning). Following the general views on 
learning by James March (March, 2010), and more specifically on policy learning 
(Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013), learning is defined in 
this paper as the adaptation of beliefs and views that result from the learners’ 
sense-making of past experience. Therefore, the policy learning that emanates 
from a specific evaluation exercise is the adaptation of that specific policy area, 
programme or other government intervention which results from making-sense of 
past experience systematically gathered through that evaluation.  
Learning studies gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s (Grin and Loeber, 
2007), particularly with several normative approaches, all of them suggesting that 
learning is important. However, just like in the evaluation literature mentioned 
above, the empirical studies in the field of policy learning are scarce (Grin and 
Loeber, 2007; Freeman, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007). According to Dunlop and 
Radaelli (2013: 3), there is a general feeling of disappointment with empirical 
achievements in the field. One of the most influential notions in the field is the 
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Bennett and Howlett (1992) distinction of three levels of policy learning according 
to what is being learned and who are the learners. This paper focuses on the first 
level, which is the 'government learning' level according to Bennett and Howlett, 
where the learners are state officials, learning about specific process-related issues 
in policy programs. The other two levels are 'lesson-drawing' and 'social learning'. 
In the former, the learners are policy networks learning about policy instruments. 
The learners on the 'social learning' level are the broad policy communities that 
learn about policy-related ideas. This multi-level approach has been influential in 
subsequent studies. However, somehow these studies have been more concerned 
with identifying multiple levels of learners, to the disregard of the multiple actors 
on each of the levels. In other words, a partial lack of attention to the fact that, on 
each of these levels, there are many different learners with different views and 
interests.  
The different types of policy learning are another fundamental issue in the 
literature. In their recent seminar work systematising the literature, Dunlop and 
Radaelli identify four generic types of policy learning based on two crucial 
dimensions, namely, the tractability of the problem, and the degree of certification 
of the actors involved in the learning (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013). In the 
formalized context of evaluation that interests us here, the certification of the 
actors involved is very high, because the evaluation of governmental interventions 
usually takes place within a pre-defined evaluation framework that identifies 
formally the actors that have the authority to act. Likewise, the tractability of the 
problem tends to be high as well. The typical problem that evaluations of 
governmental interventions aim to address is to improve the governmental 
intervention in question, which is a well-defined and tractable problem. From this 
perspective, the policy learning that results from the evaluation of governmental 
intervention (our current object of study) falls under the generic category of 
“shadow of hierarchy” in the typology of Dunlop and Radaelli. Taking a step 
further, these authors identify some more specific types of learning within this 
generic ‘shadow of hierarchy’ learning. This specific variation is based on the 
work of Mocker and Spear (1982), and depends on the different degrees of control 
that learners exercise over the objectives, and over the means and process. In other 
words, even in contexts where the problems are highly tractable and the actors are 
highly certified, there might be some important differences in the learning 
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outcomes, according to the role that learners assume in the definition of the 
content and the process. More concretely, Dunlop and Radaelli suggest the 
following specific types of learning in contexts of “shadow of hierarchy”: 
Figure 1: Specific typology of learning under conditions of high tractability of 
problems and high certification of actors (learning under the shadow of hierarchy) 
Learners’ control over learning objectives 
Learners’ control over 
learning means 
High Low
High Autonomy Instrumental 
Low Delegation Hetero-directed 
Source: Dunlop and Radaelli (2013: 612) 
This specific typology will serve to locate analytically the empirical cases of this 
paper (read below). Whereas the hetero-directed is a learning type that is 
traditionally associated to a steering mode of learning, most of the learning in 
highly actor certified and high problem tractability contexts is far more flexible, 
possibly attaining a large degree of autonomy in situations where learners 
determine the goals and processes of learning. This remains, however, an 
empirical question to be examined in this particular context of the policy learning 
that emanates from policy evaluation. 
The reader must keep in mind that in this paper we argue further that the possible 
differences of learning types are related to who the learners are, because in 
evaluation exercises there is a number of quite different actors taking part in 
defining goals and processes, and hence quite different learners according to their 
role in the evaluation. Likewise, this paper argues that these differences are also 
related to how these actors interpret the evaluation framework (the formal set of 
rules) within which they operate. The argumentative-interpretative approach used 
here does not assume any form of automatism in the forms of learning just 
because the context is related to a well-defined problem/high actor certification in 
evaluation exercises. The point is that there might be a substantial difference in the 
learning that emanates from evaluations according to other relevant dimensions 
mentioned above, not least the differentiated nature of the actors involved in 
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evaluations. The next section sets up a more specific analytical framework for the 
empirical study that will follow in the subsequent sections of this paper, when 
answering the question, who learns what and how from evaluations? 
Who learns what and how from evaluations? 
We are interested in studying how evaluation contributes to policy learning, and 
we are going to do it from a learner’s perspective that takes into consideration the 
multi-actor nature of learning, as well as its social embededness.  
Hence, one of the first issues to address in our analytical framework is: who are 
the potential learners from an evaluation? In the context of evaluation, there are 
numerous actors involved in different aspects of the evaluation, each of them 
assuming a different role. Generally speaking we can distinguish four types of 
actors (Eser and Nussmueller, 2006). The first type is the “Program Unit”, which 
is the administrative unit responsible for the evaluated governmental intervention. 
In a sense, the program unit can be seen as the “evaluated”. A second type of actor 
is the “Organisational Stakeholders”, who typically represent the organisational 
hierarchy, here including evaluation coordination units typically higher up in the 
hierarchy. The organisational stakeholders supervise and control the evaluation 
exercise. They are internal to the organisation, and act as a linchpin between the 
program unit and the broader set of social and political actors outside the 
organisation. The third type of actor is the broader set of social and political actors 
that we define here as the “External Stakeholders”. They do not necessarily know 
about the intervention in detail or the program unit, but might be interested in the 
outcomes of the evaluation for political reasons. External stakeholders are external 
to the evaluating organisation that the program unit and the organisational 
stakeholders belong to. However, at times, they might become part of the 
evaluating organization during the evaluation process through contractual 
measures (e.g. consultants) or as part of the Steering Committee. Last but not 
least, the fourth type of actor is the "External Evaluators", which are the 
consultants and experts contracted to carry out the evaluation. When studying the 
policy learning that emanates from an evaluation, all four types of actors in figure 
207 
2 may potentially learn. Identifying who actually does learn is an open empirical 
question. 
Figure 2: The multiple actors involved in an evaluation. 
The second essential analytical issue is related to what and how learners learn 
from an evaluation. This study determines the learning typology by the objectives 
of the evaluation and the evaluation process. This is what we define here as the 
“evaluation framework”; namely, the administrative structures that define the 
evaluation objectives as well as how the evaluation is carried out in an evaluation 
process. These administrative structures include formal and informal rules and 
practices related to evaluation, such as guidelines, evaluation policies and 
standards, methodology and best-practices. Thus, the evaluation framework sets 
the organizational, analytical and legal boundaries of the evaluation. Naturally, 
administrative structures relate to the organization in which evaluation practices 
are embedded, and in which several of the previously mentioned stakeholders play 
different and important roles (van der Meer and Edelenbos, 2006). The evaluation 
framework is always a crucial component of any evaluation exercise because it 
defines the frame for the execution and utilisation of the evaluation results and the 
subsequent learning (Højlund, 2014b; Leeuw and Furubo, 2008). For this reason, 
studying what and how learning takes place must inescapably refer to the features 
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of the evaluation framework in question, and the way in which learners act within 
it.  
So far, the focus on evaluation frameworks (or 'evaluation systems' in the 
evaluation literature) has not adequately captured the tension between the actors 
and the structure (Højlund, 2014a; Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Rist and Stame, 
2006). To capture this tension between the structuring evaluation framework and 
the learners' actorness and sense making, we seek inspiration in the two 
dimensions of learners’ control that Dunlop and Radaelli have based their specific 
typology upon(Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013). Hence, the learning mode is defined 
by the degree of learner's control of the objectives and process of the evaluation. 
The evaluation framework is the administrative structure that potentially defines 
the degree of control that learners have regarding their learning situation. This is 
to say that, the evaluation framework influences who learns, what is learned and 
how learning occurs. 
However, by putting too strong an emphasis on the structuring features of the 
evaluation framework, one runs the risk of overlooking the actual learning of the 
learners. As we saw earlier in this paper, the evaluation literature emphasises the 
importance of actors and their different views, not just across different types of 
actors, but within the same type of actors. For this reason, we are inspired by van 
der Meer’s remark that learning from evaluation “is not based on the 
characteristics of the evaluation [framework] as such, but on the outcome of 
processes of collective sense-making in networks”. This collective sense-making 
has to do with the way in which the learners interpret and develop an 
understanding of the past experiences and developments of the evaluated program. 
For this reason, we need to open the black box and study the actual processes of 
learning among and across specific types of actors within the frame provided by 
the evaluation framework, in order to understand who learns, what is learned and 
how learning actually takes place.  
Designing our Empirical Study  
Our empirical study is based on the selection of three retrospective program 
evaluations carried out by the European Commission at approximately the same 
time. All three evaluation cases have similar types of actors involved (see Figure 
2). These three case evaluations were all produced by external evaluators, they all 
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used the same evaluation framework, they were of similar budget sizes for the 
program cycle 2007-2013, and they work in similar ways through project support. 
Hence, the cases were chosen on the basis of their similarity, rather than being 
extreme, deviant or diverse cases.  
This case study selection technique was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, 
because it provides a broad empirical evidence, with more possible 
generalizability across similar cases. Most similar cases provide detailed account 
on relevant issues, and a broader empirical material, which is one good basis for 
replicability. Secondly, the aim of our paper is not to determine the differences 
across cases (which have similar budget, similar time-line, similar evaluation 
framework, etc), but across the different types of learners. All three cases have the 
same typology of learners. For this reason we treat the material from these three 
most-similar cases in a way that allows having a large basis for looking into how 
different types of actors learn differently. Using three most-similar rather than just 
one single case study gives us a broader material to define if, how and what 
different actors learn differently. 
Regarding the choice of these particular three cases, we have chosen mid-term 
evaluations of the European Commission because the evaluation framework and 
learning from evaluations in the Commission have not been empirically studied 
before (see for example Boswell, 2008; Zito and Schout, 2009; Radaelli and 
Dunlop, 2013; Torres and Preskill, 2001). Moreover these three Commission cases 
are interesting because the European Commission has played an instrumental role 
in proliferating evaluation practices and institutionalizing program evaluation 
practices in Europe over the last three decades (Furubo et al., 2002; Toulemonde, 
2000). 
The first case is the midterm evaluation of the Program for the Environment and 
Climate Action (LIFE). The second case is the midterm evaluation of the 
environmental research program within the Framework Program 7 for Research 
and Development that was conducted in 2010. The third case is the interim 
Evaluation (2009) of Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Program (CIP) - 
Intelligent Energy - Europe (IEE).  
It is important to define who the learners in our study are. The learners in any 
Commission-led EU program evaluations, like our 3 cases, are potentially the four 
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types identified above: the program unit, the external stakeholders (other 
Directorates-General (DGs), the Secretariat-General and the European 
Parliament), the organisational stakeholders, which are gathered formally in the 
evaluation Steering Committee normally consisting of the evaluation unit, heads 
or deputy heads of unit of the program units and other staff. Finally, the external 
evaluators are external experts or consultants hired mainly through Commission 
framework contracts.  
When studying learning phenomena, the choice of methodology usually is either 
observation of learning outcomes (e.g. through tests of comprehension) or 
inquiring the learning subject. We chose the latter option because of obvious 
feasibility problems related to the former. However, inquiring the learning subject 
has also several drawbacks. For example it is likely that learners exaggerate 
learning in hindsight because learning often is intangible and because non-learning 
is shameful. We have tried to mitigate this possible bias by including various types 
of stakeholders in the sample and thereby triangulating from different interviewee 
sources as well as documents.  
Prior to the actual data collection, we conducted 35 explorative semi-structured 
interviews with evaluation experts in the Commission, in order to gain important 
background knowledge of the evaluation framework and identify the relevant 
actors to interview for the actual data collection. The actual data for this article 
was generated from 25 structured in-depth interviews with different types of actors 
in the three case evaluations presented earlier. The interviews were structured 
around 20 questions that all interviewees were presented with. Appendix 1 
reproduces the questionnaire sent to the respondents. The questions were 
organized around three themes: the respondents' views on the learning that 
emanated from the evaluation exercise, their views on the objectives of the 
evaluation, and their views on the process of the evaluation. Interviewees were 
sampled purposefully and according to availability. Appendix 2 provides an 
anonymized list of the respondents according to their program and group of actors 
they belong to. Our sample included Commission officers in the programming 
unit, in the Steering Committee, and external experts and consultants. Interview 
data were validated with document data comprising the three case evaluations and 
other relevant documents such as the impact assessments and ex ante evaluations 
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of the new program cycle 2014-2020, as well as several non-public Commission 
documents relevant to our understanding of the Commission evaluation system.  
To analyse the data we used the principles of qualitative content analysis 
(Schreier, 2012; Kohlbacher, 2006). The actual coding and analysis of interview 
data were carried out using the NVIVO software package (Bazeley, 2013). The 
data was classified (coded) along the lines of the existing conceptual framework 
from Dunlop and Radaelli (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013) and following the 
interview guide. In practice, categories (sub-codes) were added qualitatively under 
each classification when there was a need for them, all the while observing the 
relevance to the overall research question. We use this qualitative content analysis 
approach in Table 2 to illustrate the patterns in the data of the three cases. 
Learning and learners from Commission evaluations 
This section analyses what learners learn from evaluations. On this matter, the 
interviewees identified the learners in the Commission to be primarily the 
Commission's program units or evaluation units. In principle, there could be 
learners in the Steering Committee and among external stakeholders, such as 
decision-makers in the Commission as well as in the European Parliament and the 
Council. But these external stakeholders were not identified as learners by the 
interviewees. In general, interviewees distinguish sharply between program 
management and policy-making when it comes to learning. One program manager 
put it this way: "I think that the evaluation of a program has a more important 
outcome for the program implementation than for policy making." This finding is 
supported by previous research (Højlund, 2014a). The respondents did not 
mention the Steering Committee in relation to learning. One evaluator observed: "I 
suspect that most of our findings were already on the agenda of the European 
Commission." This point was mentioned by half of the interviewees. One 
evaluation unit desk officer said: "I cannot really remember any fundamental 
things [in evaluations], where I could just say; 'well, this is really something new 
or something that I never looked at before'." This indicates that learning is gradual 
and cumulative rather than path-breaking, due to the program units’ control over 
learning goals in the evaluation framework (see next section). 
Further, interviewees also associated learning positively with the external 
evaluators. Evaluators have a steep learning curve when they start the evaluation 
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compared to the Commission staff, who already know the program inside-out. 
Even though external evaluators are selected on the basis of their expertise and 
usually through consecutive and competitive rounds of appraisals, they still find 
EU programs relatively complex. At the beginning of evaluations, external 
evaluators acquire detailed knowledge about the program and its management and 
implementation. On the other hand, program units are naturally the most 
knowledgeable with regard to the programs they manage, and therefore the 
learning about the program is gradual. In other words, the acquired knowledge 
usually builds on or confirms hunches and assumptions already made in the 
program units over the course of time.  
Almost all interviewees mentioned learning in relation to evaluation, indicating 
that learning takes place. Our coded interviewee answers clustered around four 
types of learning: 1) an 'overview' of the program; 2) small-scale program change; 
3) learning in relation to program change; and 4) learning conceptually about 
evaluation methodology. Table 2 summarizes the data clustered around these four 
types of learning in the interviewees' responses. The table contains the number of 
interviewees who mentioned each of the learning types as well as the total number 
of times each learning type was mentioned. The types are exemplified with quotes, 
and a column in the far right of the table is used for the most pronounced learner 
of each learning type. 
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About half of the interviewees seem to relate learning to an 'overview' of the 
program, when asked the question about what they did not have before the 
evaluation. Both program units and external evaluators described learning as an 
overview of general information about the program being evaluated. The overview 
included general program information such as statistics and compilations of, for 
example, program-related reports and their content. In addition, external 
evaluators learned extensively about program details that they did not have prior 
knowledge of. 
Interviewees also related learning to small-scale program changes either expressed 
as such or through examples of new (or old) ideas in the evaluations. Small-scale 
instrumental changes may be implemented by the Commission without a change 
of the program Regulation or other legal frameworks, which can only be changed 
through a political process involving the European Parliament and the Council. 
Small-scale adjustments might, for example, consist of new indicators to monitor 
the program, less project visits or more communication across DGs or within a 
DG. Interviewees from program units related most examples to this type of 
learning compared to the other learner groups. One program manager explained: 
"if there were any changes [resulting from the evaluation], they had to be minor."  
It was mainly interviewees from program units who related new information from 
evaluations to policy change. Predominantly, the reference made was to the 
connection  between the midterm evaluations and the ex-ante and impact 
assessment (IAs) for the programming period 2014-2020. One Evaluation Unit 
desk officer noted: "[The evaluation] was foreseen from the design side as a very 
important input to another step in the impact assessment for Horizon 2020." 
Interviewees gave numerous examples of recommendations in the midterm 
evaluations that were fed into these two documents, and there were numerous 
references in the IAs and ex ante evaluations to the three midterm evaluations as 
well. Nevertheless, about a third of the interviewees indicated that there was no 
policy change as a result of the evaluation. 
Finally, respondents associated learning with new information about evaluation 
methodology. In the main, evaluators related to this type of learning, whereas it 
was less prominent among officers in program units. This is not surprising, as 
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programs are evaluated every two to three years and program units acquire 
evaluation knowledge continuously, on top of the support they get from the 
evaluation unit. Particularly in the FP7 evaluation, most of the external evaluators 
had little experience with evaluation methodology because they were sector-
experts. 
Indications of no learning are less predominant than indications of learning. These 
interviewees referred to learning not taking place, or in particular to policy change 
not taking place as a consequence of learning from the evaluation. The main 
reasons for no learning are that the evaluations do not contain any new 
information and that the group of users is small. Apart from these main reasons, 
Commission staff also complained about having too few resources for learning, a 
remark that corresponds to findings in other studies (Borrás, 2011). They 
mentioned as well that the evaluation framework was not conducive to learning, 
that midterm evaluations often lacked project data to produce findings on results 
and impacts, and finally that programs were already optimized. In the case of the 
LIFE program, the program was twenty years old and had undergone quite a few 
changes over time. Hence, several interviewees thought that everything possible 
within the legal framework had already been tried. 
Learners' control of objectives 
The learners' control of the evaluation objectives in the Commission is determined 
by the evaluation framework and the time, experience and resources the learners 
have to draft the Terms of Reference (ToR). Evaluation objectives are stated in the 
evaluations' ToR, which are prepared up to a year before the procurement 
procedure is launched according to the evaluation plan of the Commission. The 
responsibility for conducting evaluations of a program rests with the program 
units, and they also draft the ToR in which learning objectives are specified. The 
ToR contains evaluation questions and contractual obligations as well as special 
information on the program. In the three cases, drafting the ToR was done by one 
or two desk officers in close cooperation with the evaluation unit and/or unit 
responsible for impact assessment. The role of the DG evaluation unit is to make 
sure that evaluation activities conform to the evaluation guidelines and standards 
of the Commission, and to help the program unit conduct the evaluation.  
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In the Commission, the framework for evaluation is mainly the Terms of 
Reference and the concrete evaluation guidelines and evaluation policy, which 
consist of several communications related to evaluation. Evaluations in the 
Commission are supposed to follow a  set of standards that are found in the 
'common' Commission's evaluation guidelines (Commission, 2004). The 
guidelines include suggestions for evaluation criteria and questions. Evaluation is 
stipulated in the Commission's Control Standards as well, and is thus subject to 
compliance audit by the Internal Audit Services and by the auditors in each DG. 
One Head of Evaluation Unit described the rigor of the evaluation framework in 
the following way: "The evaluation standards are pretty clear in what an 
evaluation has to look like, how it is to be conducted, how it is has to be structured 
and how it is to be communicated. It is a very straight jacket of very clear rules." 
After the program unit has drafted the ToR with the guidance of the evaluation 
unit, several other stakeholders are involved in the finalization of the ToR. 
Usually, the Secretariat General comments on the draft ToR, and the horizontal 
unit responsible for impact assessment (IA) might also be involved to increase the 
fit between the midterm evaluation and the IA of the subsequent program. This 
was the case in DG RTD and DG Env. In the former, the evaluation was 
commissioned particularly to feed into a parallel ex ante evaluation. In the latter, 
the midterm as well as the ex ante and IA-study were implemented by the same 
desk officer in the Commission and with the same consultants. The ToR might 
also be reviewed by the hierarchy and other DGs, though the latter usually play a 
minor role in determining the content. In principle, all the organizational 
stakeholders are also learners, who are invited into the process to enrich it with 
ideas and create synergies with other programs etc. However, in practice, they also 
have a controlling function that limits the control of the learners in the program 
units. Hence, other organizational and external stakeholders might have an interest 
in certain evaluation questions related, for example, to other programs or rule-
following.  
Our data suggest that the learners' control of the evaluation objectives is high 
within the limits of the Commission's evaluation framework. This was so in all 
three cases. In the case of IEE, the responsibility for the program is with DG 
Energy, but the implementation is conducted by EACI, an executive agency. DG 
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Energy commissioned the evaluation and wrote the ToR, but that took place in 
close cooperation with EACI. One Deputy Head of Program Unit described the 
liberties of drafting in the following way: "When you are the one writing [the 
ToR], you can more or less write what you want within the framework and infuse 
it with the ideas you like. Depending on the energy the other [stakeholders] will 
commit to changing something, you get to have a rather large influence when you 
draft."  
At the same time, the program units' influence on the evaluation objectives is 
bound by the evaluation framework consisting of evaluation criteria and 
evaluation questions. One desk officer in a program unit put it this way: 
"Evaluation questions are never radical questions. They are questions that very 
implicitly study the basics. …you are not supposed to go for a real investigation of 
the whole thing." Given the elaborate evaluation framework described above, the 
degrees of freedom associated with the formulation of the ToR are reduced in 
scope. One Head of Program Unit noted that writing the ToR and evaluation 
questions was "not a big task [for the DG], because…it is always about the 
effectiveness, the efficiency…-- I mean, [it] is a standard set of questions." 
However, in practice, the application of evaluation methodology varies across 
DGs, and evaluations depend on the experience of the staff in charge and the 
resources allocated to the evaluation. This was reflected to varying extent by the 
interviewees in the three cases.  
Overall, the control of evaluation objectives rests mainly with the program units 
within the scope allowed by the evaluation framework. The interviewees from 
program units perceived the margins of maneuver to be substantial in terms of 
formulating the questions and controlling the content of the evaluation, to be 
substantial. In the case of FP7 evaluation, which served the same purpose as a 
midterm evaluation, the evaluation framework did not play a significant role. 
Differences in evaluation practices exist across DGs according to tradition for 
evaluation and local practices. In DG RTD, it is common to contract academic 
sector experts, whereas other DGs usually contract evaluation consultants or 
country experts in the case of DG DEVCO. The evaluation framework is therefore 
not necessarily perceived to be a limiting factor in the construction of evaluation 
objectives, but just as much an aid for the program unit to ask meaningful 
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questions within the limits of what is possible in an evaluation. Therefore, 
program units retain a high level of control by means of the evaluations that they 
are also responsible for within the evaluation framework.  
On the other hand, evaluators, who also learned from the evaluations studied for 
this article, were almost completely without control of the objectives of the 
evaluation. Thus, the independence of external evaluators does not apply to the 
definition of objectives, issues and questions that the evaluation addresses. In all 
cases, evaluators had some influence on the methodology through their proposals 
and the initial kick off and inception phases, where the methodology was agreed 
with the Commission. However, the evaluation questions were fixed and only 
changed insofar as data was not available to completely answer the questions 
satisfactorily. Overall, external evaluators retain almost no control of evaluation 
objectives. 
Learners' control of the evaluation process 
The evaluation process is explained by the Commission’s evaluation guidelines 
and standards, and is thus a part of the evaluation framework. The latter stipulates 
how externalization normally takes place through framework contracts, where 
consortia compete for evaluation contracts. According to the Commission, around 
80% of evaluations in the Commission are externalized (Commission and 
Jacobsen, 2007). The competitors submit proposals on how they intend to carry 
out the assignment, and answer the evaluation questions specified in the ToR. 
Once the best bid is selected, the actual implementation starts with a kick-off 
meeting and an inception phase, where the methodology and timing are specified 
and where the Commission can ask questions about the proposal and the further 
intentions of the evaluation team. The external evaluators and the Commission 
Steering Committee typically hold between three to six meetings in order for the 
Commission to oversee the evaluation process. Throughout the process, the 
designated project manager from the program unit oversees, helps, guides and 
negotiates with the external evaluators on any matter necessary for the finalization 
of the evaluation. Over the course of the evaluation, the external evaluators write 
an inception report, an interim and a draft final report, before the evaluation is 
finalized. Normally, each report is presented to the Steering Committee that 
provides guidance and approves the progress of the evaluation. 
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The three evaluations in this study were implemented by external consultants 
(LIFE and IEE) or an external expert group (FP7). The evaluation process was 
managed by desk officers from the program unit in all three cases, and both the 
Steering Committee and program unit had some control over guiding the process. 
However, in practice, the external evaluators are independent and mainly in 
contact with a representative from the program unit. One external evaluator 
explains the relationship: “We went along doing the evaluation as we felt, and the 
major influence on how that evaluation would shape from the Commission side 
[was NN from the program unit]. The Head of Program Unit …had a lot of 
interesting things to say and was very helpful". This is a consequence of the 
externalized nature of program evaluations in the Commission, where the external 
evaluators work independently to answer the evaluation questions. The 
Commission respected this independence in the three cases and thus relinquished 
its control over the process. The interviewees from program units felt that their 
needs and comments were taken on-board, and at the same time the external 
evaluators did not feel pressured by the Commission to take findings in any 
particular direction. Interviewees from both parties described the evaluation 
processes in all three cases as good with a mutual understanding between the 
external evaluators and the Commission. One Head of program unit made the 
following remark: "To me it was an objective, impartial, professional approach 
that was adopted by the consultants. I do not think we influenced particularly the 
way that they did it." One external evaluator described the Commission's 
involvement in the whole evaluation exercise in the following way: "The 
commission made quite clear what they needed, but they were open in terms of 
how they were to get it." This quote illustrates the Commission's control and focus 
on the objectives and renouncement of control of the evaluation process. In all 
three cases, the external evaluators also perceived their role to be independent, and 
the involvement of the Commission in the evaluation process to be positive and 
constructive. 
Even though the external evaluators are in control during the evaluation process, 
several factors suggest that internal forces are also at play. First, the three cases 
show that the Commission retains some control through a well-guided and 
managed evaluation process, in order to steer the overall direction of the 
evaluation, secure timeliness and mitigate problems in the process. This is found 
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to be the case in a recent research on the evaluation system in the Commission 
(Højlund, 2014a). The number of times an evaluation report is scrutinized by the 
Steering Committee throughout the evaluation process does reduce the control of 
the external evaluators. Second, the external evaluator (the consultants more than 
the experts) depends on the Commission for future evaluation contracts, as the 
Commission is an important procurer of evaluation services. However, the data do 
not suggest salient support for this assumption of dependency and its influence on 
the control of the evaluation process. This is due to the fact that the Commission 
has an interest in keeping the evaluation independent, in order to secure its 
legitimacy and thus retain its usability in later policy-making (Højlund, 2014a). 
Overall, the external evaluators are in control of the evaluation process within the 
evaluation framework and the subtle control of the Steering Committee and the 
program unit's project manager of the evaluation. In turn, the program unit in its 
entirety has little control over the evaluation process. 
Conclusions 
This paper follows a learner’s perspective to ascertain who learns, and what and 
how learners actually learn from evaluations. Aiming to bridge the gap between 
the evaluation and policy learning literatures, this paper focuses on the multiple 
learners’ sense-making of their experience with the program evaluated within the 
frame of the evaluation framework. Taking this learners’ perspective means we 
start by identifying who the learners are before addressing the matter of what and 
how learning takes place. On this basis, our perspective makes a double 
contribution. First, it recognizes different types of actors who take part in an 
evaluation, and identifies empirically those among them who are learners. Second, 
it underlines the importance of understanding that evaluations are public 
administration activities designed within an “evaluation framework”.  
In order to understand ‘who learns’, our paper has identified four overall types of 
actors who are commonly involved in evaluations, and who are potentially the 
learners from evaluation. Those are: program units, external stakeholders, 
organisational stakeholders and external evaluators. Our empirical findings show 
that the learners are primarily program units and external evaluators. 
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Organisational stakeholders and external stakeholders are not reported as learning 
from evaluations to any noteworthy degree. 
As to the question of what is learnt from evaluations, our findings show that there 
are different responses. Some respondents indicate that learning is an overview of 
the program that gives a different perspective than its day-to-day implementation. 
Other respondents indicate that learning is a series of small-scale adjustments in 
the program as a direct result of the knowledge attained from the evaluation. Other 
respondents emphasize that learning has to do with policy change that is beyond 
the specific program. And last but not least, respondents also point to the learning 
of evaluation methodology as such.  
Most respondents indicate that learning is not taking place in a radical and 
disruptive way. Instead most point out that gradual and incremental learning is the 
norm. Somehow it is as if the outcomes of learning are not surprising, but 
expected. This brings us to our next finding, which has to do with ‘how’ learning 
takes place.  
Following previous studies (Mocker and Spears, 1982; Dunlop and Radaelli, 
2013) and our focus on the evaluation framework where actors are highly certified 
and the problems are highly tractable, we have focused on the extent to which the 
learners were in control of the evaluation objectives and processes. Our findings 
show quite clearly that, in the cases studied, the program unit retains control over 
evaluation objectives, whereas external evaluators retain control over the process. 
The European Commission has a standardized way of conducting evaluations, so 
that evaluation objectives are stated in the evaluations' Terms of Reference (ToR), 
prepared according to relatively fixed procedures. The program units draft the 
ToR, and they retain control over the specific learning objectives of the 
evaluation. However, organizational stakeholders monitor this drafting process, 
which somewhat limits the control exercised by the program unit. The process of 
the evaluation, for its part, is mainly controlled by the external evaluators. Again, 
the Commission standards, which define the specific evaluation framework in our 
three empirical cases, tend to assign control over the process to external 
evaluators, a process which is well defined beforehand by the evaluation 
framework combining the specific terms of reference and extended praxis in this 
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area. However, control over the evaluation process is also limited, as it is formally 
supervised by the organizational stakeholders. Turning back to the typology 
shown above in figure 1 of this paper, our empirical findings show that external 
evaluators are learners who learn instrumentally, because they have a very low 
control over objectives, but high control over the processes and means. 
“Instrumental” refers to the instrumentalization of the learning. In other words: 
“There is pressure to learn but the logic of discovery is relatively free in relation to 
the means” (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013: 613). Likewise, our findings show that 
program units are learning through delegation, with high control over objectives, 
but very little on the processes. This corresponds to a ‘delegation’ type of policy 
learning. “Here learners set their learning objectives autonomously, but are 
constrained as to the contents and means of learning. Here the shadow can be a 
resource used to organize the production and dissemination of knowledge” 
(Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013:613). 
Even in a highly standardized evaluation framework like the one in the European 
Commission, variations occur according to the nature of the program and the 
multiple views of the actors who participate in the evaluation. Different actors 
learn differently from evaluations, and in some contexts, like the ones examined 
here, the learners tend to be concentrated in two of the four types of actors 
engaged in evaluation activities. Furthermore, when asked the learners indicate 
different things about learning. Our data show that external evaluators are more 
inclined to learn about evaluation methodologies, and that program units learn 
about small-scale program improvements and potential policy changes.  
Nonetheless, tThese findings give rise to several other questions related to 
learning and evaluation. First, it is unclear whether these findings hold in other 
empirical cases of evaluation such as prospective ex-ante evaluation or impact 
assessment or retrospective regulatory evaluation, and if these findings from the 
particular evaluation framework of the Commission are also relevant in other 
organizations. Another open research question is whether learning at the level of 
organisational and external stakeholders would result in more path-breaking and 
disruptive learning. These are questions for future research, and the backbone of 
our plea for further scholarly attention to the link between evaluation and policy 
learning. 
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Appendix 1 – Interview guide 
Introduction questions 
Q1. What is your name, your unit, and your job description? 
Q2. What was your role in relation to the midterm evaluation? 
Learning from the evaluation 
Q3. Did the participants learn something from the midterm evaluation? 
Q4. Did you learn something?  
Q5. Did the midterm evaluation influence some changes of work organization 
around the program? 
Q6. Which participants learned most (and learned the least) from the midterm 
evaluation, and why?  
Q7. Were the findings of the midterm evaluation used afterwards? By whom? 
Q8. What could be done in the future to enhance learning from mid-term 
evaluations like this one? 
The objectives of the evaluation 
Q9. Which units and departments in the European Commission were involved in 
the design and planning of the mid-term evaluation before tendering? What were 
their relative roles? [OBJ CONTROL] 
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Q10. Who had most influence on the evaluation questions and the formulation of 
evaluation objectives? [OBJ CONTROL] 
Q11: Describe the interaction between the stakeholders during the design-phase. 
Who was the most active in terms of influencing the evaluation design? [OBJ 
INTERACT] [OBJ PRO-ACT] 
Q12. In your opinion, was the information and knowledge requested in the terms 
of reference and other objective-defining documents a sufficient starting point for 
the mid-term evaluation, or were there some missing aspects? [OBJ LEGIT] 
Q13. Describe your influence on the formulation of evaluation questions (ToR, 
inception- and interim report) [OBJ CONTROL] [OBJ PRO-ACT] 
Q14. Did the objectives influence the way in which the mid-term evaluation was 
conducted, why, how?  
The process of the evaluation 
Q15. Please describe briefly the evaluation process of the midterm evaluation of 
program XX. (Probe: Conflictual? Consensual? Collaborating?) [PROCESS 
INTERACT] 
Q16. Describe your role in the evaluation implementation process. Were you 
actively involved in the evaluation implementation? Why? [PROCESS PRO-ACT] 
Q17. Did you exercise some influence in the implementation of the evaluation? 
[PROCESS control] 
Q18 Did you exercise some influence in the definition of the methodology and data 
collection during the implementation phase? [PROCESS METHOD] 
Q19. Do you think that the process produced useful valuable findings? [PROCESS 
METHOD-LEG] 
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Q20. How would you assess the capacity of the Steering committee and the 
consultant/expert group to conduct the evaluation? [FRAME-LEG] 
Appendix 2 – List of interviewees 
Case-specific interviews (25) 
Interview number Case Interviewee function Interview date NVIVO Nodes NVIVO References 
1 FP7 Evaluator 19th June 2013 16 27
2 FP7 Evaluation function 20th 2013 25 65
3 FP7 Desk Officer 25th June 2013 16 27
4 FP7 Evaluator 5th June 2013 20 36
5 FP7 Evaluator 25th Jun 2013 18 40
6 FP7 Evaluator 25th June 2013 1 1
7 FP7 Evaluator 12th June 2013 21 43
8 FP7 Evaluator 18th September 2013 16 21
9 FP7 Evaluation function 20th June 2013 17 26
10 FP7 Evaluator 26th June 2013 20 43
11 IEE Evaluator 18th June 2013 19 38
12 IEE Desk Officer 19th June 2013 21 61 
13 IEE Desk Officer 2nd July 2013 18 50
14 IEE Management 31st July 2013 25 70 
15 IEE Management 31st July 2013 18 44
16 LIFE Management 20th June 2013 28 115 
17 LIFE Consultant 24th June 2013 25 67
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18 LIFE Evaluation Function 25th June 2013 22 58
19 LIFE Evaluation manager 8th August 2013 22 63
20 LIFE Policy Unit 25th June 2013 27 67
21 LIFE Management 5th September 2013 25 67
22 LIFE Desk Officer 11th July 2013 16 25
23 LIFE Evaluator 3rd July 2013 24 51 
24 LIFE Desk Officer 9th September 2013 23 43
25 LIFE Evaluator 27th June 2013 18 42 
Explorative background interviews (35) 
Interview number Organization Function
1 DG REGIO Evaluation function
2 Consultancy Evaluator and Commission evaluation trainer 
3 DG DEVCO Evaluation function
4 OECD (Formerly in a consultancy) Evaluator and Commission evaluation trainer 
5 Consultancy Consultant
6 DG DEVCO Evaluation function
7 European Parliament Member of European Parliament 
8 DG REGIO Head of Unit 
9 DG TAXUD Evaluation function 
10 DG INFSO/CONNECT Evaluation function
11 DG MARKT Head of Unit 
12 Secretariat General Evaluation function
13 DG INFSO/CONNECT Evaluation function
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14 DG DEVCO Evaluation function
15 DG BUDGET Head of Unit 
16 DG INFSO/CONNECT Evaluation function
17 Consultancy Evaluator and Commission evaluation trainer 
18 Secretariat General Head of Unit 
19 DG DEVCO Evaluation function
20 DG ENV Head of Unit 
21 Consultancy Evaluator
22 DG ENV Project manager
23 European Parliament Policy officer 
24 European Parliament Assistant to MEP 
25 European Parliament Assistant to MEP 
26 European Parliament Assistant to MEP 
27 European Council National Representative
28 DG ENV Head of Unit 
29 DG ENV Head of Unit
30 DG ENV Evaluation function
31 DG ENV Evaluation function
32 DG ENV Desk officer 
33 DG ENV Desk officer
34 Consultancy Evaluator
35 Consultancy Evaluator
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i The keyword 'institutionalism' resulted in two articles in ‘The American Journal of 
Evaluation’; eighteen articles in ‘Evaluation’; one article (plus two EES-conference papers) 
in the ‘Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation’; two articles in ‘Evaluation Review’. The 
keyword 'neo-institutional*' resulted in one relevant article in ‘The American Journal of 
Evaluation’; one article in ‘Evaluation’; the search engine could not make the search in the 
‘Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation’; no articles in ‘Evaluation Review’. All searches 
were carried out in ‘All fields’ signifying all searchable elements combined (e.g. author, 
references, title, abstract etc.).  
The four journals were sampled according to the following four criteria: The source 
should; 1) be peer-reviewed; 2) address the common evaluation community across 
sectors, methods and geography; 3) be searchable online; 4) be in English.  
Reflections on sampling methodology: 
I recon that the third sampling criterion might have a bias towards sources from the US and the 
EU, while the fourth criterion most certainly is biased towards the Anglo-Saxon world. I am 
unaware of peer-reviewed journals that are not published online, but that is of course not to say 
that they do not exist or are not relevant to this study. Also, it is likely that sources exist in Asian 
languages that I would be unable to read. However, I consider it more likely that debates in 
French and German have not fully been integrated into the 'mainstream' English literature. That 
is not uncommon in other fields of study such as EU-studies and at the EES Conference in 
Helsinki in 2012, I overheard at least one German colleague arguing in plenum that this was a 
problem. 
I acknowledge that there is a high probability that literature excluded from this review by the 
four sampling criteria contains information on the use of organisational theory in relation to 
evaluation use. However, I argue that the sample is representative of the mainstream literature 
on evaluation, which has its roots in the Anglo-Saxon world (notably the US). Therefore, 
previous attempts to integrate an organisational institutionalist framework into explanations of 
evaluation use should have been reflected in the sample if it had value to the general field of 
evaluation. Moreover, other reviews of the literature on evaluation use were examined and 
referred to accordingly in the article's page 6. One could expect that these reviews would have 
referred to sources containing institutionalist explanations of evaluation use, if these sources 
were relevant to the general field of evaluation. I am able to read and comprehend German and 
French, so that has not been an obstacle during the analysis of data in this article. Finally, I 
consistently refer candidly to the literature that I have come across, where organisational 
institutional arguments are used. That is particularly the case of Dahler-Larsen (2012).  
ii The literature on evaluation use and (expert) knowledge use have run parallel and 
crossed in many years, which makes sense since evaluation and (expert) knowledge use 
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are often the same. Therefore, I regard Boswell's (2008) study as a valuable contribution 
also to the understanding of evaluation use. 
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